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The Territorial Challenge: From Constitutional Patriotism to Unencumbered Agonism in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Zoran Oklopcic

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Constitutional patriotism is on the ascent among contemporary constitutional theories. Its objective is to re-orient the loyalty of citizens away from particularistic attachment to a Nation, and towards the Constitution. In promoting political justice, constitutional patriotism relies on citizens’ acceptance of a particular constitutional order not as an embodiment of particularistic ethnocultural, or even statist values, but rather as an expression of universal political principles. In other words, a constitutional order ought not to be seen as an instrument for a nation's political self-actualization, but rather as a framework for institutions and a repository of values that enable a diverse body of citizens to critically rework their particular traditions in light of universalist principles of political justice.

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Articles
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 13 , Issue 1: Symposium on Human Rights , January 2012 , pp. 23 - 50
Copyright
Copyright © 2012 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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