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European exceptionalism?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 September 2013

GEORG NOLTE  and
HELMUT PHILIPP AUST
GEORG NOLTE*
Affiliation:
Humboldt University Berlin, Unter den Linden 9, D-10099 Berlin, Germany
HELMUT PHILIPP AUST*
Affiliation:
Humboldt University Berlin, Unter den Linden 9, D-10099 Berlin, Germany
*
*Email: [email protected]; [email protected]
*Email: [email protected]; [email protected]
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Abstract

The paper discusses recent propositions that, after a period of ‘American exceptionalism’, forms of ‘European exceptionalism’ are now emerging. The paper first asks what makes a political entity ‘exceptionalist’. For this purpose inspiration is sought in the defining features of ‘American exceptionalism’. The paper then discusses whether ‘Europe’ displays comparable features in the fields of international legal policy and domestic rights culture. It also asks whether there are other aspects of European governance which could make it plausible to speak of a European exceptionalism. The paper concludes that it is misleading to use the term ‘European exceptionalism’ because the underlying phenomena are not comparable with what is usually understood as ‘American exceptionalism’.

Keywords

constitutional culturedouble standardsEuropean exceptionalismexemptionalisminternational law
Type
Research Article
Information
Global Constitutionalism , Volume 2 , Issue 3 , November 2013 , pp. 407 - 436
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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References

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27 See, however, for critical views Economides and Kolliopoulos (n 23) 299–300 as well as the ILC Fragmentation Report (n 23) para 294: ‘From the perspective of other treaty parties, the use of disconnection clause (sic) might create double standards, be politically incorrect or just confusing.’

28 Licková (n 5) 489.

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33 Commission v Sweden, Case C-205/06, 2009 ECR I-1335; Commission v Austria, Case C-118-07, 2009 ECR I-1301; Commission v Finland, Case C-118/07, ECR 2009 I-10889.

34 Commission v Sweden, Case C-205/06, 2009 ECR I-1335, para 37.

35 The Commission apparently does not seek a renegotiation of all existing member states’ BITs but rather confines this requirement to those agreements which it considers to include provisions incompatible with EU law; see Cremona, M, ‘Member States Agreements as European Union Law’ in Cannizzaro, E, Palchetti, P and Wessel, RA (eds), International Law as Law of the European Union (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2012) 291, 321–2.Google Scholar

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45 Bradford and Posner (n 5) 52.

46 B Fassbender, ‘The Better Peoples of the United Nations? Europe’s Practice and the United Nations’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 857, 870.

47 Scheffer (n 20) 221.

48 See de Búrca (n 5) 690–1.

49 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, Nicaragua v United States, ICJ Rep 1986, 14, para 186.

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53 Presidency Conclusions, Brussels Council of the European Union (29–30 October 2009), para 40.

54 Regulation (EU) No 1168/2011 (25 October 2011) OJ (L 304) 1.

55 Frontex Press Release (18 June 2008), available at <http://www.frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-unhcr-reinforced-cooperation-a0Yf4h> accessed 13 January 2013.

56 Letter of the European Ombudsperson (6 March 2012), Case: OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ, available at <http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/correspondence.faces/en/11316/html.bookmark> accessed 13 January 2013.

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64 See art 59, para 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights as amended by art 17 of Additional Protocol No 14, May 13 2004 (entry into force 1 June 2010), ETS No 194.

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71 See European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the Existing Mechanisms to Review the Compatibility with Human Rights Standards of Acts by UNMIK and EULEX in Kosovo, adopted 17–18 December 2010, CDL-AD(2010)051, para 17.

72 Ibid 13 with fn 17.

73 Ibid.

74 Cf the heated debate in the aftermath of European Court of Human Rights, Agim Behrami and Bekir Behrami v France/Ruzhdi Saramati v France, Germany and Norway, App Nos 71412/01 and 78166/01, Decision of the Grand Chamber of 2 May 2007 on the scope of accountability of UNMIK, available at < http://www.echr.coe.int> accessed 13 January 2013. See, for example, H Krieger, ‘A Credibility Gap: The Behrami and Saramati Decision of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2009) 13 Journal of International Peacekeeping 159.

75 Venice Commission (n 71) para 58.

76 Koh (n 1) 1483.

77 Cf G Nolte, ‘Das Verfassungsrecht vor den Herausforderungen der Globalisierung’ (2007) 67 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 129, 151–3.

78 The Court frequently makes use of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its interpretation, see Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, ECHR 2001-XI, para 60 (on the prohibition of torture); A and others v United Kingdom, 49 European Human Rights Review 29, para 178 (on the temporal extension of a state of emergency).

79 Koh (n 1) 1484.

80 Reservation of the United States to the ICCPR, declared upon ratification on 8 June 1992: ‘That the United States considers itself bound by article 7 to the extent that “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” means the cruel and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.’

81 Rubenfeld (n 6) 1988.

82 See also Gardbaum (n 2) 397; Schauer, F, ‘The Exceptional First Amendment’ in Ignatieff, M (ed), American Excpetionalism and Human Rights (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2005) 29, 56.Google Scholar

83 Ibid 29–30.

84 Koh (n 1) 1483.

85 Ignatieff (n 1) 10.

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89 Ibid para 133 of the English translation.

