Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-fscjk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-25T01:55:00.492Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Opposition Party Support in Africa: An Elite–Mass Analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Hennie Kotzé  and
Carlos García-Rivero
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

The existence of a healthy, respected and respectful opposition is a common feature of democratic politics. For a democracy to function properly, it needs an opposition to provide political contestation and electoral competition, thus limiting the power of the ruling party. In other words: no opposition – no democracy.

In this regard, Africa has a poor track record. During the 1950s and 1960s, euphoria swelled throughout the continent following political independence from colonial rule. These new African democracies, however, rapidly began succumbing to authoritarianism. Political repression, single-party states and military rule flourished, causing authoritarian forms of government to become the norm throughout the continent. Opposition parties were, and in many countries still are, severely restricted and have generally had little chance to be heard. This is especially so in the many single-party states, characterized by a lack of democratic experience and culture, which became prevalent in post-independence Africa.

Type
Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 43 , Issue 3 , 2008 , pp. 454 - 485
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2008.

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Field, G. L., Higley, J. and Burton, M., ‘A New Elite Framework for Political Sociology’, Revue Européene des Sciences Sociales, 28 (1990), p. 153.Google Scholar

2 Although the 2007 elections had the effect of returning Kenya to the ethnic confrontation and electoral fraud of previous times: results for the presidential elections were delayed and finally president Kibaki was declared winner. This gave rise to ethnic confrontation between supporters of Kibaki and his main opposition rival Odinga, that is still ongoing as this article goes to press, although a national unity government including both the leader of the opposition and president seems to be the final solution for a country with more than 300,000 people uprooted from their homes due to political violence since the election day.Google Scholar

3 Although most studies focus on the general public, the role of the elites in politics cannot be underestimated. There is an important debate about whether politics is the result of political elites’ interaction or whether elites are simply the reflection of structural and institutional changes. See R. D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Elites, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1976; M. Dogan and J. Higley, ‘Elites, Crisis and Regimes in Comparative Analysis’, in M. Dogan and J. Higley (eds), Elites, Crisis and the Origins of Regimes, Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, pp. 3–27. The importance of elites has been noted by R. Gunther and J. Higley, Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992; H. Kotzé, ‘South Africa: From Apartheid to Democracy’, in Dogan and Higley, Elites, Crisis and the Origins of Regimes, pp. 213–22 among many others. In Africa, elites have additional importance, not only in terms of steering their countries, but also in terms of their contribution to the development of civil society. In fact, ‘Africa's greatest contribution to civil society is the national conference … an assembly of national elites’ ( Bratton, M., ‘Civil Society and Political Transition in Africa’, Institute for Development Research Report, 11: 6 (1994), p. 6 Google Scholar), which generally meets to address any political crisis affecting the country, such as government corruption and the like. With regards to our definition of elites, it should be noted that although elites also form part of the ruling powers, we focus exclusively on those elites within the various sectors of civil society.

4 Support for a regime refers to the legitimacy of the regime; whereas satisfaction with the way a regime works refers to the efficacy of such a regime. Linz and Stepan distinguish between legitimacy (support for democracy) and efficacy (satisfaction with the democracy). See J. Linz and A. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, pp. 42, 223. As pointed out by Linde and Ekman, consolidated democracies need ‘support for the regime principles … as well as support for the performance of the regime’ ( Linde, J. and Ekman, J., ‘Satisfaction with Democracy. A Note on a Frequently Used Indicator in Comparative Politics’, European Journal of Political Research, 42 (2003), pp. 391–408 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 395, original emphasis).

5 We side with Bratton and define civil society as a ‘sphere of social interaction between the household and the state which is manifest in norms of community cooperation, structures of voluntary association, and networks of public communication’, Bratton, M., ‘Civil Society and Political Transition in Africa’, IDR Reports, 11 (1994), p. 3 Google Scholar.

