No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Strengthening European Union Democratic Accountability Through National and Treaty-Based Pre-Legislative Controls
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
Abstract
Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.
This article considers whether greater accountability for EU supranational decision-making can be achieved through a combination of member states' legislative processes and EU treaty-based mechanisms. The EU is formed by member states' national consent through treaty ratification and a system of domestic pre-legislative controls on consent—parliamentary approval, public consultation and referendum—which operates to limit the nature and extent of EU law. Using the UK as an example to compare with other member states, the article contends that such domestic controls are prerequisites to national incorporation of EU law and strengthen democratic accountability. Consent alone, however, does not provide an adequate basis for accountability of supranational decisions; EU constitutional principles of citizenship, democracy, and political rights illustrate how the EU fulfills a role as protector of rights. The article further argues that the EU's protector role represents partial legitimacy and accountability for supranational decisions. Greater legitimacy and accountability derives from national parliaments' pre-legislative controls under EU law—scrutinizing legislation, monitoring subsidiarity, and exercising veto powers. The article concludes that if these controls are exercised properly, they represent powerful accountability mechanisms.
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2015 by German Law Journal GbR
References
1 5 July 2013, 565 Parl. Deb., H.C. (2013) 1169–1246 (U.K.).Google Scholar
2 Dehousse, Renaud, Institutional Reform in the European Community: Are There Alternatives to the Majoritarian Avenue? (European Univ. Inst., EUI Working Paper RSC 95/4, 1995).Google Scholar
3 See 89 BverfGE 155; see also R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. No.2 [1991] 1 A.C. 603, 659.Google Scholar
4 International Organizations (Jan Klabbers ed., 2005).Google Scholar
5 See Preamble to 1957 Treaty of Rome Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957; see also Urwin, Derek, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration (1995); see also Pinder, John & Usherwood, Simon, The European Union: A Very Short Introduction (2013); see also Pinder, John, The Building of the European Union (1998).Google Scholar
6 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union arts. 119, 140, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]; see also TFEU art. 20; see also Treaty on European Union arts. 4–6, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 (C 326) [hereinafter TEU]; see also TFEU arts. 4–6 (describing expansion of EU shared and complementary competencies—health protection, education, culture, development cooperation, environmental protection, consumer protection]); see also Single Market Act: Twelve Levers to Boost Growth and Strengthen Confidence, Working Together to Create New Growth, COM (2011) 206 final (Apr. 13, 2011); see also Craig, Paul, The Lisbon Treaty: Process, Architecture and Substance, 33 Eur. L. Rev. 137 (2008).Google Scholar
7 Majone, Giandomenico, Europe's ‘Democratic Deficit’: The Question of Standards, 4(1) Eur. L.J. 5, 12 (1998).Google Scholar
8 For example, the Polish parliament's failure to amend the constitution to implement Council Framework Decision 2002/584 of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant, which formed part of the acquis at the point of accession; see Piqani, Darinka, Arguments for a Holistic Approach in European Constitutionalism: What Role for National Institutions in Avoiding Constitutional Conflicts Between National Constitutions and EU Law, 8(3) Eur. Const. L. Rev. 493, 503 (2012).Google Scholar
9 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; see also McNair, Arnold, The Law of Treaties (1961).Google Scholar
10 See TEU art. 4(3); Case C-266/03, Commission v. Luxembourg, 2005 E.C.R. I-0000 (interpreting Article 4(3) as entailing enforceable substantive and procedural obligations).Google Scholar
11 Gw. [Constitution], art. 93 (Neth.).Google Scholar
12 Gw. [Constitution], art. 94 (Neth.).Google Scholar
13 See Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1.Google Scholar
14 See Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585; see also Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 1970 E.C.R. 1126.Google Scholar
