Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 February 2014
This article examines how party competition has led to electoral reforms in Taiwan. Dissatisfied with the existing system, political parties in Taiwan promoted electoral reforms. The Democratic Progressive Party led the reform process and the Kuomintang collaborated with it to change the electoral system from a single non-transferable vote and multi-member district system to a first-past-the-post mixed system. Despite opposition to the changes, these two parties successfully formed a coalition and passed reform bills with the support of the public. Using a theoretical framework of actors’ rational choices, this article argues that the parties’ goals of maximizing the number of seats and strategic interaction led to electoral reforms, and that during the reforms, the provision that the first-past-the-post system would provide more seats in the Legislative Yuan was crucial for the two parties. The article supports this argument with evidence from interviews, biographies and documents.
Eunju Chi is a Research Professor in the Peace and Democracy Institute at Korea University. Contact email: [email protected].