6 This was the case in, among other countries, Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire. Others, such as Ethiopia, Liberia and Uganda did not converge into single-party states but succumbed to military rule. See Finer, S. E., ‘The One-Party Regimes in Africa: Reconsiderations’, Government and Opposition, 2 (1967), pp. 491–509 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and J. A. Wiseman, Democracy in Black Africa: Survival or Revival, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990.

7 Others also place emphasis on pre-colonial times and the difficulties of consolidating the state structure. See Herbst, J., ‘Migration, the Politics of Protest and State Consolidation in Africa’, African Affairs, 89 (1990), pp. 183–203 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and M. C. Musambachime, ‘Protest Migrations in Mweru-Luapula’, African Studies, 47 (1988), pp. 19–43.

8 The Zimbabwean independence war in the late 1970s serves as a clear example, although violent opposition can be traced back to the mid-1950s in southern Sudan. See Swart, G. and Hussein, S., ‘The Islamic Fundamentalist State of Sudan’, Conflict Trends, 2 (2002), pp. 43–8Google Scholar or H. Campbell, Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The Exhaustion of the Patriarchal Model of Liberation, Claremont, David Philip, 2003.

9 See Monga, C., ‘Eight Problems with African Politics’, Journal of Democracy, 8 (1997), pp. 156–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar among the many.

10 On coups in Africa, see S. Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa, London, Yale University Press, 1990.Google Scholar

11 See, for instance, Amnesty International, Zimbabwe: The Toll of Impunity, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engafr460342002, June 2002; P. Du Toit, State-Building and Democracy in Southern Africa. Botswana, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace Research, 1995; or Makumbe, J., ‘Zimbabwe's Hijacked Election’, Journal of Democracy, 13 (2002), pp. 86–101 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 R. Fatton, Predatory Rule: State and Civil Society in Africa, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1992, pp. 4–5.Google Scholar

13 Manning, C., ‘Assessing African Party Systems After the Third Wave’, Party Politics, 11 (2005), pp. 707–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 707; M. Bratton and N. van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transition in Comparative Perspective, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 8.

14 Clapham, C., ‘Opposition in Tropical Africa’, Government and Opposition, 32 (1997), pp. 541–57CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 548.

15 Sadiki, L., ‘Guided Democracy in Algeria and Egypt’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 49 (1995), pp. 249–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar; H. Amirouche, ‘Algeria's Islamist Revolution: The People Versus Democracy?’, Middle East Policy, 5 (1998), pp. 82–101.

16 In other parts, however, governing parties managed to remain in office for longer, e.g. KANU in Kenya, which only lost elections in 2002 or ZANU–PF in Zimbabwe, which is still in power.Google Scholar

17 Van De Walle, N., ‘Africa's Range of Regimes. Journal of Democracy, 13 (2002), pp. 66–80 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 According to Bratton and van de Walle, the 1989 elections in Namibia marked the beginning of the wave of democratization in Africa (Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa).Google Scholar

19 Manning, ‘Assessing African Party Systems’, p. 708.Google Scholar

20 Ibid., table 1, pp. 710–11.Google Scholar

21 Van de Walle, ‘Africa's Range of Regimes’, p. 68.Google Scholar

22 Ibid., p. 71.Google Scholar

23 Ibid., p. 72.Google Scholar

24 Ibid., p. 73.Google Scholar

25 Ibid., p. 77.Google Scholar

26 Bogaards, M., ‘Parties and Party Systems in Africa’, European Journal of Political Research, 43 (2004), pp. 173–97CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 175.

27 Van De Walle, N. and Butler, K. S., ‘Political Parties and Party Systems in Africa's Illiberal Democracies’, Cambridge Review of International Studies, 13 (1999), pp. 14–28 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, p. 15; M. Kuenzi and G. Lambright, ‘Party System and Democratic Consolidation in Africa's Electoral Regimes’, Party Politics, 11 (2005), pp. 423–46, p. 440.

28 Van de Walle, ‘Africa's Range of Regimes’, p. 78.Google Scholar

29 Bratton, M., ‘The Alternation Effect in Africa’, Journal of Democracy, 15 (2004), pp. 147–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar, p. 147.

