Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 March 2014
DURING THE 1990S, THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (IFIS) have gone beyond supporting free-market economics via the socalled Washington consensus which advocated primarily marketoriented reform, to adopt a broader notion of ‘good governance’ which includes political as well as economic factors. The World Bank's Development Report 1997; The State in a Changing World is a key document in explaining this new thinking. It lays out the desirability of democracy, the rule of law and effective democratic regulation alongside the market-oriented economic policies and fiscal orthodoxy which IFIs have long advocated. There is no doubt that governance matters to development and to that extent the Report is welcome. The Report also makes a number of worthwhile points about administrative good practice and reform. However some scepticism is in order too. This is because the Bank's notion of ‘good governance’ is too idealistic, insufficiently historically specific and over-confident in respect of what we do know and can know about the politics of development.
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