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Why Should Public Hearings in the Brazilian Supreme Court be Understood as an Innovative Democratic Tool in Constitutional Adjudication?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Thiago Luis Sombra

Abstract

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This Article engages in an empirical analysis of the counter-majoritarian role of the Brazilian Supreme Court, the Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), in terms of its sharp contrast with the aim of attracting wider participation from civil society in public hearings. Public hearings are an important judicial tool that have recently been introduced and that may influence foreign constitutional courts. A public hearing is a procedure in which the STF can hear experts, scientists, professors, civil servants, and even ordinary citizens when a Justice Rapporteur seeks to elucidate a specific technical aspect of a case, a controversial social issue, or an issue in a field that is generally unfamiliar to the presiding judge or judges. This research aims to address the influence of these public hearings on the deliberation process of the STF based on the democratic theory of representation. First, Section B outlines the main premises of the debate, elucidated the purposes and findings of public hearings. Next, Section C presents a theoretical approach addressing deliberation and representation to explain how information obtained in public hearings might improve the STF's adjudicative process. Section D outlines the chosen criteria and methods for the empirical research; this will demonstrate that public hearings in the STF are not working as envisioned. Lastly, to offer qualitative insight, Section E carefully examines two of the eighteen public hearings analyzed. The Article concludes that the STF has much work to do in terms of rethinking and improving the functionality of public hearings.

Type
Articles
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 17 , Issue 4 , August 2016 , pp. 657 - 690
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 by German Law Journal, Inc 

References

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17 One may contend that in-person participation of the justices is unnecessary, as the hearings are broadcast live and recorded by Justice TV, which would allow the other justices to follow the declarations in other circumstances. To the extent that the focus of the survey refers to the expansion of democratic support and greater legitimacy of the deliberation, however, the interaction and presence of the other justices evidences the relevance of the collective decision-making process in the court and the effective capacity to influence it. See Luís Roberto Barroso, Judicialização, Ativismo Judicial e Legitimidade, 13 Revista de Direito do Estado 71, 73 (2009).Google Scholar

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** [T]he question of what is, among the possibilities presented in the Law to be applied, the ‘correct’ one, is not even—according to the assumption itself—a matter of knowledge directed to positive Law, nor a matter of the theory of Law, but a question in Law politics. The task of obtaining, from the law, the only fair (right) sentence or the single correct administrative act is essentially identical to the task of those who propose, in the frames of the Constitution, the creation of the fair (right) laws.Google Scholar

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53 Lei No. 9.868 (6) § 1, (20) § 1 de 10 de Novembre de 1999, diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.] de 11.11.99 (Braz.). It is a prerogative of the Justice Rapporteur whether to hold a public hearing or not, but once decided upon, the justice invites certain experts and simultaneously allows others to apply to offer an argument or speech. Thereafter, the Justice Rapporteur divides all of the participants into two positions—for example, in favor of or in opposition to the subject matter presented (e.g., the prohibition of asbestos)—and allots equal time for each panelist. The panelists are not permitted to have a debate, interrupt one another, or ask questions. Only the Justice Rapporteur and the Attorney General can ask questions of each panelist. To ensure due process, it is generally recommended that the Justice Rapporteur select the same number of panelists to defend and oppose each position.Google Scholar

54 Lei No. 9.868 (6) § 2.Google Scholar

55 Constituição Federal [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 103, IX (Braz.). The primary reason for the massive influence of unions, business associations, and national professional entities on the judicial review procedure is based on their legitimacy in filing direct actions before the court. For instance, direct actions seeking to declare legislaton unconstitutional and/or the similar declaratory action of constitutionality are two important tools of the Brazilian judicial review model, which is accomplished in mixed fashion. The court directly rules on both types of cases, influenced by the Kelsen's theory of abstract and concentrated judicial review and also by the decentralized American model of judicial review.Google Scholar

56 Alexander Costa & Juliano Z. Benvindo, A Quem Interessa o Controle Concentrado de Constitucionalidade?: O Descompasso Entre Teoria e Prática na Defesa dos Direitos Fundamentais. (Conselho Nacional de Desenvolviemnto Cientifico e Tecnologico (CNPq) Working Paper, Apr. 1, 2014).Google Scholar

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58 This becomes an isolating position because justices’ opinions are not subject to accountability or responsive control. Presumably, judges are less influenced by public opinion than politics.Google Scholar