30 Clapham, ‘Opposition in Tropical Africa’, p. 552.Google Scholar

31 Gyimah-Boadi, E., ‘Civil Society in Africa: The Good, the Bad, the Ugly’, Civnet Journal for Civil Society, 1 (1997), p. 2 Google Scholar.

32 Fatton, R., ‘Africa in the Age of Democratisation: The Civic Limitations of Civil Society’, African Studies Review, 38 (1995), pp. 67–99 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33 Clarke, H. D., Steward, M. C. and Whiteley, P., ‘New Models for the New Labour: the Political Economy of Labour Party’, American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), pp. 559–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also, A. Campbell, P. Converse, W. E. Miller and D. Stokes, The American Voter, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1960, pp. 121–2.

34 Campbell et al., The American Voter, p. 119.Google Scholar

35 Bartle, J., ‘Left–Right Position Matters, but Does Social Class? Causal Models of the 1992 British General Elections’, British Journal of Political Science, 28 (1998), pp. 501–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

36 The most commonly cited variables driving party support are leadership approval and economic evaluations. For some they act together ( Mckuen, M. B., Erikson, R. S. and Stimson, J. A., ‘Macropartisanship’, American Political Science Review, 83 (1999), pp. 1125–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar), but for others not ().

37 Brody, R. A. and Rothenberg, L. S., ‘The Instability of Partisanship: An Analysis of the 1980 Presidential Election’, British Journal of Political Science, 18 (1967), pp. 445–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

38 Franklin, C. H. and Jackson, J. E., ‘The Dynamics of Party Identification’, American Political Science Review, 77 (1983), pp. 957–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

39 Johnston, R. and Pattie, C., ‘The Strength of Party Identification Among the British Electorate’, Electoral Studies, 15 (1996), pp. 295–309 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, p. 301; R. H. Frank, Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions, New York, W.W. Norton, 1988, among others.

40 For a detailed literature review see H. Norpoth, M. S. L. Beck and J. D. Lafay (eds), Economics and Politics: The Calculus of Support, Ann Arbor, Michigan University Press, 1991. This is the main focus of the widely known Essex model. It basically argues that government support will rely upon how well-off voters think they are going to be in the following months or year. See for instance D. Sanders, ‘The Economy and Support for the Conservative Party 1979–1995’, paper presented at the annual meeting of the Political Studies Association, York, England, 1995.Google Scholar

41 Morocco's disputes with Western Sahara or Senegal's independence movement are clear examples. See Mohsen-Finan, K., ‘The Western Sahara Dispute Under UN Pressure’, Mediterranean Politics, 7 (2002), pp. 1–12 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; A. Maghraoui, ‘Marruecos, La Haya y el Problema del Sahara’, Política Exterior, 88, (2002), pp. 131–42.

42 See Liebenberg, I., ‘Consolidation of Democracy in Africa: Inhibitors on Civil Society’, African Security Review, 6 (1997), pp. 41–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

43 On this topic see, for instance, Herbst, J., ‘Migration, the Politics of Protest, and the State Consolidation in Africa’, African Affairs, 89 (1990), pp. 193–203 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

44 See W. Foltz, ‘Political Opposition in Single-Party States of Tropical Africa’, in R. A. Dahl (ed.), Regimes and Oppositions, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1973, pp. 143–70; M. Slaih and J. Markakis (eds), Ethnicity and the State in Eastern Africa, Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1998; C. Daddieh and J. E. Fair (eds), Ethnicity and Recent Democratic Experiments in Africa, New Jersey, African Studies Association Press, 2002; and A. W. Doane, ‘Bringing the Majority Back in: Toward a Sociology of Dominant Group Ethnicity’, paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, Miami, 1993, to mention but a few.Google Scholar

45 P. Norris and R. B. Mattes, Does Ethnicity Determine Support for the Governing Party?, Afrobarometer Working Paper 26, Cape Town, Institute for Democracy in South Africa, 2003, p. 1. See also D. L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985; and Horowitz, D. L., ‘Democracy in Divided Societies’, Journal of Democracy, 4 (1993), pp. 18–38 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