15 The European Communities Act, 1972, c. 68, § 2(4) (U.K.) [hereinafter “The Communities Act”].Google Scholar
16 See id. c. 68, §§ 3(1)–(2).Google Scholar
17 See Costa at 585; see generally Internationale Handelsgesellschaft.Google Scholar
18 See Macarthys Ltd v. Smith [1981] Q.B. 199; see also Garland v. British Rail Engineering [1982] 2 All E.R 402; see also Marshall v. Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Authority [1986] Q.B. 401; see also R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. [1989] 2 All E.R. 692; see also Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195.Google Scholar
19 See the Court of Appeal's position in relation to a statute preceding the Communities Act in Macarthys Ltd v. Smith [1981] Q.B. 199 and the House of Lord's position in relation to a statute subsequent to the Communities Act in R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. [1989] 2 All E.R. 692.Google Scholar
20 See Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195, 60–62.Google Scholar
21 See Allan, T.R.S., Parliamentary Sovereignty: Law, Politics and Revolution, 113 L.Q. Rev. 443 (1997); see also H.W.R. Wade, Sovereignty: Revolution or Evolution?, 112 L.Q. Rev. 568 (1996).Google Scholar
22 See R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. No.2 [1991] 1 A.C. 603, 659.Google Scholar
23 See Attorney General for Canada v. Attorney General for Ontario [1937] A.C. 326.Google Scholar
24 See R v. Secretary of State Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Rees-Mogg [1994] 2 W.L.R. 115.Google Scholar
25 See id. at 568–71.Google Scholar
26 Crown Prerogatives (Parliamentary Control) Bill, HC Parliamentary Business, Mar. 3, 1999, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmbills/055/1999055.htm.Google Scholar
27 Tam Dalyell MP introduced a private member's bill, the Military Action Against Iraq (Parliamentary Approval) Bill, which received its first formal reading on 26 January 1999 but failed to progress due to the Queen's refusal to grant consent for debate on the prerogative power to wage war. The bill can be seen at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199899/cmbills/035/1999035.htm. See also 13 Feb. 2003, 339 Parl. Deb., H.C. (2003) 1056–73 (UK); see also 10 Mar. 2003, 401 Parl. Deb., H.C. (2003) 32, 35, 38; see also 17 Mar. 2003, 401 Parl. Deb., H.C. (2003) 703–23.Google Scholar
28 House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, Taming the Prerogative: Strengthening Ministerial Accountability to Parliament, Fourth Report of Session 2003-04, H.C. 422.Google Scholar
29 Watt, N., R. Mason & N. Hopkins, MPs force Cameron to Rule Out British Assault on Syria, The Guardian (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/aug/30/cameron-mps-syria (showing how many MPs reported acting on overwhelming opposition from their constituents expressed via Twitter, emails and meetings).Google Scholar
30 See 29 Aug. 2013, 556 Parl. Deb., H.C. (2013) 1425–1556.Google Scholar
31 For an example, see Irish Supreme Court, Case 1986 No. 12036P, Crotty v. An Taoiseach, [1987] I.R. 713, establishing the constitutional practice of referendums for EU treaty reforms. Section 20(2) of the Danish Constitution allows for transfer of powers to the EU by statute adopted by a five-sixths parliamentary majority or simple majority public vote. Ireland, Denmark, and the UK are the only member states constitutionally requiring a referendum. Referendums in France, the Netherlands, Spain, and Luxembourg in 2005 on the Constitutional Treaty were not constitutionally required. See Mendez, Fernando & Mendez, Mario, Referendums and European Integration: Beyond the Lisbon Vote, Public Law 223 (2010).Google Scholar
32 See French Conseil Constitutionnel [Constitutional Court] reviews of the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty under Article 54 of the French Constitution: Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2004-505DC, Nov. 19, 2004 (Fr.); Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2007-560DC, Dec. 20, 2007. See also Ústavní soud České republiky dne 26.11.2008 (ÚS) [Constitutional Court] [Decision of the Constitutional Court of Nov. 26, 2008], sp.zn PI. ÚS 19/08 (Czech); Ústavní soud České republiky dne 3.11.2009 (ÚS) [Constitutional Court] [Decision of the Constitutional Court of Nov. 3, 2009], sp.zn PI. ÚS 29/09.Google Scholar
33 See reviews of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and Polish Constitutional Tribunal after ratification of the Lisbon Treaty: Case 143/2010 (VII. 14.) Treaty of Lisbon, Judgment of July 12, 2010; Case K 32/09 Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of Nov. 24, 2010.Google Scholar
