Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-4rdpn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-02T23:05:02.986Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Consensus and Parliamentary Opposition: The Case of Spain

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Alejandro Mújica  and
Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

It is well known that in developed democracies the opposition tends to cooperate with the government. Spain is no exception: around 70 per cent of all ‘organic laws’ (constitutionally significant bills that require a parliamentary majority to be passed) are approved with the support of the main opposition party. We try to explain the variation in the level of consensus in the first seven legislative terms of the current Spanish democracy. We show that there are three key variables: the balance of power between government and opposition, the nature of the institutional actor that first proposes the bill, and the ideological significance of the bill.

Type
Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 41 , Issue 1 , 2006 , pp. 86 - 108
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 2006

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Robert Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1966.Google Scholar

2 Klaus von Beyme, ‘Parliamentary Oppositions in Europe’, in Eva Kolinsky (ed.), Opposition in Western Europe, London, Croom Helm, 1987, pp. 31–2; Lawson, Stephanie, ‘Conceptual Issues in the Comparative Study of Regime Change and Democratization’, Comparative Politics, 25: 2 (1993), p. 203;CrossRefGoogle ScholarOreste Massari, ‘Natura e ruolo delle opposizioni politico-parlamentari’, in Gianfranco Pasquino (ed.), Opposizione, governo ombra, alternativa, Rome-Bari, Gius Laterza & Figli, 1990, pp. 32–3; Gianfranco Pasquino, La oposición, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1998, p. 41. Cfr. Stefano Sicardi, Maggioranza, minoranze e opposizione nel sistema constituzionale italiano, Milan, Giuffrè Editore, 1984, pp. 3–8.

3 Richard Rose, Understanding Big Government, London, Sage, 1984, pp. 84–5; Pasquino (ed.), Opposizione, governo ombra, alternativa, p. 15; Pasquino, La oposición, p. 63.Google Scholar

4 Cazzola, Franco, ‘Consenso e opposizione nel parlamento italiano. Il ruolo del PCI dalla I alla IV Legislatura’, Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 2: 1 (1972), pp. 71–96.Google Scholar

5 Tosi, Silvano, ‘Italy: Anti-System Opposition within the System’, in Rodney Barker (ed.), Studies in Opposition, London, McMillan St Martin's Press, 1971, pp. 153–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 Di Palma, Giuseppe, Surviving without Governing, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977, pp. 55 ff.Google Scholar

7 Rose, Richard, Do Parties Make a Difference?, London, Macmillan, 1980, pp. 80–1.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 Rose, Understanding Big Government, p. 85.Google Scholar

9 Ibid.Google Scholar

10 Thomas Saalfeld, ‘The West Bundestang after 40 Years: The Role of Parliament in a Party Democracy’, in Philip Norton (ed.), Parliaments in Western Europe, London, Frank Cass, 1990, pp. 77–8.Google Scholar

11 See, for example, the case of Bangladesh; Ahmed, Nizam, ‘Parliamentary Opposition in Bangladesh: A Study of its Role in the Fifth Parliament’, Party Politics, 3: 2 (1997), pp. 147–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

12 We can only calculate the percentage of consensus for all laws in the V legislature (1993–96): from data provided by Guerrero, we can deduce that 63 per cent of all laws were approved with the vote of the main opposition party. See Enrique Guerrero, Crisis y cambios en las relaciones parlamento-gobierno (1993–1996), Madrid, Tecnos, 2000, p. 163. On the other hand, Capo has shown that during the first four legislatures, the average number of positive votes for all laws was 214 (in a chamber of 350 members), the average number of negative votes was only 36, and the average number of abstentions was 15. We can reasonably infer from this that in order to produce these averages, most laws had to be approved with a high degree of consensus. See Capo, Jordi, ‘Oposición y minorías en las legislaturas socialistas’, in Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 66 (1994), p. 96.Google Scholar

13 Maurizio Cotta, ‘Parliamenti e rappresentanza’, in Gianfranco Pasquino (ed.), Manuale di scienza della politica, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1986, pp. 300–1.Google Scholar