46 See E. Kaufman, ‘Dominant Ethnicity: From Background to Foreground’, in E. Kaufmann (ed.), Rethinking Ethnicity: Majority Groups and Dominant Minorities, London, Routledge, 2004, pp. 1–14.Google Scholar

47 On opposition in Africa see R. Southhall (ed.), Opposition and Democracy in South Africa, London, Frank Cass, 2001; or Kotzé, H., ‘A Consummation Devoutly to be Wished? The Democratic Alliance and its Potential Constituencies’, Democratization, 8 (2001), pp. 117–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar, among the very many.

48 Mattes, R., Gouws, A. and Kotzé, H., ‘The Emerging Party System in the New South Africa’, Party Politics, 1 (1995), pp. 381–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar, among others.

49 Norris and Mattes, Does Ethnicity Determine Support for the Governing Party?.Google Scholar

50 M. Bratton, R. Mattes and E. Gyimah-Boadi, Public Opinion, Democracy and Market Reform in Africa, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004. See also W. Cho and M. Bratton, Electoral Institutions, Partisan Status, and Political Support: A Natural Experiment from Lesotho, Afrobarometer Working Paper 49, Cape Town, Insitute for Democracy in South Africa, 2005; J. Pereira, I. Raimundo, A. Chikwanha, A. Saute and R. Mattes, Eight Years of Multiparty Democracy in Mozambique: The Public's View, Afrobarometer Working Paper 30, Cape Town, Institute for Democracy in South Africa, 2003.Google Scholar

51 For the full report, see H. Kotzé and C. Steyn, African Elite Perspectives: AU and NEPAD, Johannesburg, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2003.Google Scholar

52 See for instance, Kotzé, H. and Masutha, J. R., ‘Tracking Elite Opinions on Political Corruption in South Africa, 1995–2000’, Politeia, 21 (2002), pp. 5–24 Google Scholar; or H. Kotzé and P. du Toit, ‘Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Identity Politics in South Africa: A 1994 Survey of Elite Attitudes After Apartheid’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 2 (1996), pp. 1–17, to mention but a couple.

53 For information on the data and questionnaires see R. Inglehart, M. Basanez, J. Díez-Medrano, L. Halman and R. Luijkx, Human Beliefs and Values: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook Based on the 1999–2002 Values Surveys, Mexico City, Siglo XXI, 2004. See also http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org.Google Scholar

54 Again we would like to remark that although some elites also form part of the ruling powers, we focus exclusively on those within civil society. Therefore, we have excluded from the analysis those elites from the ‘politicians’ sector that support the ‘ruling party’, as they most likely form part of the state apparatus.Google Scholar

55 On elite composition see Dogan and Higley, ‘Elites, Crisis and Regimes in Comparative Analysis’. For the selection of the elites, an institutional or positional approach was used (see U. Hoffman-Lange, ‘Surveying National Elites in the Federal Republic of Germany’, in G. Moyser and M. Wagstaff (eds), Research Methods for Elite Studies, London, Allen and Unwin, 1987, pp. 27–47). It should be pointed out that this study does not claim to be a representative study of elites in the selected countries. It is only representative of persons in the top positions in the different sectors that were included in the sample in each country. In the South African case the sampling list was drawn up by the Centre for International and Comparative Politics, Stellenbosch University. In the case of the other countries the lists were constructed by research agencies in collaboration with experts on the politics of the particular country. The survey was quota controlled in terms of the societal sectors selected in the different countries.Google Scholar

56 The exact wording for the elites is: ‘It is generally accepted that political parties, political movements or groups have different policy positions. Which political party in [the country] best represents your views?’. The respondent is prompted to respond. No card is shown. For the general public, the exact wording is: ‘If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote? Just call out the number on this card. If “Don't Know”: Which party appeals to you most?’ Although not identical, we believe that both questions capture the same idea: the political party the respondent supports.Google Scholar