34 For example, Article 93.1 no. 2 of the German Basic Law restricts complainants to the Federal Government, a Land government, or one fourth of the members of the Bundestag. The Austrian constitution restricts post-legislative complaints to individuals who can show infringement of personal rights directly affecting them.Google Scholar
35 For example, Danish referendums on the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty, and the Amsterdam Treaty, and on whether Denmark should join the euro, which it has not; 2005 French and Dutch referendums voted against the Constitutional Treaty.Google Scholar
36 See TEU arts. 6(3), 42(2); see also TFEU arts. 25, 223(1), 262, 311.Google Scholar
37 For example, Deputies of the Austrian parliament failed to achieve the necessary one-third majority under Article 140.1 of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law to demand a review of constitutionality of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. After ratification they filed an individual petition, which was rejected by the Austrian Constitutional Court. Verfassungsgerichtshof (VfGH) [Constitutional Court], Case SV 1/10-9 Treaty of Lisbon II, order of June 12, 2010.Google Scholar
38 See concerns expressed by EU Commissioner for the Internal Market and Services in the speech at Europe House, London, July 12, 2013, called The Single Market in Financial Services: We Need the UK on Board, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-636_en.htm.Google Scholar
39 Mendez, & Mendez, , supra note 31, at 227–29.Google Scholar
40 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], art. 23.1 (Ger.).Google Scholar
41 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2BvE 2/08, para. 243 (June 30, 2009), https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html.Google Scholar
42 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], arts. 23.1, 79.2, 79.3.Google Scholar
43 See 89 BverfGE 155; see also Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2BvE 2/08, (June 30, 2009).Google Scholar
44 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2BvE 2/08, para. 270 (June 30, 2009).Google Scholar
45 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2BvR 1390/12 (Sept. 12, 2012) [hereinafter ESM Treaty Temporary Injunctions]; See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2BvR 1390/12 (Mar. 18, 2014) [hereinafter ESM Treaty Decision].Google Scholar
46 See 89 BverfGE 155, paras. 56–63, 94–96; see also Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2BvE 2/08, paras. 210, 246–60, 375, 383 (June 30, 2009); see also ESM Treaty Temporary Injunctions at paras. 208–15, 286–87; see also ESM Treaty Decision at paras. 160–66.Google Scholar
47 Tekst Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r. [Constitution] arts. 90(1), (2) (Poland).Google Scholar
48 See id. arts. 90(3), (4).Google Scholar
49 See id. art. 125(1).Google Scholar
50 See id. arts. 125(1), (2).Google Scholar
51 See K18/04 Polish Membership of the European Union (Accession Treaty), Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment of May 11, 2005; K32/09 Treaty of Lisbon, Judgment of Sept. 24, 2010; P1/05 Application of the European Arrest Warrant to Polish Citizens, Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Decision of Apr. 27, 2005; K33/12 The Act on the ratification of the European Council Decision of Mar. 25, 2011 amending Article 136 TFEU with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro, Judgment of June 26, 2013 [hereinafter ESM Decision].Google Scholar
52 See ESM Decision at 84 (dissenting Opinion of Judge Marek Zubik (English translation)).Google Scholar
53 Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, c. 25, § 20 [hereinafter The Reform Act].Google Scholar
54 See id. § 20(1)(a), (c).Google Scholar
55 See id. §§ 20(4)–(5), 20(8), 22(1).Google Scholar
56 European Union Act 2011, c. 12, § 14(2)(c) [hereinafter The EU Act].Google Scholar
57 See id. § 18.Google Scholar
58 See Gordon, Michael & Dougan, Michael, The United Kingdom's European Union Act 2011: Who Won the Bloody War Anyway?, Eur. L. Rev. 3, 7–8 (2012) (arguing that § 18 does not represent a “sovereignty clause” and fails to explain how UK law is reconciled with EU supremacy).Google Scholar
59 See The EU Act § 9(3).Google Scholar
60 See id. § 10(1)(a) (relating to Article 56 of the TFEU).Google Scholar
61 See id. § 10(4) (relating to Article 6(2) of TEU). Accession must be agreed to unanimously under Article 218(8) TFEU, after approval by member states in accordance with their constitutional requirements.Google Scholar