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82 Pogrebinschi, supra note 43, at 73. Thamy Pogrebinschi makes a methodological research mistake by considering only direct actions of unconstitutionality, declaratory actions of constitutionality, and actions of breach of fundamental precepts, but does not consider extraordinary resources, complaints, habeas corpus, and injunctions. It is not possible to conclude that the STF only plays its political role in concentrated and abstract control. Every day, because of the general repercussions and the jurisprudential upturns of the court, relevant political decisions have also been taken through appeals, as in the cases of warrants related to injunctions relating to public servants’ right to strike. See generally S.T.F., Mandado de Injunção No. 670, Relator: Minist. Gilmar Mendes, 27.10.2007., Supremo Tribunal Federal [S.T.F.] 30.10.2008 (Braz.); S.T.F., Mandado de Injunção No. 712–8, Relator: Minist. Eros Grau, 25.10.2007., Supremo Tribunal Federal Jurisprudencia [S.T.F.J.], 30.10.2008. (Braz.).Google Scholar

83 The finding of Papadopoulos is also made by Roberto Gargarella, The Constitution of Inequality: Constitutionalism in the Americas, 1776–1860, 3 Int. J. Const. Law 1, 22 (2005), who considers the hypertrophy of counter-majoritarian practices and arrangements by constitutional courts to be one of the features of the liberal constitutional model with a specific focus on selecting the most important issues for democratic politics. Papadopoulos, supra note 76 at 139, 141.Google Scholar

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98 This was also the case with the hearings on both plantation burnings and asbestos. Workers could only be represented through professional associations, although the views of many of them differed from those of their representatives.Google Scholar

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104 Katharina Sobota, Don't Mention the Norm!, 4 Int. J. Semiotics L. 45, 47–48 (1991). Although Mark Tushnet uses a theoretical secondary source to argue that public hearings seem to improve the quality of the jurisprudence of the STF, this empirical study has shown that the desired potential is still below the line that is reasonable for this conclusion to be valid. Tushnet, supra note 19, at 15.Google Scholar

105 Rodriguez, supra note 40, at 93.Google Scholar

106 For better comprehension, it is important to clarify that the STF does not rule on all its cases en banc (full bench). Each Justice Rapporteur can judge some cases alone because all the justices have previously ruled on the cause of action in a plenary session. Holding a public hearing is a prerogative of the Justice Rapporteur when handling cases that require technical information or expert opinion to provide higher quality elements to the judging session with the full bench panel.Google Scholar

107 Ministro Marco Aurélio Considera Inconstitucionais Leis Etaduais que Proíbem Amianto, Notícias STF, Oct. 31, 2012, http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=222755.Google Scholar

108 S.T.F., RE No. 586.224, Relator: Ministro Luiz Fux, Apr. 5, 2015., http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/processo/verProcessoPeca.asp?id=306750595&tipoApp=.pdf (Braz.).Google Scholar

109 According to Charles Ragin:Google Scholar

** Because of its inherently asymmetric nature, set-theoretic analysis offers many interesting contrasts with analysis based on correlations. Until recently, however, social scientists have been slow to embrace set-theoretic approaches. The perception was that this type of analysis is restricted to primitive, binary variables and that it has little or no tolerance for error. With the advent of ‘fuzzy” sets and the recognition that even rough set-theoretic relations are relevant to theory, these old barriers have crumbled.Google Scholar

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110 Charles C. Ragin, Fuzzy-Set Social Science 8–9 (2000).Google Scholar

111 Id. at 9.Google Scholar

112 For methodological matters and for purposes of choosing the appropriate approach, Miguel Gualano de Godoy adopted an objective criterion and a subjective criterion to assess the impact of hearings on justices’ decisions. For example, he used the declarations expressed in votes and the use of similar grounds to those of the hearings even when no express reference to them was made. Except for some conclusions related to the chosen investigative material, he generally presents similar conclusions on the topic. Namely, public hearings are still below their potential for contributing to the decision-making process of the court, and, to a large extent, are a result of the thoughtless rhetorical practices of the STF. Godoy, supra note 19, at 96.Google Scholar

113 Tushnet, supra note 19, at 17 (“[S]ometimes, though, it seems that social movements affect constitutional interpretation without having influenced judicial selection.”).Google Scholar

114 Formal unconstitutionality is an adjudication technique in judicial review in which the competence to craft a law, an act, or statute is at issue.Google Scholar

115 As explained above using the NVivo software, the data collected from all the public hearings held until now were processed to establish their commonalities. Although only two of these were analyzed in depth, both public hearings are fairly representative of the features described in this article.Google Scholar

116 Supremo Tribunal Federal, ADI 5072 — Ação Direta de InconstitucionalidadeI, http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/processo/verProcessoAndamento.asp?incidente=4506342 (last visited July 25, 2016).Google Scholar