57 The indexes have been constructed with variables that clustered together in a factor analysis.Google Scholar

58 The exact variables, for the elite analysis were as follows: support for democracy, measured with an index consisting of two variables: agreement or disagreement with the following statements –‘Democracy in the country is too fragile to allow too many political parties’ and ‘All this country needs is one political party to rule’. The Cronbach's Alpha were as follows: for Uganda (0,7426), Zimbabwe (0,5161), South Africa (0,6801); satisfaction with democracy, ‘On the whole, are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in [the country]?’; support for free market economy was measured with the variable, ‘There are also different views on the role of the state in the economy. An important aspect is the extent to which the state should have control over the economy. Views on this issue vary from those who advocate total state control over the economy (‘1’), to completely free enterprise (‘10’); confidence in the economic prospects of the country, ‘How much confidence do you have in the economic prospects of [the country]? (‘1’) signifies no confidence, while (‘10’) signifies complete confidence; confidence in the state was measured with the following question: ‘I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?’ An index was constructed consisting of various state institutions listed under this question (Cronbach's Alpha in brackets). For Zimbabwe, the index included confidence in government, police, armed forces, parliament and civil service (0,8705); for Uganda, confidence in parliament, armed forces, the legal system, police and civil service (0,6936), for South Africa, confidence in government, parliament, armed forces, police, civil service and legal system (0,7635); confidence in civil society was measured with an index consisting of several civil society organizations. Civil society in Africa is often referred to as being characterized by heterogeneity ( Fatton, R., ‘Africa in the Age of Democratisation: The Civic Limitations of Civil Society’, African Studies Review, 38 (1995), pp. 67–99 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; C. Allen, ‘Who Needs Civil Society?’, Review of African Political Economy, 73 (1997), pp. 329–37. This heterogeneity is reflected in our data, and in some cases it was difficult to construct indexes (Cronbach's Alpha in brackets). For Zimbabwe, only ‘confidence in trade unions’ was used; for Uganda, the index comprised confidence in churches, the press, television, labour unions and political parties (0,5439); for South Africa, the index included confidence in the churches, press, television, political parties and in major companies (0,5663); respect for human rights in the country was measured asking the respondent: ‘How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays in [the country]?: a lot of respect for individual human rights, some respect, not much respect, no respect at all?’; income was measured directly by presenting a scale of incomes to the respondent. Ethnicity was measured according to ethno-linguistic divisions: South Africa (Afrikaans, Zulu, Xhosa, Tswana, English); Uganda (Luganda, Rutole – including Runyankole and Rukiga – Luo, Lusoga); Zimbabwe (Shona, Dbele). Ethnicity was introduced through dummy variables, with English being included as the reference category. Although it is commonly stated that ideology affects party support, we have opted not to include it in the analysis. Most studies dealing with ideology have been conducted in developed and democratic countries, mainly in Europe and North America where the left–right continuum is commonly used. However, the meaning of this concept in Africa is still to be fully analysed. Finlay and collaborators, for example, argued that the ‘stability and meaningfulness of the concept of Left–Right political orientation is to a large extent a function of the level of development of the country’ (). Indeed, even if the left–right continuum appeared as a factor in this analysis, the meaning of such a continuum in Africa remains uncertain (on this see C. García-Rivero and H. Kotzé, ‘Testing the Left–Right Continuum in Africa’, paper presented at the 2004 ECPR Joint Sessions in Uppsala, Sweden). Although interesting, the meaning of ideology and its effect on opposition politics in Africa is left for further research.