62 See id. § 10(1)(b)–(f): Amendment to the Statute of the European System of Central Banks or of the European Central Bank (Article 129(3) of TFEU); an increase in the number of Advocates-General (Article 252 of TFEU); the establishment of specialized courts attached to the General Court (Article 257 of TFEU); amendment to the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Article 281 of TFEU); amendment to the Statute of the European Investment Bank (Article 308 of TFEU).Google Scholar
63 See id. § 7(2)(a) (relating to Article 25 of TFEU).Google Scholar
64 See id. § 7(2)(b) (relating to Article 223(1) of TFEU).Google Scholar
65 See id. § 7(2)(c) (relating to Article 262 TFEU).Google Scholar
66 See id. § 7(2)(d) (relating to Article 311 TFEU).Google Scholar
67 See id. § 7(4)(a) (relating to Article 17(5) TEU).Google Scholar
68 See id. § 7(4)(b) (relating to Article 48(7) TEU). The certain EU areas relate to all those provisions not listed in Schedule 1 of the EU Act (for example, family law with cross-border implications and the number of Advocates-Generals).Google Scholar
69 See id. § 7(4)(c) (relating to Article 64(3) of TFEU).Google Scholar
70 See id. § 7(4)(d) (relating to Article 126(14) of TFEU).Google Scholar
71 See id. §§ 7(4)(e)–(f) (relating to Articles 333(1) and 333(2) of TFEU).Google Scholar
72 See id. § 8(3) (relating to Article 352 of TFEU). But note two other methods for approval of general competence decisions: Motion before Parliament and each House agrees without amendment (§ 8(4)); or a statement to Parliament that the decision is exempt from approval (§ 8(5)).Google Scholar
73 “Act of parliament” is referred to eleven times, and “parliamentary approval” seven times.Google Scholar
74 See The EU Act §§ 2(2), 3(2).Google Scholar
75 Emphasis added. Section 13(1)(c) of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendum Act 2000, c. 41, (The PPERA) already requires the Electoral Commission to promote public awareness of the institutions of the EU.Google Scholar
76 Under the PPERA the Electoral Commission has wide ranging powers: Section 6B observations of working practices by representatives of the Commission; Section 6C and 6D accredited election observers; Section 8 powers regarding elections exercisable on recommendation of the Commission; Section 11 broadcasters to have regard to Commission's views on party political broadcasts.Google Scholar
77 Sections 125–27 of the PPERA set general restrictions on publication of promotional material and campaign broadcasts but not in relation to the accuracy of information.Google Scholar
78 See The EU Act § 2(1) (relating to Article 48(2)–(5) of TEU).Google Scholar
79 See id. § 3(1) (relating to Article 48(6) of TEU).Google Scholar
80 See id. § 4(1)(a)–(j) (relating to Articles 3, 4 and 6 of TFEU).Google Scholar
81 See id. § 4(1)(k)–(m) (relating to TEU provisions: Article 7(2) (serious and persistent breach determination by European Council); Article 14(2) (European Parliament composition); Article 15(4) (European Council consensus decisions); Article 17(5) (Commissioners); Article 19(2) (Judges and Advocates-General of the Court); Article 22(1) (EU strategic interests and objectives); Chapter 2 of Title V (CFS policy); Article 48(3), (4), (6) and (7) (treaty revision procedures); Article 49 (EU membership application); Article 50(3) (European Council decision extending treaties' application for withdrawing state)). TFEU provisions: Article 19(1) (measures against sexual, racial or ethnic, religious, age or sexual orientation discrimination); Article 21(3) (social security or social protection measures); Article 22(1) (non-national EU citizens standing and voting in state of residence local elections); Article 22(2) (same persons standing and voting in European Parliament elections in state of residence); Article 25 (strengthening EU citizens' rights); Article 77(3) (passports, identity cards, residence permits etc.); Article 82(2)(d) (minimum rules on criminal procedure); Article 83(1) (decision on other areas of crime); Article 86(1) and (4) (European Public Prosecutor's Office); Article 87(3) (police cooperation); Article 89 (cross-border operation by competent authorities); Article 113 (harmonization of indirect taxes); Article 115 (approximation of national laws affecting internal market); Article 121(2) (broad guidelines of economic policies); Article 126(14) (replacing protocol on excessive deficit procedure); Article 127(6) (conferral on European Central Bank prudential supervision tasks); Article 153(2)(b) (working conditions, social security etc.); Article 155(2) (agreements at EU level between