14 Franco Cazzola, Governo e opposizione nel parlamento Italiano, Milan, Giuffrè Editore, 1974.Google Scholar

15 S. E. Finer (ed.), Adversary Politics and Electoral Reform, London, Anthony Wigram, 1975.Google Scholar

16 José Ramón Montero, ‘Sobre el sistema electoral español: rendimientos políticos y criterios de reforma’, in Juan Montabes (ed.), El sistema electoral a debate, Madrid, CIS & Parlamento de Andalucía, 1998, p. 40.Google Scholar

17 Rose uses a similar definition of consent: ‘consent is given to laws by the approval of Parliament’, see his Understanding Big Government, p. 90.Google Scholar

18 The Standing Orders of Congress, section 131.2, available at .Google Scholar

19 Pasquino (ed.), Opposizione, governo ombra, alternativa, p. 17.Google Scholar

20 Guerrero, Crisis y cambios en las relaciones parlamento-gobierno (1993–1996), p. 159. This scholar concludes that during the first four legislative terms, organic laws accounted for 15.5 per cent of all new legislation. We have extended his analysis to include the sixth legislative term and the figure is slightly lower, 14.6 per cent. These percentages are similar to those in other Western democracies, where constitutional laws represent between 11 and 22 per cent of all laws; see Rose, Understanding Big Government, p. 88.Google Scholar

21 Capo's formula is , where vf stands for the number of votes for the law, n is the number of MPs of the main party, v is the total number of cast votes, and N is the size of the assembly. If the index has a value of 1, the incumbent party does not obtain support from any other parliamentary group. If the index has a value over 1, the incumbent gets support from other groups: the more so, the greater the number. Theoretically, the index can have a value under 1, for those rare cases in which the incumbent party is unable to obtain a yes vote from its own MPs. See Capo, ‘Oposición y minorías en las legislaturas socialistas’, pp. 96–7.Google Scholar

22 See, among others, Joe D. Hagan, Political Opposition and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993; Lynn M. Maurer, ‘Legislative–Executive Relations in a Newly-Consolidated Democracy: The Case of Spain’, PhD dissertation, Columbus, Ohio State University, 1995Google Scholar; José María Maravall, ‘Accountability and Manipulation’, in Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes and Bernard Manin (eds), Democracy, Accountability and Representation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 154–96; Altman, David and Pérez-Liñán, Aníbal, ‘Más allá de la poliarquía: una aproximación a la calidad de las democracias’’, Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política, 11 (1999), pp. 83–105.Google Scholar

23 Palma, Giuseppe Di, ‘Disaffection and Participation in Western Democracies: The Role of Political Oppositions’, Journal of Politics, 31: 4 (1969), pp. 987.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

24 See Lipset y Rokkan (ed.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives, New York, Free Press, 1967, pp. 9 ff.Google Scholar

25 Klaus von Beyme, ‘Elite Input and Policy Output: The Case of Germany’, in Moshe M. Czudnowski (ed.), Does Who Governs Matter?, DeKalb, Northern Illinois University Press, 1982, p. 63; Barreiro, Belén, ‘Justificaciones, responsabilidades y cumplimiento de promesas electorales’, Revista Española de Ciencia Política, 1: 1 (1999), p. 167.Google Scholar

26 Belén Barreiro, Democracia y conflicto moral: la política del aborto en España e Italia, Madrid, Istmo, 2000; ‘Judicial Review and Political Empowerment: Abortion in Spain’, West European Politics, 21: 4 (1998), pp. 147–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

27 As the number of organic laws dealing with foreign affairs is quite limited (10 laws) we have been forced to create a single category combining issues, regional governments and supranational institutions.Google Scholar

28 See Berta Úlvarez-Miranda, Sur de Europa y la adhesión a la Comunidad: los debates políticos, Madrid, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1996.Google Scholar

29 These analyses are available on request.Google Scholar