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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 March 2014
IN THE CABINET ROOM of RICHARD NIXON'S WHITE HOUSE THERE hang two portraits, one of Woodrow Wilson and one of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Report has it that they are the personal selection of the present incumbent, representing those of his predecessors whom he most admires. If so, they constitute an interesting choice, an unusual combination. Woodrow Wilson, in the type-casting of history, is a typical ‘strong’ President, the innovative leader who rules as well as reigns, the convinced mandatory of the popular will. Eisenhower, by contrast, represents a unique attempt in our time to recreate the ‘weak’ or ‘strict constructionist’ President of an earlier age, a quasi-monarchical head of state who does not seek to rule and does not claim for himself a larger or more authoritative mandate than that of his legislative colleagues. Moreover Wilson, despite his repudiation by the American people, saw himself as an active leader of his party, while Eisenhower, despite his landslide victories, thought it improper (or found it distasteful) to use the presidency as an instrument of party advantage.
1 The way for this had already been prepared by Johnson, when he appointed Sargent Shriver as a White House assistant to be in charge of co‐ordinating the work of existing agencies in this field – Agriculture, Labour, HEW.
2 In June 1970 George Romney was reported as saying ‘The key question that the President is going to have to answer is whether he is to have the White House staff basically responsible in policy areas and playing leadership roles, or whether the Cabinet officers are going to do it.’ He soon had his answer.