management and labor); Article 192(2) (adoption of certain environmental measures); Article 194(3) (energy measures of a fiscal nature); Article 203 (association of countries and territories with the EU); Article 218(8) (certain international agreements); Art. 222(3) (implementation of solidarity clause having defense implications); Article 223(1) (uniform procedures for elections to European Parliament); Article 311 (own resources decisions); Article 312(2) (multi-annual financial framework); Article 332 (expenditure on enhanced cooperation to be borne by member states other than those participating); Article 333(1) and (2) (enhanced cooperation); Article 346(2) (changes to list of military products exempt from internal market provisions); Article 352(1) (measures to attain EU objectives where treaties do not provide necessary powers).Google Scholar
82 See generally The EU Act § 6(5).Google Scholar
83 See TEU art. 7(2).Google Scholar
84 See id. art. 7(3).Google Scholar
85 See TFEU art. 353.Google Scholar
86 See id. art. 354.Google Scholar
87 See The EU Act § 6(5)(b), sch. 1.Google Scholar
88 See ESM Treaty Temporary Injunctions, Case No. 2BvR 1390/12 (Sept. 12, 2012); see also ESM Treaty Decision, Case No. 2BvR 1390/12 (Mar. 18, 2014), at paras. 124–28.Google Scholar
89 In Germany only prior legislative approval is necessary for participation in decisions under Article 48(7) TEU and Article 352 TFEU; see Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2BvE 2/08, para. 409 (June 30, 2009), https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html. Contrast with the Czech Republic, which does not require prior parliamentary approval for use of Article 352 TFEU or Article 48(7) TEU; Ústavní soud České republiky dne 26.11.2008 (ÚS) [Constitutional Court] [Decision of the Constitutional Court of Nov. 26, 2008], sp.zn PI. ÚS 19/08, paras. 150, 165 (Czech).Google Scholar
90 The UK government reneged on an election promise to hold a referendum on the proposed 2004 Constitution Treaty. This was unsuccessfully challenged in R (Wheeler) v. Office of the Prime Minister [2008] EWHC 1409 (Admin). On 16 July 2008, the UK ratified the watered down version of a constitution under the Lisbon Treaty without holding a referendum.Google Scholar
91 UK turnout at the June 2009 European Parliamentary elections was thirty-four-point-five percent compared to forty-three percent across the EU as a whole. Historically, UK turnouts tend to be lower than the EU average as well as being lower than other types of election in the UK. See The European Parliamentary and Local Government Elections June 2009: Report on the Administration of the 4 June 2009 Elections (The Electoral Commission: October 2009), 24-26, http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/81483/047-elections-report-final-web.pdf.Google Scholar
92 For example, see concerns about rules governing referendum campaigns in Ireland, Mendez & Mendez, supra note 31, at 227.Google Scholar
93 See Principles of European Constitutional law (Armin Von Bogdandy & J. Bast eds., 2009); Craig, supra note 6.Google Scholar
94 See S. and Marper v. United Kingdom, App. No. 30562/04 and 30566/04 (Apr. 12, 2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; see also Joined Cases C-465/00, C-138/01, and C-139/01, Rechnungshof v. Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others and Christa Neukomm and Joseph Lauermann v. Österreichischer Rundfunk, 2003 E.C.R. I-5014.Google Scholar
95 See TEU art. 12; see also TFEU art. 197(1)–(2); see also TEU protocol no. 1; Regulation 1049/2001 (public access to EU institutions' documents): Recital 15, Arts. 2(1), 14(2); Art. 29 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court.Google Scholar
96 See TFEU arts. 18, 21, 28, 30, 34, 35, 49, 56, 110.Google Scholar
97 See direct effect in Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R.; incidental direct effect in C-194/94, CIA Security International, 1996 E.C.R. I-2201; indirect effect in Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann, 1984 E.C.R. 1891; and state liability in Case C-6 & 9/90, Francovich v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. I-5357.Google Scholar
98 See Dougan, Michael, The Constitutional Dimension to the Case of Union Citizenship, 31 Eur. L. Rev. 613 (2006); see also Neil MacCormick, Democracy, Subsidiarity and Citizenship in the European Commonwealth, 16 L. & Phil. 331 (1997). For a contrasting view that citizenship has had “integrative” rather than “constitutive” effects see Jo Shaw, Citizenship: Contrasting Dynamics at the Interface of Integration and Constitutionalism, in The Evolution of EU Law 608–09 (Paul Craig & Grainne De Burca eds., 2011).Google Scholar
