Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
In his famous talk “The Force of Law,” given at Cardozo Law School in 1989, Derrida linked his work with the Critical Legal Studies movement. This lecture signposted a change of direction in deconstruction. Early deconstruction had been criticized for formalism, aestheticism and scant recognition of political realities. Derrida's (in)famous statement that “there is nothing outside of the text,” was a rare philosophical sound-bite meaning that language, communication and social interaction cannot avoid, as commonly assumed, the uncertainties and ambiguities of the written text. But the aphorism was often misinterpreted to signify extreme idealism, disregard for the real world and literary and philosophical reductionism. But the “Force of Law” signified a clear turn towards political and ethical engagement, symbolized by the discussion of law and justice. After that talk, deconstruction became obsessed with questions of ethical responsibility, the meaning of friendship and the complex relationship with the other. Before his death, Derrida wrote a number of essays on contemporary political events. He denounced the Kosovo and Iraq wars and devoted a book to ‘rogue’ elements and states, in which he attacked the United States as the greatest rogue. Just before his untimely death in 2004, Derrida had become preoccupied with the concept of sovereignty at the basis of the tragedies and abuses of modernity. It is this political and ethical turn of deconstruction that I would like to address in the context of critical legal theory.
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