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Debating Trade: The Legislative Politics of Free Trade Agreements in Latin America

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 October 2017

Fabian A. Borges
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Abstract

Stereotypes of Latin American legislatures as either rubber stamps or obstructionist obscure important cross-national differences. This article argues that the ability and willingness of legislatures to serve as counterweights to presidents are functions of their capabilities, electoral rules and the president’s powers. These arguments are assessed by comparing the legislative debates of free trade agreements with the US and accompanying legislation in Chile, Costa Rica and Peru. The cases reveal that legislatures with strong capabilities behave proactively, proposing their own policies that challenge the executive’s. If they challenge the president, congresses with weaker capabilities do so primarily through obstruction. Further, electoral rules shape the way legislators go about challenging the executive. Whereas legislators elected under personal vote systems take their cues from constituents, those elected under party-vote systems follow the party line. Worryingly, however, even a capable and motivated legislature may be sidelined by a powerful executive.

Keywords

legislaturesLatin Americatradepresidentialism
Type
Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 54 , Issue 2 , April 2019 , pp. 336 - 364
Copyright
© The Author(s). Published by Government and Opposition Limited and Cambridge University Press 2017 

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Footnotes

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Fabian A. Borges is Assistant Professor of Political Science at California State University, San Bernadino. Contact email: [email protected].

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