117 Alexandre Freire, Alonso Freire & José Miguel Garcia Medina, Audiěncia Pública Tornou-se Instrumento de Legitimidade, Consultor Jurídico (July 4, 2013), http://www.conjur.com.br/2013-jul-04/audiencias-publicas-tornaram-stf-instrumento-legitimidade-popular; Mônia Clarissa Hennig Leal, As Audiěncias Públicas No Âmbito do Supremo Tribunal Federal Brasileiro: Uma Nova Forma de Participação?, 19 Revista Novos Estudos Jurídicos 327, 330–31 (2014), http://siaiweb06.univali.br/seer/index.php/nej/article/view/6010.Google Scholar

118 See generally Rosanvallon, supra note 36; Michael Saward, The Representative Claim, 5 Contemp. Pol. Theory 297 (2006).Google Scholar

119 S.T.F., Audiěncia Pública no RE No. 586.224, Relator: Justice Rapp Luiz Fux, 22.4.2013., http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/processo/verProcessoAndamento.asp?incidente=2616565 (Braz.).Google Scholar

120 Lei No. 10.547, de 2 de Maio de 2000, Diário Oficial do Estado de São Paulo [D.O.S.P.], 08.08.2008. (Braz.).Google Scholar

121 Id. Google Scholar

122 The following spoke in the hearings: the Environment Ministry, the EMBRAPA, Agroindustrial Cooperative of the State of Rio de Janeiro Ltda (Cooperativa Agroindustrial do Estado do Rio de Janeiro Ltda—COAGRO), ALCOPAR, ORPLANA, Northeastern Sugar Cane Producers Union (União Nordestina dos Produtores de Cana), ESALQ/USP, ASCANA, FEPLANA, the Labor Public Prosecutors’ Office (Ministério Público do Trabalho—MPT), the Sugarcane Agroindustry Union of the State of São Paulo (União da Agroindústria Canavieira do Estado de São Paulo—ÚNICA), the Federation of Agriculture of Paraná (Federação da Agricultura do Paraná—FAEP), the Sugar Industry Union in the State of Paraná (Sindicato da Indústria do Açúcar no Estado do Paraná—SIAPAR), the Institute for Space Research (Instituto de Pesquisas Espaciais—INPE), the Institute of Advanced Studies (Instituto de Estudos Avançados —IEA), the Vale Technological Institute (Instituto Tecnológico Vale—ITV), the National Confederation of Agriculture (Confederação Nacional de Agricultura—CNA), ASSOMOGI, SIAMIG—Sugar-Energetic Industries Association of the State of Minas Gerais (Associação das Indústrias Sucroenergéticas do Estado de Minas Gerais), BNDES, SINDAÇÚCAR, the Federation of Agriculture of Alagoas (Federação da Agricultura de Al agoas—FAEAL), the Union of Manufacturing Industry of Ethanol of the State of Goiás (Sindicato da Indústria de Fabricação de Etanol do Estado de Goiás —SIFAEG), the Union of Sugar Manufacturing Industry of the State of Goiàs (Sindicato da Indústria de Fabricação de Açúcar do Estado de Goiás—SIFAÇÚCAR), the Environmental Sanitation Technology Company (Companhia de Tecnologia de Saneamento Ambiental—CETESB), the Councilman of the Municipality of Barretos, ABEMA, and CONTAG. See Federal, Supremo Tribunal, Recurso Extraorinário 586.224 Sãn Paulo (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/audienciasPublicas/anexo/CronogramaFinalQueimadaCanaviais.pdf.Google Scholar

123 To avoid explanations of legal issues, the Justice Rapporteur delimited twelve questions to guide the guests’ presentations.Google Scholar

124 S.T.F., Audiěncia Pública no RE No. 586.224, Relator: Justice Rapp Luiz Fux, Apr. 22, 2013, http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/processo/verProcessoAndamento.asp?incidente=2616565 (Braz.) (last visited Nov 5, 2015).Google Scholar

125 Cass R. Sunstein, A Constitution of Many Minds: Why the Founding Document Doesn't Mean what it Meant Before 167, 181 (2009).Google Scholar

126 Fernando Leal, Para que servem as audiěncias públicas no STF?, JOTA (June 16, 2015), http://jota.info/para-que-servem-as-audiencias-publicas-no-stf.Google Scholar

127 Caio Prado Júnior, Formação do Brasil Contemporâneo: Colônia 134 (3d ed. 2000).Google Scholar

128 S.T.F., RE No. 586.224, Relator: Justice Rapp. Luiz Fux, 5.3.2015., http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/processo/verProcessoPeca.asp?id=306750595&tipoApp=.pdf (Braz.).Google Scholar

