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The ambiguous coalition in West Germany

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Gerhard Lehmbruch
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ON I DECEMBER 1966 THE BUNDESTAG ELECTED THE CHRISTIAN democrat leader Kurt Georg Kiesinger as head of a government formed by Christian democrats (CDU) and social democrats (SPD), by a majority of 340 (out of 496) members. The liberals (FDP), with 49 members, were pushed aside into opposition. For the first time since 1930 the social democrats entered a German central government, not as the result of an electoral victory but at the conclusion of an inner Crisis within the hitherto existing majority. The CDU whose prestige was badly damaged by this crisis continued to provide the chancellor. This helps to explain why some 60 members of the coalescing parties voted against the candidate. Public opinion oscillated between feelings of relief because of the end of a period of insecurity, and feelings of discomfort in view of an experiment which seemed unorthodox and hazardous. The disputes around the grosse Koalition (great coalition) thus revealed the ambiguity of conceptions of parliamentary government as they had developed since the establishment of the Federal Republic.

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Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , 01 April 1968 , pp. 181 - 204
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 1968

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References

1 The members for West Berlin, where votes are counted separately, not induded.

2 Cf. Schmidt, Gustav, Deutescher Historismus und der Übergang zur parlamentarischen Demokratie, Lübeck and Hamburg, 1964, esp. pp. 155–84, 212–20 (on the political ideas of Meinecke and Troeltsch)Google Scholar.

3 See, for example, Weber, Max, Gesammelte politiscbe Scbriftem, 2nd ed., Tübingen, 1958, p. 372;Google Scholar Thoma, Richard, ‘Das Reich als Demokratie’, in: Handbuch der Deutschen Staatrechts, Tübingen, 1930, vol. I, p. 195 Google Scholar.

4 This was helped by the evolution of the party system in the Laender. The CDU‐SPD coalitions, which (generally with the support of other, minor parties) existed in all the Laender, broke up successively, the last one (that of Baden‐Wuerttemberg) in 1960. Since then some Laender have seen the hegemonic rule of one of the parties; others (such as Bavaria, Northrhine‐Westphalia, Hamburg, Lower Saxony) an alteration of CDU‐led and SPD‐led governments. On the other hand, it was significant that the formation of a SPD‐CDU cabinet in Lower Saxony, in May 1965, preceded the crisis of the Erhard government. Since then the great coalition has been re‐established in Baden‐Wuertternberg, while in Northrhine‐Westphalia the social democratic backbenchers thwarted the party leaders' project to form a government with the CDU and pushed the christian democrats into opposition with the aid of the liberals.

5 The usual objection to this form of alternative government on a merely parliamentary (and not electoral) basis is that it might signify a sort of ‘merry‐go round’ without authentic political change. But while this objection may well be true for coalition reshuffling in the Weimar Republic or in the French Fourth Republic it overlooks the fact that in the Federal Republic the dominant party of the coalition would have changed, as would have most holders of ministerial office. This might well signify a major political upheaval.

6 SPD and FDP tried to circumvent article 67 by passing a resolution of the (negative) Bundestag majority demanding that the chancellor should himself put the question of confidence according to artide 68. This constituted an implicit vote of no‐confidence but was considered unconstitutional by chancellor Erhard.

7 The FDP ministers were not replaced, and chancellor Erhard stated his intention to secure a majority in parliament again.

8 According to articles 68 and 81, a minority government may legislate with the support of the Federal Council, but, leaving aside the question whether a sufficient number of Laender governments would have lent their support to such ‘emergency legislation’, the procedure would have supposed the consent of the Federal President who was known to advocate the formation of a great coalition.

9 In the absence of reliable empirical data we are reduced to conjectures which are based on more or less subjective impressions.

10 The CDU wanted to introduce majority representation for the elections of 1969. This was refused by the social democrats on the grounds that members actually sitting should not legislate on a question which concerned the eventual continuation of their mandate. Furthermore no agreement was made upon a specific system of majority elections.

11 These three personalities already tried during the Spiegel crisis of 1962 to prepare a great coalition, but at that time the SPD refused to follow Wehner.

12 Cf. Wildenmann, Rudolf, Kaltefleiter, Werner, Schleth, Uwe, ‘Auswirkungen von Wahlsystemen auf das Parteien‐ und Regierungssystem der Bundesrepublik’, in Scheuch, Erwin K., Wildenmann, Rudolf (eds.), Zur Soziologie der Wahl, Kölner, Zeitschrift für Soziologie tmd Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft 9, Köln and Opladen, 1965, pp. 74–112 Google Scholar.

13 See the article by Kirchheimer, Otto, in Social Research, vol. 24, 1957, pp. 127–156 Google Scholar.

14 Lohmar, Ulrich, Innerparteilicbe Demokratie. Eine Untersuchung der Verfasnsungrwirklichkeit palitischer Parteien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Stuttgart, 1963, p. 140.Google Scholar The author of this doctoral dissertation in sociology is a member of the executive of the SPD parliamentary party.

