Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 June 2018
Ordinarily, militant democracy is about restricting the rights of those who threaten to overthrow the very democracy that guarantees these rights. Hence, militant democracy permits the defence of democracy by disarming its opponents. Turkey’s recent constitutional reform, which arguably is a move away from liberal democracy, forces militant democracy to face up to its transnational application. Can we use militant democracy’s tools to defend not our own, but another democracy? Maybe we can and even should. This article examines the two transnational manifestations of militant democracy. The first is ‘transnational democracy gone militant’, epitomised by the European Union (EU)’s power to enforce liberal democratic standards in its Member States. The second is ‘militant democracy gone transnational’. This manifestation permits treating people rallying in the EU to attack democracy abroad in the same manner in which we are permitted to treat opponents of ‘our own’ democracy. As long as we are dealing with members of the Council of Europe (CoE), the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) gives us the instruments we need. Generally, militant democracy is a militant liberal democracy, which is not neutral towards itself, but is also an opponent of every system that is antithetical to it.
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