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Accountability and Patterns of Alternation in Pluralitarian, Majoritarian and Consensus Democracies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2013

Krister Lundell
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Abstract

One of the core values in a democracy is the possibility for citizens to bring about alternation in power if they disapprove of the governmental policy. This article examines patterns of alternation and the degree of accountability in three different democratic systems: pluralitarian (characterized by a two-party system), majoritarian (moderately fragmented party system) and consensus (very fragmented party system) democracies. The extent of non-alternation as well as wholesale alternation decreases as we move from pluralitarian to majoritarian and further on to consensus democracy. When alternation is related to election results, majoritarian systems are the most responsive ones, whereas consensus systems generate the lowest degree of accountability.

Type
Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 46 , Issue 2 , 2011 , pp. 145 - 167
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2011.

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37 All data used in the article may be obtained from the author upon request.

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