15 The Federal Constitutional Court, in its decision condemning chancellor Adenauer's attempt to establish a governmental television network, ruled that, as a consequence of the constitutional guarantee of liberty of the press, ‘all relevant forces should be represented in the bodies governing radio stations’. (Judgement of 28 February 1961, in Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, vol. 12, 1962, pp. 262 ff.)Google Scholar

16 These traits of the political culture are dominant in Switzerland, and play an important role in Austria. Cf. Gerhard Lehmbruch, Proporzdemokratie. Politisches System and politische Kultur in der Schweiz and in Oesterreich, Tübingen, 1967.

17 This point has been emphasized by Loewenberg, G., Parliament in the German Political System, Ithaca, N.Y., 1966, pp. 393–7.Google Scholar

18 Cf. Dahl, Robert, ‘Epilogue’, in Dahl, Robert (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, New Haven, 1966, pp. 395 ff.Google Scholar

19 For an analysis of the Austrian coalition system, see Frederick Engelmann, C., ‘Austria: The Pooling of Opposition’, in Dahl, Robert, op. cit., pp. 260–283; Gerhard Lehmbruch, op. cit Google Scholar.

20 The situation is different with the Swiss all‐party government: the Swiss tradition of the separation of powers can be – as has been demonstrated in the Mirage affair – sufficiently strong to counter‐balance the effects of the partisan solidarity of parliamentarians and members of the executive.

21 Cf. the articles by Kirchheimer and by Engelmann cited above.

22 For example in Bavaria, where the heterogeneous coalition of the Hoegner cabinet, consisting of socialists, liberals, Bavarian particularists and the refugee party, was held together during its existence (1954–1957) by a coalition committee in face of a strong christian democratic opposition. Formal written coalition agreements had already existed in the Weimar Republic.

23 See, especially, Adolf Schüle, , Koalitionsvereinbarungen im Lichte der Verfassungsrechts, Tübingen, 1964. On Austrian coalition pacts see Gustav Kafka, E., ‘Die verfassungsrechtliche Stellung der Parteien im modernen Staat’. in Veroeffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, Heft 17, 1959, pp. 53–102;Google Scholar Marcic, Rene, Die Koalitionsdemokratie. Dar oesterreichische Modell in, Lichte der Wiener rechtstbevretischen Schule, Karlsruhe, 1966.Google Scholar

24 In November 1967 the SPD objected to the demands of certain CDU leaders that majority representation should be introduced for the elections of 1969, on the grounds that such an objective had been fixed for 1973 only, and that this agreement could only be changed by formal negotiations within the coalition.

25 Kiesinger, as Erhard before him, at first showed a certain reluctance to accept this supplementary burden but soon had to acknowledge that the logic of party government, as it had developed since 1949, required him not to allow anyone to use the party machine as a rival source of leadership power. On the other hand, Brandt may have committed an error of judgement when he claimed for himself the important portfolio of foreign affairs; this task absorbs him more than his position as party chairman really allows.

26 In 1966 Helmut Schmidt renounced entering the cabinet because he failed to obtain the portfolio of first order to which he felt entitled. Barzel was, with Schröder, one of Kiesinger's rivals for the chancellorship; today he seems to have recovered from the disgrace into which he had fallen as a consequence of his manoeuvres against chancellor Erhard.

27 The first important reunion of these personalities took place in summer 1967 at Kressbronn, the chancellor's holiday resort on the Lake of Constance. It was then felt that closer contacts between party leaders would be necessary to improve the working of the coalition.

28 This was drastically demonstrated when the Bundestag committee on finance had to revise its own amendment tending to limit a supplementary income tax to a period of four years. The CDU members of the committee, who had voted with the liberals, argued in vain that they had not been informed of the ‘coalition agreement’ of 24 October, according to which the tax should be levied without any limitation in time. See ‘Widerstand im Finanzausschuss gegen die Regierung’, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 November 1967 (D‐Ausgabe), where the correspondent speaks of ‘the coalition committee’. (This is inexact insofar as the agreement was made by an ad boc meeting of party leaders.)

29 See, e.g., ‘Armes Parlament’, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 December 1967.

30 . The Chancellor himself manifested his irritation when Helmut Schmidt insisted in public declarations on the subordination of government to parliament.

31 . In February 1967 the SPD objected to the government's decision to raise unemployment compensation by ten per cent and demanded a rise of twenty per cent. In a new coaliation bargain with Barzel and the cabinet a compromise resulted which raised the compensation by fifteen per cent. At the end of 1967 it became evident that the compromise worked out in the cabinet on constitutional amendments for the state of emergency had no chance of passing in parliament without important modifications taking into account the strong objections of SPD members. In January 1968 the government's project to impose taxes and dirigistische restrictions on private long distance motor traffic (proposed by the SPD Minister of Traffic Leber) met with strong opposition within the CDU parliamentary party; a counter‐project was proposed by christian democratic spokesmen.

