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Before and after the Italian National Elections of 1976

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Extract

THE ITALIAN ELECTIONS OF 20 JUNE 1976 HAVE BEEN COMPARED TO those of 18 April 1948. Nearly thirty years ago, the Italian electorate, under heavy international pressures, gave 48.5 per cent of the votes and an absolute majority of seats to the DC (Christian Democrats) desisively defeating the Socialist-Communist Popular Front which polled only 31.0 per cent of the votes as compared to their combined percentage of 39.7 per cent only two years earlier (though, in the meantime, the Social Democrats had split from the Socialists and carried with them 7 per cent of the electorate).

Type
Original Article
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 1977

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References

1 Two especially useful analyses have been written by Parisi, A., ‘Questione cattolica e referendum: l’inizio di una fine’, II Mulino, XXIII, May‐June 1974, pp. 410438 Google Scholar; and Marradi, A., ‘Analisi del referendum sul divorzio’, Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, IV, 12 1974, pp. 589644 Google Scholar.

2 For a more extended analysis along these lines see Pasquino, G., ‘Crisi della DC e evoluzione del sistema politico’, Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, V, 12 1975, pp. 443472 Google Scholar.

3 See the very important interview by Pansa, G., ‘Berlinguer conta “anche” sulla NATO per mantenere l’autonomia da Mosca’, II Corriere della Sera, 15 06 1976, pp. 12 Google Scholar.

4 The campaign of the DN was marred by the involvement of one of its deputies, Saccucci, in the killing of an opponent during a political rally. There are no scholarly analyses of Italian minor parties, but excellent articles have been published by A. Madeo, ‘II “caso Compagna” e i dissensi nel PRI’, ‘La sicurezza “paterna” della campagna del PRI’, and ‘PLI: cerca il rilancio nel voto degli incerti’, all in II Corriere della Sera, respectively 15, 16 and 17 June 1976, p. 5. p. 6 and p. 6. On the neo‐fascist party in general see the interesting, but not completely satisfactory, study by Rosenbaum, P., II nuovo fascismo da Saló ad Almirante, Milan, Feltrinelli, 1976 Google Scholar, and for two relevant case‐studies, see A. Cannizzaro, N. Jeracitano and G. Rossetti, ‘Reggio Calabria: inchiesta preelettorale’, and R. D’Amico, ‘Catania. Le elezioni del 1972 nella storia elettorale della cittáA nel secondo dopoguerra’, in Caciagli, M. and Spreafico, A. (eds.), Un sistema politico alla prova, Bologna, II Mulino, 1975, respectively pp. 253316 and 317378 Google Scholar.

5 See for instance the career of Antonio Bisaglia: through very hectic activity, he was elected president of the Small Farmers Association of his constituency, then, thanks to a very high preferential vote, he became prominent enough to be appointed Minister of Agriculture and was finally able to shift to the more important office of Minister of State Participations. See Pansa, G., Bisaglia, una storia democristiana, Milan, Sugarco, 1975 Google Scholar.

6 For an elaboration of these contrasts see Pasquino, G., ‘Ricambio parlamentare e rendimento politica’, Politia del diritto, VII, 10 1976 Google Scholar. An excellent analysis of Italian parliamentarians is offered by Putnam, R. D., The Beliefs of Politicians. Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1973 Google Scholar.

7 Spinelli had just contributed an essay ‘Una politica europea per la sinistra’ to the Progetto socialista, Bari, Laterza, 1976, written by intellectuals all closely identified with the Socialist Party.

8 In the presumption or expectation of acquiring governmental responsibilities, the PCI also appealed to some of its best regional administrators such as the presidents of the regional governments of Emilia‐Romagna (Guido Fanti) and Umbria (Piero Conti) and to many loyal experts.

9 See the brilliant essay by A. Pizzorno, ‘I ceti medi nei meccanismi del consenso’, in Cavazza, F. L. and Graubard, S. R. (eds.), II caso italiano, Milan, Garzanti, 1974, pp. 314337 Google Scholar.

10 The contrast between the Republican strategy for industrial restructuring and that of Umberto Agnelli (together with many DC sectors) is even deeper today. See the very perceptive article by Riva, M., ‘C’é un duello Visentini‐Umberto Agnelli’, II Corriere della Sera, 11 07 1976, p. 13 Google Scholar.

11 Generally speaking, Italian trade unions did not actively enter the electoral competition and few trade unionists decided to stand for Parliament. The exception was represented by the Right wing of CISL which campaigned for the DC, particularly vehemently in the South where its leader, Vito Scalia, was elected to the Chamber of Deputies.

12 For an assessment and an interpretation of the several surveys as well as an explanation of the reasons why they were off the mark, see Parisi, A. and Pasquino, G., ‘20 giugno: struttura politica e comportamenti elettorali’, II Mulino, XXV, May ‐June 1976, pp. 342386 Google Scholar.

13 This is also the prediction advanced by G. Sani in his excellent analysis of the regional elections, ‘Ricambio elettorale e identificazioni partitiche: verso una egemonia delle sinistre?’ and in his overall assessment of the various elections between 1972 and 1976, ‘Le elezioni degli anni settanta: terremoto o evoluzione?’, both in Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, respectively V, December 1975, pp. 515—544, and VI, August 1976, pp. 261—88.

14 See the evidence on the shifts in voting patterns in major Italian cities. I rely here also on a more detailed analysis offered by A. Parisi and G. Pasquino, ‘20 giugno: struttura politica e comportamenti elettorali’, op. cit.

15 As Tarrow, S. rightly pointed out some time ago in his Peasant Communism in Southern Italy, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1967 Google Scholar.

16 The devastation brought about by previous monarchist and Christian Democratic administrations is well documented by Allum, P. A., Politics and Society in Post‐war Naples, Cambridge, At the University Press, 1973 Google Scholar.

17 On this process see the perceptive analysis by Sani, G.. ‘Mass Constraints on Political Realignments: Perceptions of Anti‐System Parties in Italy’, British Journal of Political Science, VI, 01 1976, pp. 132 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 I have dealt with this problem in ‘II sistema politico italiano tra neotrasformismo e democrazia consociativa’, II Mulino, XXII, July‐August 1973, pp. 549—566.

19 See G. Sartori, ‘Rivisitando il “pluralismo polarizzato”’, in F. L. Cavazza and S. R. Graubard (eds.), II caso italiano, op. cit., especially pp. 205—215.

20 The abstention of the Socialists on the vote of confidence for Fanfani’s fourth cabinet ‐ February 1962 ‐ June 1963 ‐ supported by the DC, the PRI and the PSDI, opened the way to a full governmental involvement of the PSI.

21 See the very negative and harsh assessment of the government and of Communist behaviour by the pro‐Socialist daily La Repubblica: ‘Un voto gratuito per un governo incolore’, 5 August 1976, pp. 1—2.

22 The official position has been stated by Chiaromonte, G., ‘Il governo e il PCI’, Rinascita, 6 08 1976 Google Scholar: ‘we have not expressed our confidence in this government whose composition, by the way, does not please us in many respects… We will work… in order that this government will represent in some way a step towards those solutions of democratic unity which could truly lead the country out of the crisis and launch profound economic, social and political transformations’, p. 2.

23 Allum, P. A., Italy ‐Republic without Government?, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973, p. 250 Google Scholar.