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Continuity amid Change: Democratization, Party Strategies and Economic Policy‐making in Mexico

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 February 2017

Kenneth C. Shadlen
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MEXICO'S NATIONAL, MID-TERM ELECTlONS OF JULY 1997 PRODUCED important changes in the country's political landscape. The ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which has dominated virtually all realms of Mexican politics since the late 1920s, suffered an unprecedented setback, losing its majority in the lower house of the Mexican Congress.

Though the era of single-party political domination appears to have come to an end, policy-making since the July 1997 elections has exhibited considerable continuity. Notwithstanding the opposition's new legislative majority, the will of the President, Ernest0 Zedillo, of the PRI, has prevailed on important issues of public policy. What can the continued legislative strength of the President, in the wake of significant opposition gains, tell us about the nature of democratization in Mexico?

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Articles
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Government and Opposition , Volume 34 , Issue 3 , July 1999 , pp. 397 - 419
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Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 1999

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References

1 For concise overviews of the 1997 electoral results, see Lawson, C., ‘Mexico’s New Politics: The Elections of 1997’, Journal of Democracy, 8:4 (1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; J. Klesner, , ‘Democratic Transition? The 1997 Mexican Elections’, PS: Political Science and Politics, 30:4 (1997)Google Scholar.

2 On transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, see O’Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986 Google Scholar; Przeworski, A., Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1991 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Haggard, S. and Kaufman, R., The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1995, chs 1–4Google Scholar.

3 See, for example, Hagopian, F., ‘Democracy by Undemocratic Means: Elites, Political Pacts, and Regime Transition in Brazil’, Comparative Political Studies, 23:2 (1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 See, among others, González Casanova, P., Democracy in Mexico, New York, Oxford University Press, 1970 Google Scholar; Molinar Horcasitas, J., El tiempo de la legitimidad, Mexico, DF, Caly Arena, 1991 Google Scholar. For references to Mexico as an example of a highly institutionalized authoritarian regime, see Huntington, S., Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968 Google Scholar. See also, Mainwaring, S. and Scully, T., ‘Introduction: Party Systems in Latin America’, in Mainwaring, S. and Scully, T. (eds), Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995, p. 20 Google Scholar, where the authors note that democratization in Mexico requires substantial ‘deinstitutionalization’.

5 This perspective should be contrasted with that presented in the early work on this topic by Guillermo O’Donnell. He suggested that democratization might be more problematic in military–authoritarian regimes, principally because of the destruction of civilian institutions, the militarization of society and the vacuum left on the military’s departure. See O’Donnell, G., ‘Introduction to the Latin American Cases’, in O’Donnell, G., Schmitter, P. and Whitehead, L. (eds), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, pp. 10–11 Google Scholar.

6 This observation is not intended as a comment on the degree to which civilian controls over the military are institutionalized in fledgling democracies. The point is simply that even in the best cases, where military subordination appears to be firmly institutionalized, at the end of the day military ex‐authoritarians retain the resources to protect themselves.

7 For an excellent analysis that places state violence in the context of the broader array of the Mexican state’s instruments of social control, see Hellman, J., ‘Social Control in Mexico’, Comparative Politics, 12: 2 (1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 This point was emphasized by Adolfo Aguilar Zinzer, at a talk at the University of California, Berkeley, in October 1996. See also, Bailey, J. and Valenzuela, A., ‘The Shape of the Future’, journal of Democracy, 8: 4 (1997), pp. 52–3Google Scholar.

9 Though electoral reforms are the principal focus of this paper, by no means are they the only political reforms being negotiated in Mexico’s transition. Other areas include reform of the legal and judicial system and a more comprehensive set of institutional reforms under the rubric of ‘reform of the state’ (‘reformas del estado’). In the same regard, it merits emphasis that since this paper focuses on electoral issues and party politics, the principal actors are found within this institutionally delimited domain. As a result, other forms of opposition, such as popular movements, anti‐corporatist sectoral organizations, indigenous groups and armed opposition movements are generally omitted from the analysis.

