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Traditional empire–modern state hybridity: Chinese tianxia and Westphalian anarchy1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2017

HUNG-JEN WANG
HUNG-JEN WANG*
Affiliation:
National Cheng-Kung University, Taiwan (R.O.C.)
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract:

Individual relationships between Mainland China and Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan are considered confusing for some because China’s rising international power is not resulting in stronger calls for a shared identity based on ‘Chinese pride’ or historical links. Instead, China’s economic growth appears to be provoking increasingly stronger calls for autonomy or independence. In this article I discuss why Beijing’s self-described peace and development policy is failing to procure positive responses in those four regions, with a primary focus on the failed use of narrowly-defined Westphalian thinking to understand relevant issues. I argue that the reason for this failure is the tension between the individualist ontology underlying modern international politics (as expressed in terms of Westphalian sovereignty) and the relational ontology underpinning a traditional Chinese politics built upon a tianxia (‘all-under-heaven’) world view. This tension has become conspicuous in the context of China’s recent rise and Beijing’s growing confidence in contesting Western power. The Chinese leadership’s reliance on arguments involving historical connections with Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan, and calls for autonomy or independence from citizens living in those four areas, are examples of this contestation.

Keywords

China’s riseindependencesovereigntytianxiaunilateralism
Type
Special Issue: Independence in a World of Intersecting Legal and Political Regimes
Information
Global Constitutionalism , Volume 6 , Issue 2 , July 2017 , pp. 298 - 326
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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Footnotes

1

The author wishes to express his appreciation for comments from two anonymous reviewers regarding outdated and missing information in the four cases under study here. The author also appreciates the funding from the Ministry of Science and Technology, R. O. C. (Taiwan), Project No. MOST 104-2410-H-006-002-MY2.

References

2 Although a comprehensive investigation of other cases involving minority groups would have value, in this article I do not address the situations in the Guangxi Zhuang and Mongol autonomous regions due to manuscript length considerations. Further, there is a much larger body of information on Xinjiang and Tibet (and, of course, Taiwan and Hong Kong) than on Guangxi Zhuang and Inner Mongolia in the official Chinese media.

3 Shih, CY, China’s Nation Problems (Wunan Publisher, Taipei, 1999).Google Scholar

4 Ibid.

5 According to Xi, the Chinese Dream means rejuvenating China by making it prosperous and strong, thereby restoring happiness to the Chinese people. Although unspoken, the Chinese Dream assumes the inclusion of Tibet, Xinjiang and Hong Kong, and at some time in the future, Taiwan. See Xi, JP, The Governance of China (Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 2014) 35–6.Google Scholar

6 According to international relations theory, states facing external threats have at least two choices: establishing alliances with other states in order to balance them, or making an alliance with the major external threat in order to achieve self-security. While balancing seems to have been the preferred strategy for most of history, bandwagoning has long been perceived as a viable option in cases of weak states being threatened by a great power. See Walt, S, The Origins of Alliance (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1987) 17–21, 27–32.Google Scholar

7 Some see scholarly considerations of tianxia thinking as evidence of a failed peaceful world paradigm, and criticise it as ‘a euphemism for Chinese hegemony’. See Dreyer, JT, ‘The “Tianxia Trope”: Will China Change the International System?’ (2015) 24(96) Journal of Contemporary China 1015CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The same group of ‘Chinese hegemony’ analysts view tianxia and Westphalian thinking as two competing principles with the same ontological goal of increasing a nation state’s power or national interests. In this article, however, I describe tianxia and Westphalian thinking as two separate ontologies.

8 Chih-yu Shih and Chiung-chiu Huang describe ‘balance of relationship’ (BoR) as a Chinese doctrine that considers stable bilateral relations as more important than immediate gains. However, BoR is not the same as pacifism, since Chinese benevolence can be renounced when deemed necessary to restore a desirable connection. See Shih, CY and Huang, CC, ‘China’s Quest for Grand Strategy: Power, National Interest, or Relational Security?’ (2015) 8(1) Chinese Journal of International Politics 1.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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12 For example, Hong Kong’s interpretation of the policy emphasises the ‘two-system’ idea, while the KMT party in Taiwan is more concerned about political legitimacy as the true representative government of all China.

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43 Participants in the September 2014 ‘Umbrella Revolution’ in Hong Kong described their demonstration as a civil disobedience campaign. Their main claim was that they were fighting for freedoms and democratic processes promised by the Chinese government under a ‘one country, two systems’ policy that is supposed to guarantee a significant level of autonomy for 50 years. I regard the movement as emphasising institutional autonomy rather than national identity in terms of pursuing statehood, which is a central issue in the Taiwan situation. See Beech, H, ‘Hong Kong Stands up’ Time Magazine (Asia edition) (3 October 2014) available at <http://time.com/3453736/hong-kong-stands-up/>.Google Scholar

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65 An increasing number of Hong Kong residents, especially below the age of 30, are expressing dissatisfaction with Beijing’s manipulation of Hong Kong government personnel and interventions into Hong Kong politics. The Umbrella Movement protests in 2014 are only one example. These individuals are especially angry about Beijing’s insistence on choosing all candidates for the 2017 Chief Executive election. The protestors view this as interfering with the right of self-governance implied by the ‘one China, two systems’ principle (see ‘Pro-Democracy Group Shifts to Collaborate with Students Protesters in Hong Kong’ New York Times (27 September 2014) available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/28/world/asia/pro-democracy-protest-in-hong-kong.html?_r=0>). However, from Beijing’s point of view, the election proposals issued by the Chinese government are the same as those for elections of the National People’s Congress and the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference – two examples of ‘democratic centralism’ (see Yang, LK and Yan, J, ‘Democratic Centralism and CCP’s Organizational Morphology: Analysis Based on Ecological Adaptation’ (2016) 2 Socialism Studies 80–5).Google Scholar

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68 Discussions of how Chinese people feel about the negative opinions expressed by Hong Kong residents can be found on many website forums. See, for example, a summary of such comments in ‘Hong Kong People in the Eyes of Mainlanders’ Independent Media Hong Kong (19 December 2013) available at <http://www.inmediahk.net/node/1019683>.

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