For the general public the exact variables and wordings were as follows: support for democracy was measured with the question ‘I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them? Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government’; satisfaction with democracy, ‘On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country?’; support for free market economy, ‘Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? (‘1’) means you agree completely with the statement on the left; (‘10’) means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between: government ownership of business and industry should be increased vs. private ownership of business and industry should be increased’; support for income equality,‘Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? (‘1’) means you agree completely with the statement on the left; (‘10’) means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between: incomes should be made more equal vs. we need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort’; confidence in state was also measured with an index including the following variables (Cronbach's Alpha in brackets): Zimbabwe – confidence in government, in the police, in the armed forces, in parliament and in the civil service (0,844); Uganda – confidence in the police, in parliament, in government, in armed forces and in civil service (0,819), South Africa – confidence in government, in parliament, in police, in armed forces, (0,774); confidence in civil society was measured through an index comprising confidence in the following organizations (Cronbach's Alpha in brackets): Zimbabwe – confidence in the environmental protection movement and in major companies (0,647); Uganda – confidence in the press, television, trade unions and major companies (0,764); South Africa – confidence in churches, the environmental protection movement, major companies and in the women's movements (0,628); respect for human rights was measured by asking the respondent ‘How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays in [the country]? Do you feel there is, a lot of respect for individual human rights, some respect, not much respect, no respect at all?’. Income and ethnicity were measured using the same categories as in the case of the elites.

59 South Africa provides a prime example of opposition party support being characterized by ethnic divisions. The IFP in South Africa, for instance, gains supporters mainly from the Zulu-speaking people of the KwaZulu Natal province. Malawi and Kenya are similar cases. In Kenya, the opposition was traditionally organized along ethnic lines and therefore divided. However, the opposition managed to win the 2002 elections through the so-called ‘rainbow’ coalition that showed that ethnicity did not seem to drive politics as strongly as before (see Herve, M., ‘Kenya: les elections de la transicion’, Politique Africaine, 90 (2003), pp. 56–77 Google Scholar). The results of the Nigerian elections of 1994 also bear witness to the weakening of ethnicity's influence. The northern candidate unexpectedly lost the elections against the candidate from the south, who had managed to get support from people of a different ethnic group in the north. In South Africa, it has also been shown that ANC supporters increasingly align themselves to the ANC due to socio-economic status rather than racial factors (see ).

60 Norris and Mattes, Does Ethnicity Determine Support for the Governing Party?, p. 16. See also García-Rivero, ‘Underlying Trends of Party Support in South Africa’.Google Scholar

61 As explained above, the 2002 Kenyan elections, which were won by the opposition ‘rainbow’ coalition, showed that other factors may play a more important role than ethnicity.Google Scholar

62 Norris and Mattes, Does Ethnicity Determine Support for the Governing Party?, p. 1.Google Scholar

63 In the case of the elites, this was also technically mandatory due to the small sample size for the individual opposition parties. We acknowledge that these parties are not identical, but the analysis of such an index nevertheless gives us a picture of opposition support as a whole in this country.Google Scholar

64 As noted above, support for democracy is related to the legitimacy of the regime whereas satisfaction with democracy is related to the efficacy of the regime, see Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, pp. 42, 223. Also see H. Klingeman, ‘Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis’, in P. Norris (ed.), Critical Citizens, Global Support for Democratic Governance, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 31–56; or P. Norris, ‘Introduction’, in Norris, Critical Citizens, pp. 1–27. In countries like Zimbabwe or Uganda that are not democracies, we mean by ‘support for democracy’, the support for the notion of democracy or the idea of a democratic government. By ‘satisfaction with democracy’, we mean the satisfaction with the way democracy is being implemented in the particular country. After all, the only ‘democracies’ citizens know in Zimbabwe and in Uganda are the current regimes they have.Google Scholar

65 Foreign donors decreased funding as democracy was already achieved. In addition, government imposes limitations on NGOs that receive foreign funding. For details on some of these restrictions in relation to funding from abroad see Wiltmot, J. and Caliguire, D., ‘Renewing Civil Society’, Journal of Democracy, 7 (1996), pp. 57–66 Google Scholar.

66 This is especially clear at the local government level where ‘institutions are almost indistinguishable from ZANU–PF structures’ (du Toit, State-Building and Democracy in Southern Africa, p. 130).Google Scholar

67 Since independence, land redistribution (due to the best land being in the hands of White farmers) was promised by President Mugabe. In 2000, to satisfy the demands of Black people unhappy with the government's 20-year delay in terms of land redistribution, the government incited land occupations by war veterans. During the occupations, ‘war veterans and ZANU–PF youth militia were widely seen using government vehicles, which supports the claim that their violent actions enjoyed state sponsorship’ ( Makumbe, J., ‘Zimbabwe's Hijacked Election’, Journal of Democracy, 13 (2002), pp. 86–101 Google Scholar).