129 Tushnet, supra note 19, at 14.Google Scholar

130 RE 586.224, supra note 128.Google Scholar

131 Id. Google Scholar

132 Rosanvallon, supra note 36, at 54.Google Scholar

133 S.T.F., Audiěncia Pública na ADI No. 3937, Relator: Justice Rapp Marco Aurélio, 31.8.2012., http://redir.stf.jus.br/paginadorpub/paginador.jsp?docTP=AC&docID=553763 (Braz.) (last visited Oct. 25, 2015).Google Scholar

134 Id. Google Scholar

135 Lei No. 12.684, de 26 de Julho de 2007, Diário Oficial do Estado de São Paulo [D.O.S.P.] (Braz.).Google Scholar

136 Constituição Federal [C.F.] [Constitution] arts. 22 (XI), (XII), 24 (V), (VI), (XII), 1.Google Scholar

137 Id. art. 170.Google Scholar

138 Ministro Marco Aurélio Considera Inconstitucionais Leis Estaduais que Proíbem Amianto, Notícias STF, Oct. 31, 2012, http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=222755.Google Scholar

139 Id. For example, the Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Development, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Environment, the Heart Institute of the Hospital das Clínicas, Secretaries of the State of São Paulo, Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (FIOCRUZ), and CETESB all participated.Google Scholar

140 Id. For example, the Syndicate of the Workers in the Industry of Extraction of Non-metallic Minerals of Minaçu—Goiás, the Brazilian Medical Association (Associação Médica Brasileira—AMB) and the National Association of Occupational Medicine (Associação Nacional de Medicina do Trabalho—ANAMT), Brazilian Chrysotile Institute, National Association of Labor Attorneys (Associação Nacional dos Procuradores do Trabalho—ANPT), and the Brazilian Association of the Exposed all participated.Google Scholar

141 Evasive rhetoric has recently been commonplace in the STF, as in the recent trial called Unconstitutional State of Affairs. Thiago Luis Santos Sombra, The “Unconstitutional State of Affairs” in Brazil's Prison System: The Enchantment of Legal Transplantation, Int'L J. of Const. L. Blog (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/09/the-unconstitutional-state-of-affairs-in-brazils-prison-system-the-enchantment-of-legal-transplantation/.Google Scholar

142 Notícias STF, supra note 138.Google Scholar

143 Id. Google Scholar

144 Id. Google Scholar

145 Id. Google Scholar

146 José Rodrigo Rodriguez believes:Google Scholar

** [T]he debate on possible models for judicial rationality is increasingly present in national law and has been going on apart from an assessment of the reasonableness of our jurisdiction …. The so-called ‘judicialization of politics’ combined with the theoretical action of some jurists has led to opening the judicial branch and legal thinking to the scrutiny of society and the need to provide justifications. Increasingly, the public sphere criticizes this branch and evaluates its decisions. Thus, the social agents will hardly comply and accept arguments from authority as a basis for judicial decisions.Google Scholar

** Rodriguez, supra note 40, at 92.Google Scholar

147 One of the concerns that motivated this research came from José Rodrigo Rodriguez's question: “Would it not be more reasonable to assume that this irrational standard of our jurisdiction is its normal state and to set aside any pretention of modifying it?” Id. at 91.Google Scholar

148 The impression of Mark Tushnet in this regard allows for comprehending the complexity of public hearings from an interesting point of view:Google Scholar

** [I]n contrast, legislative hearings and Brazilian public hearings involve ‘repeat players’ on one side—the legislator or the judges—but, typically, ‘one-shooters’ on the other. It may be that social norms dealing with respect in in-person conversations will induce a somewhat more genuine practice of deliberation in the legislative hearings and the Brazilian public hearings.Google Scholar

** Tushnet, supra note 19, at 16.Google Scholar

149 Although relevant studies such as that of Thamy Pogrebinschi support the notion that the STF acts more as a complement to legislative activities than in its counter-majoritarian function, the examination of collected data indicates the opposite when considering that a sampling universe was greater than only the actions originating in the concentrated control of constitutionality, as was undertaken by the cited author. Pogrebinschi, supra note 43, at 116.Google Scholar

150 Alec Stone Sweet, Governing With Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe 62–63 (2000).Google Scholar

151 Mark Tushnet's caution regarding conclusions on the effective contribution of public hearings to decision-making process's optimization is commendable:Google Scholar

** [W]e cannot draw confident conclusions about how crowd-sourcing and public hearings or similar mechanisms would work if widely adopted. Successful innovations in constitutional technology are rare, and these may turn out to be ventures down paths that end at a blank wall. Yet, both are clearly in a constitutionalist tradition that makes the consent of the public an important part of constitutional foundations.Google Scholar

** Tushnet, supra note 19, at 18.Google Scholar