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Global constitutionalism reconfigured through a regional lens
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 September 2021
Abstract
This article examines how global constitutional norms are received and reconfigured by South Asian judiciaries. It makes two central claims. First, it argues that India, as the largest state in the region, acts as a filter through which Bangladesh and Sri Lanka receive both structural and rights-based global norms. Second, it contends that Bangladeshi and Sri Lankan courts adopt distinct approaches to the Indian case law. While Bangladesh mostly converges with the Indian jurisprudence, Sri Lanka engages with it but does not wholly adopt its conclusions. The article puts forward a preliminary explanation for these distinct approaches based on differences in the constitutional structures and political histories of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka vis-à-vis India.
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- © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
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102 Ibid.
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128 Constitution of Sri Lanka (1978) Art 17 (emphasis added).
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132 Ibid.
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