68 Since independence, Zimbabwe has held parliamentary elections in 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2008. Although ZANU-PF emerged victorious in the first six, there were widespread allegations of fraud, violence and intimidation ( Sithole, M., ‘Fighting Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe’, Journal of Democracy, 12 (2001), pp. 160–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar). The major competitor of ZANU-PF was ZAPU, the other independence political party. In the 2002 presidential elections, however, the MDC (Movement for Democratic Change) leader Morgan Tsvangirai emerged as the most important opposition leader. During the first years of independence, Mugabe's regime continually attempted to dispel ZAPU influence in society, often using state agencies to achieve this goal. Events such as the detention without trial in 1985 of ‘more than 100 ZAPU leaders … [provides] evidence of gross abuse of human rights through the torture of detainees in the infamous Stops Camp at police headquarters in Bulawayo’ (P. du Toit, State-Building and Democracy in Southern Africa. Botswana, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, p. 132). In 1987, ZANU-PF forced ZAPU to merge with it. However, new opposition organizations such as the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and MDC appeared in 1997 and 1999 respectively. The governing ZANU-PF lost the Constitutional referendum in February 2000, providing hope that alternation in office could occur in the 2003 presidential elections. However, Mugabe once again won the 2003 presidential elections due to intimidation and human rights violations (See Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2004, London, AI, 2004). This has resulted in Zimbabwe scoring 7 on the Political Rights scale and a 6 on the Civil Liberties scale in the Freedom House 2002 report (the scales range from 7 (no freedom) to 1 (total freedom), (Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2002, Rowman and Littlefield, 2003). As this article goes to press, Mugabe has accepted the electoral victory in the 2008 parliamentary elections of the MDC, and in the first round of the presidential elections. The second round is still to be held. The MDC claims fraud and that they have won more than 50 per cent of the vote and consequently there should not be a run-off. A fraud in the second round of presidential elections could lead the country to a similar state to Kenya, where the fraud in the 2007 elections has given rise to riots, killings and refugees.

69 More than 50 per cent of the government budget comes from international donors. See Okuonzi, Sam Agatre, ‘Dying for Economic Growth? Evidence of a Flawed Economic Policy in Uganda’, Lancet, 364 (2004), pp. 1632–7CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

70 World Bank, The World Bank Group in Uganda: Country Brief, Washington, DC, World Bank, 2003.Google Scholar

71 On Ugandan human rights restrictions and violations see Human Rights Watch, World Report 2003: Uganda – Human Rights Developments, New York, Human Rights Watch, 2003; Amnesty International, ‘Uganda’, in Amnesty International Report 2003; or US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Washington, DC, US Department of State, 2002; Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2003, Berlin, Transparency International, 2003.Google Scholar

72 El Pais, 3 March 2006.Google Scholar

73 J. S. Migdal, State in Society, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 64.Google Scholar

74 Allen, C., ‘Who Needs Civil Society?’, Review of African Political Economy, 73 (1997), pp. 329–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar, p. 336.

75 It is argued that elites tend to be closer to the state than the public. They therefore adopt the principles emanating from the state and are better able to avoid the state's possible repressive capacity. By extension, they are less likely to reject the state than the general public. See Gibson, J. L. and Duch, R. M., ‘Elitist Theory and Political Theory in Western Europe’, Political Behavior, 13 (1991), p. 194 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

76 It should, however, be noted that regression analysis does not allow us to establish causality, i.e. do respondents support the opposition because they lack confidence in the state and have confidence in civil society, or do they lack confidence in the state and have confidence in civil society because they support the opposition? Further in-depth analysis would be necessary in order to comprehensively address this issue.Google Scholar