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Why Adolf Hitler Spared the Judges: Judicial Opposition Against the Nazi State

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Hans Petter Graver

Abstract

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The Nazi regime had loyal judges who willingly transformed the liberal German law into an instrument of oppression, discrimination and genocide. This was achieved without substantially interfering with the operation of the courts and without applying disciplinary measures on the judges. But, not all judges were congenial servants of the regime—some resisted in their capacity as judges. Based on case-studies and existing literature, this Article distinguishes between two different lines of judicial opposition to those in power: Between opposition taking place in the open and opposition in secret, and between opposition within what is accepted by those in power as being within the law and opposition that is in breach of the law. The Article then seeks to explain the deference the regime gave to judicial by employing institutional theory and the concept of path dependence. Germany was deeply embedded in the Western legal tradition of emphasis on law as an autonomous institution with an independent judiciary.

Type
The rule of law, constitutionalism and the judiciary
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 19 , Issue 4 , 01 July 2018 , pp. 845 - 878
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 by German Law Journal, Inc. 

References

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