10 For analysis of Mexico’s various electoral reforms, see Klesner, J., ‘Electoral Reform in Mexico’s Hegemonic Party System: Perpetuation of Privilege or Democratic Advance?’, paper prepared for delivery at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 1997 Google Scholar. For more on reformism and adaptation, see Morris, S., Political Reformism in Mexico: An Overview of Contemporary Mexican Politics, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers, chs 3, 4 and 8Google Scholar.

11 Indeed, the PRI’s ability to thwart the electoral opposition with control over electoral institutions distinguished Mexico’s authoritarian—hegemonic party system from systems in other countries with hegemonic parties.

12 Thus, it was not just an electoral‐based regime, but, increasingly, an electoralbased transition, in which political parties were key participants.

13 Garrido, L., La Ruptura: La Corriente Democrática del PRI, Mexico, DF, Editorial Grijalbo, 1993 Google Scholar.

14 For analysis of the PRD’s development during this period, induding its strategy vis‐à‐vis the PRI, see Bruhn, K., Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico, University Park, PA, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997 Google Scholar.

15 This strategy caused tension with the PAN. Many PAN representatives boycotted votes on legislation negotiated between the party leadership and the Salinas government and eventually the critical ‘Democratic Forum’ left the party and allied with the PRD. However, the degree of defection was minor and the strategy went unchanged.

16 Craig, A. and Cornelius, W., ‘Houses Divided: Parties and Political Reform in Mexico’, in Mainwaring, S. and Scully, T. (eds), Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995 Google Scholar See also, Klesner, ‘Electoral Reform in Mexico’s Hegemonic Party System’, op. cit.

17 In January 1999, Raul Salinas was found guilty of the last charge, ordering the September 1994 assassination of the PRI Secretary‐General Jos Ruz Massieu. The remaining charges are still under investigation.

18 In two of these states, Baja California and Guanajuato, the incumbent governors were from the PAN, suggesting that voters were not rejecting incumbents in general, but specifically punishing the PRI.

19 One observer, citing the new IFE’s importance and autonomy, has referred to it as ‘essentially a fourth branch of power’. Lawson, C., ‘Mexico’s New Politics: The Elections of 1997,’ op. cit., p. 15 Google Scholar. The various dimensions of the 1996 electoral reform are discussed in Klesner, J., ‘Electoral Reform in Mexico’s Hegemonic Party System’, op. citGoogle Scholar.

20 A good comparison can be made with the national elections of August 1994, where the playing field remained quite uneven, even if the vote count was generally accepted as accurately reflecting the votes cast. See Cornelius, W., ‘Un balance norteamericano del proceso electoral mexicano de 1994’, Nexos (Mexico City), 202 (1994)Google Scholar.

21 Following the electoral formula included in the 1996 reforms, 300 seats were chosen by plurality votes in single‐member districts (SMD) and 200 seats were allocated according to proportional representation (PR). The final vote‐count gave PRI 165 SMD seats and 74 PR seats, for a total of 239. The PRD won 70 SMD seats and 55 PR seats, for a total of 125. The PAN won 64 SMD seats and 57 PR seats, for a total of 121. Of the remaining 15 seats, the Mexican Green Party (PVEM) won 8 and the Workers’ Party (PT) won 7.

22 Bailey and Valenzuela, ‘The Shape of the Future,’ op. cit., pp. 51–2Google Scholar

23 GDP growth of 7.1 per cent in 1997 was the highest since 1981.

24 For example, in a speech delivered at the Mexican stock market, the President asserted that ‘under current international financial conditions, the margins for prudent and responsible manoeuvring are very narrow and at times practically non‐existent’. ‘Zedillo reiterates call for conservative fiscal policy’, Associated Press, 17 November 1997 (Mex2000 e‐mail distribution list).