90 National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, decision of 28 June 2012.

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98 G de Búrca, ‘The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order after Kadi’ (2010) 51 Harvard International Law Journal 1, 49. The Medellin case (Medellin v Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008)) concerned the international effects of a judgment by the International Court of Justice on the rights of foreigners to be informed about consular assistance under art 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In the case, the US Supreme Court found ICJ decisions not to be enforceable in the US legal order.

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102 See (n 33).

103 The Queen, on the application of International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and Others v Secretary of State for Transport, Case C-308/06, ECR 2009, I-405.

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105 Eckes (n 29) 367.

106 Brita v Hauptzollamt Hamburg, Case C-386/08, ECR 2010-1289.

107 Air Transport Association of America et al. v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change et al., Case C-366/10, ECR 2011 – not yet reported, paras 50 (on the priority of international agreements over EU secondary legislation), 101 (on customary international law as a limit to EU action) and 123 (on the general obligation of the EU to exercise its competences in light of the international legal requirements).

108 Ignatieff (n 1) 8.

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112 See, for example, Jalloh v Germany, ECHR 2006-IX, paras 49 ff and 105 for a reference to the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court; A and others v United Kingdom, 49 EHRR 29, paras 111 (for a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada) and 112 (US Supreme Court); see further Wildhaber, L, ‘The Role of Comparative Law in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights’ in Bröhmer, J (ed), Internationale Gemeinschaft und Menschenrechte: Festschrift für Georg Ress (Heymanns, Cologne, 2005) 1101.Google Scholar

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114 For references to the practice of the UN Human Rights Committee see, for example, Mammatkulov and Askarov v Turkey, ECHR 2005-I, paras 114, 124; Öcalan v Turkey, App No 46221/99, Judgment of 12 March 2003, para 203 (in this respect upheld by the Grand Chamber in ECHR 2005-IV, para 166).

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118 For example, courts in democracies such as India or South Africa regularly cite decisions of foreign domestic as well as international courts. See with further references Benvenisti, E, ‘Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts’ (2008) 102 American Journal of International Law 241.Google Scholar

119 This argument is advanced, in particular, by Bradford and Posner (n 5) 16; Safrin (n 5) 1314.

120 See in particular JHH Weiler, ‘The External Legal Relations of Non-Unitary Actors: Mixity and the Federal Principle’ in JHH Weiler (ed), The Constitution of Europe: “Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor”? And Other Essays on European Integration (CUP, Cambridge, 1999) 130; see further P Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Hart, Oxford, 2006) 135–81.

121 Safrin (n 5) 1328–30.

122 Wessel, RA, ‘The EU as a Party to International Agreements: Shared Competences, Mixed Responsibilities’ in Dashwood, A and Maresceau, M (eds), Law and Practice of EU External Relations: Salient Features of a Changing Landscape (CUP, Cambridge, 2008) 152Google Scholar; Tietje (n 104) 64–7; Hoffmeister, F, ‘Litigating against the European Union and its Member States’ (2010) 21 European Journal of International Law 723.Google Scholar

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125 de Búrca (n 5) 690–1.

126 SC Res 1973, UN Doc S/RES/1973 (17 March 2011).

127 On the constitutional requirements for the use of force see Nolte, G, ‘Germany: Ensuring Political Legitimacy for the Use of Military Forces by Requiring Constitutional Accountability’ in Ku, C and Jacobson, HK (eds), Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law (CUP, Cambridge, 2003) 231.Google Scholar

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129 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union, art 4, para 2, 9 May 2008, 2008 OJ (C 115) 13; on the implications of this provision see von Bogdandy, A and Schill, S, ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity under the Lisbon Treaty’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 1147Google Scholar; particularly on ‘constitutional identity’ in a European composite style see Pernice, I, ‘Der Schutz nationaler Identität in der Europäischen Union’ (2011) 136 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 185, 210.Google Scholar

130 See Cremona, M, ‘The Union as a Global Actor: Roles, Models and Identity’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 553.Google Scholar

131 Safrin (n 5).

132 On the limited impact of the EU as a normative power see, for instance, Bendiek, A and Kramer, H, ‘The EU as a ‘‘Strategic’’ International Actor: Substantial and Analytical Ambiguities’ (2010) 15 European Foreign Affairs Review 453, 467–9Google Scholar; Smith, KE, ‘The European Union at the Human Rights Council: Speaking with One Voice But Having Little Influence’ (2010) 17 Journal of European Public Policy 224.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

133 Meunier, S and Nicolaїdis, K, ‘The European Union as a Conflicted Trade Power’ (2006) 13 Journal of European Public Policy 906, 922.Google Scholar

134 de Witte, B, ‘International Law as a Tool for the European Union’, (2009) 5 European Constitutional Law Review 265, 278–9Google Scholar; the concept of ‘norm generator’ was first used by Cremona (n 130) 557.

135 Meunier and Nicolaїdis (n 133) 913.