32 . On this subject, see Domes, Jürgen, Mehrbeitsfraktion und Bundesregierung. Aspekte des Verhältnisse der Fraktion der CDU/CSU im zweiten und dritten Deutscen Bundestag zum Kabinett Adenauer, Köln and Opladen, 1964.Google Scholar

33 This agency is perhaps the most ‘politicized’ administrative body within the federal government. Consequently, the SPD demanded the position of deputy speaker of the government; but it nominated Konrad Alders, once the principal defendant in the Spiegel affair, who was not a member of the party. In January 1968 the SPD demanded the post of deputy chief of the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst), a post it has held for a long time in the Bundesamt für Verfassungrschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) which fulfils the functions of a ‘political police’.

34 It should be added that there are rather few candidates available in the ranks of the SPD who are qualified for top positions in the federal administration. Qualified younger party members have generally preferred to enter the civil service of the Laender or municipalities governed by SPD majorities to the rather modest chances of a career at Bonn. Thus, when Klaus Schütz left his post of permanent secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which he had held since the forming of the coalition) in order to become mayor of West Berlin, his successor was a diplomat without party ties, Mr Duckwitz, for no suitable SPD member could be found.

35 For a critical analysis of this transformation see Narr, Wolf Dieter, CDUSPD. Programme and Praxis seit 1945, Stuttgart, 1966.Google Scholar

36 On the Austrian case see: Secher, Herbert P. “Representative Democracy” or “Chamber State”: The Ambiguous ‘Role of Interest Groups in Austrian Politics’, in Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 13, 1960, pp. 890–909.Google Scholar

37 On the economic policy of the great coalition see Hartwick, Hans‐Hermann, ‘Konturen einer neuen Politik. Ein Jahr Grosse Koalition’ in Zeitschrift für Politik, Band XIV, 1961, pp. 428–58.Google Scholar

38 Recognition of the GDR for instance.

39 Opinion polls indicate an increasing agreement with a more accommodating attitude towards East Germany. And it is significant that many papers have abandoned the prevalent label ‘Soviet Occupation Zone’ in favour of the term ‘German Democratic Republic’ which had been taboo for a long time.

40 Establishment of diplomatic relations with Hungary, which seemed imminent, as well as with Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, has apparently been blocked by strong pressures from East Berlin and Moscow.

41 The apprehension of conservative christian democrats that the more flexible attitude of the great coalition might lead to a progressive ‘selling out’ of traditional diplomatic positions is probably justified. If a majority of East German communist leaders fail to perceive these dynamic aspects of the present situation this is probably due to the ideological outlook of this elite group: having been raised in the tradition of conspiratorial societies, the older elements of party leadership are unable to understand the character of the political process within a system which cannot be sufficiently explained in terms of Leninist class theory. (This aspect has been stressed in the recent study of Peter Christian Ludz, Parteielite ins Wandel. Funktionsaufbau, Sozialstruktur und Ideologie der SED Führung. Erne empirisch‐systematische Untersuchung, Köln and Opladen, 1968.)

42 One may doubt whether the discussion on constitutional emergency powers, which had hitherto taken place in the privacy of ‘expert talks’, would have been given public hearings in committee of the Bundestag if the existence of a FDP counter‐project and the tenacious opposition of trade union spokesmen had not put strong pressure on the social democratic leadership.

43 The political ideas of the student protest movements are largely derived from the Marxist‐Freudian social philosophy of Herbert Marcuse. Its ‘Maoist’ aspects seem to be more a matter of ‘style’ than of ideology or platform.

44 This emerges from opinion polls and is acknowledged by the NPD leaders who insist on their respect for the rules of the democratic game – an attitude dictated not only by fear of a possible interdiction by the Federal Constitutional Court but obviously also by the fact that many electors with authoritarian opinions nevertheless continue to believe in these rules.

45 This argument follows the hypotheses developed by Erwin K. Scheuch as a result of his research on extreme rightist movements and, in particular, the NPD. See: Erwin Scheuch, K., unter Hans, Mitarbeit von Klingemann, D., ‘Theorie des Rechtsradikalismus in westlichen Industriegesellschaften ’Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts‐ und Gesellschaftspolitik, 12. Jahr 1967, pp. 11–29.Google Scholar

46 Among the elements causing this insecurity the most important are probably the fading away of hopes that West Germany might find its place within a European supranational unit (hopes that had been a surrogate for the discredited German national idea) and the cauchemar des alliances resulting from increasing US‐Soviet co‐operation. This led to a loss of confidence in the solidarity of the Westetn powers and accounts for the increasing attraction of Gaullist arguments among the West German elite. They failed to grasp that the French fiction of an independent national policy rests upon particular conditions which do not exist in the case of Germany and that the range of international activity of the Federal Republic is severely restricted.

47 For example if the evolution of US‐Soviet relations led to an increasing isolation of West Germany.

48 Prospects of electoral reform remain uncertain because majority representation in its classical form would work to the disadvantage of incumbent deputies in both parties – christian democrats in urban areas, social democrats in catholic rural districts, and so on. While the CDU could expect to gain an absolute majority in 1969 with such a system, the SPD has more interest in postponing the reform until 1973 and continuing the coalition until then. This follows from the assumption of SPD leaders that the party's chances would be sensibly ameliorated by a period of participation in government which they hope would dispel the apprehensions of middle class voters.