25 Excelsior, 19 November 1997.

26 SourceMex (weekly electronic newsletter), 8: 40 (5 November 1997).

27 Excelsior, 19 November 1997.

28 Duffy, Tim, ‘Chamber Session Highlighted by IVA Debate’, The News (Mexico City), 26 11 1997 Google Scholar.

29 Reforma, 12 November 1997.

30 Consistent with this approach, another element of the PRD’s budget proposal was a wage increase for public employees.

31 Reforma, 22 October 1997.

32 According to Francisco Paoli Bolio, leader of the PAN’s congressional delegation, ‘at no moment did the PAN either conceive or accept the election of July 6 as a vote to change economic policy. That is false!’ (La Jornada, 15 December 1997).

33 Indeed, at one point the New York Times (10 November 1997) quoted the PAN’s coordinator for economic affairs in the Congress assailing Zedillo’s budget on the same grounds as the PRD assailed it, pledging ‘to confront the enormous deterioration in Mexicans’ quality of life, and the vast breach between the haves and the have‐nots’.

34 The 1997 elections did not eliminate the PRI’s dominance within the upper house. Of the Senate’s 128 seats, only 32 were disputed in the 1997 elections; and the PRI retained a 59 per cent majority.

35 Francisco Paoli Bolio, Bloomberg Business Wire, 2 December 1997. Taken from Mex2000 e‐mail distribution list.

36 In fact, President Salinas’s commitment to reward the PAN provoked substantial resistance from within the PRI. At times the President had to intervene in local disputes to reward the PAN over the objections of the local PRI leadership – the most notable example being the 1991 gubernatorial election in the state of Guanajuato.

37 In retrospect, depressed oil prices forced the government to readjust both GDP and its revenue estimates throughout 1998. The budget was based on expected oil prices of US $15.5 a barrel, yet Mexico received an average of 10.2 in 1998. As a result, various budgetary cutbacks were announced by President Zedillo in January, March and July of 1998. Concerned that the President was exploiting the oil issue to bypass the Congress, opposition leaders announced that they would introduce a set of restrictions on the President’s ability to unilaterally adjust the budget. See SourceMex, 2 January 1998; 25 March 1998; 15 July 1998.

38 Excelsior, 15 September 1998. The motivation for this agreement was the concern, after Russia devalued its currency in August 1998, that the financial crisis would spread to highly indebted countries in Latin America.

39 See Proceso, 1147 (25 October 1998); Mexico and NAFTA Report (RM–98‐10), 27 October 1998. The rejectionist strategy produced tension between the PRD’s national leadership and Muñoz Ledo, the coordinator of its congressional delegation, who maintained that the PRD should participate in negotiations. In October 1998, Muñoz Ledo expressed his discomfort with the decision to stop negotiating and declared that he would seek the party’s nomination for the 2000 presidential elections.

40 Ortíz, who had left the Treasury Secretariat to direct the Bank of Mexico in January 1998, did not resign.

41 Just as the PRD’s rejectionism caused intra‐party tension, so too did the PAN’s willingness to enter into negotiations with President Zedillo, and many PAN deputies broke ranks with the party leadership and voted against the December 1998 banking legislation.

42 See the discussion in Schedler, A., ‘Hard to Observe and Hard to Believe: Mexico’s Veiled Transition to Democracy’, paper prepared for delivery at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA, 09 1998 Google Scholar (available on the internet at http://pro.harvard.edu/abstracts/12/1210ASchedler0.html).

43 See for example, La jornada, 13 October 1998 and 5 March 1999.

44 See Klesner, J, ‘Democratic Transition?’ op. cit., p. 709 Google Scholar.

45 In July 1998, for example, opposition representatives offered a quick and hostile reaction to the PRI’s proposal to reduce the Chamber of Deputies from 500 to 300 seats by eliminating the 200 seats allocated by PR. See SourceMex, 29 July 1998.

46 See, for example, Hagopian, ‘Democracy by Undemocratic Means’, op. cit.; Loveman, B., ‘Mision Cumplida?’ Civil–Military Relations and the Chilean Political Transition’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 33: 3 (1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

47 O’Donnell, G., ‘On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Post‐Communist Countries’, World Development, 21: 8 (1993)Google Scholar.

48 On this latter point, especially the lack of legal protection in the countryside, see Human Rights Watch/Americas, Implausible Deniability: State Responsibility for Rural Violence in Mexico, April 1997.