99 See TEU art. 9; see id. Preamble; see also TFEU art. 20(1).Google Scholar
100 See id. art. 45(1) (freedom of movement for workers); see also Title II TFEU (free movement of goods); see also TFEU art. 63(1) (movement of capital); see also TFEU art. 56 (freedom to provide services).Google Scholar
101 See TFEU art. 20(1).Google Scholar
102 See Case C-369/90, 1992 E.C.R. I-4239; see also Case C-135/08, Rottman v. Bayern, 2010 E.C.R. I-1449.Google Scholar
103 See TFEU arts. 20(2), 21–24.Google Scholar
104 See The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union arts. 39–46, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) [hereinafter The Charter].Google Scholar
105 See TEU arts. 1, 3(2), (5).Google Scholar
106 See id. art. 1.Google Scholar
107 See id. art. 3(2).Google Scholar
108 See id. art. 3(5).Google Scholar
109 See id. Preamble, Arts. 1, 3(2); see also TFEU arts. 20(1), 20(2)–24; see also The Charter Preamble.Google Scholar
110 See TEU Preamble arts. 2, 9–12.Google Scholar
111 See TEU art. 10(1).Google Scholar
112 See id. arts. 9–12.Google Scholar
113 Bogdandy, Armin Von, The European Lesson for International Democracy: The Significance of Articles 9–12 EU Treaty for International Organisations, 23 Eur. J. Int'l L. 315, 322 (1998).Google Scholar
114 See TEU art. 10(2).Google Scholar
115 See id. arts. 14(2)–14(3).Google Scholar
116 See id. art. 10(2).Google Scholar
117 See id. art. 12.Google Scholar
118 See id. art. 10(3).Google Scholar
119 See id. art. 9.Google Scholar
120 See id. art. 11(1).Google Scholar
121 See id. art. 11(4).Google Scholar
122 This is a government initiative and is not provided for under statute. Ten thousand signatures get a response from the government. One hundred thousand signatures mean the petition will be considered for debate in Parliament. See Petition Parliament and the Government, GOV.UK (July 20, 2015), https://www.gov.uk/petition-government.Google Scholar
123 Commission Regulation No. 211/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 65), recitals 5–6, arts. 3(4), 7(2) (voting requirements); 3(2), 4, 5, 8, 9 (organizers' duties); 8 (certification duties of member states); 10–11 (Commission's duties).Google Scholar
124 See the expert group's report of Dec. 2, 2014, Meeting of the Expert Group on the Citizens' Initiative, available at http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/legislative-framework.Google Scholar
125 See European Commission, Under Article 25 TFEU: On Progress Towards Effective EU Citizenship 2011–2013, at 7–8, COM (2013) 270 final (May 8, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 Article 25 Report].Google Scholar
126 European Citizens' Initiative Hits 1 Million Signatures, European Commission (Feb. 11, 2013), www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-107_en.htm; see also Water and Sanitation are a Human Right!, www.right2water.eu/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2015).Google Scholar
127 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2006 on Services in the Internal Market, 2006 O.J. (L 376), art. 17(1)(d).Google Scholar
128 Communication from the Commission on the European Citizens' Initiative “One of Us”, at 15, COM (2014) 355 final (May 28, 2014).Google Scholar
129 Id. at 17–19. The Commission concluded legislative amendments were not necessary because: (1) The 2012 Financial Regulation complies with EU primary legislation protecting human dignity, the right to life, and the right to the integrity of the person; (2) the 2013 Horizon 2020 Regulation provisions on human embryonic stem cell research comply with the EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; and (3) the existing legal framework for development cooperation enables managing development funding in a way that helps minimize abortions in developing countries, and a funding ban would undermine other objectives, such as maternal health. See id. Google Scholar
130 C-280/11P, Council v. Access Info Europe (Oct. 17, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu; Case C-350/12P, Council v. in 't Veld (July 3, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu.Google Scholar
131 See TEU art. 10(4).Google Scholar
132 See European Commission, EU Citizenship Report 2013, at 24, COM (2013) 269 final (May 8, 2013) [hereinafter EU Citizenship Report 2013].Google Scholar
133 Id. Google Scholar
134 Id. at 24–25.Google Scholar
135 See TEU art. 10(3).Google Scholar
136 See id. art. 11(2).Google Scholar
137 See id. art. 11(3).Google Scholar
138 See id. art. 16(8).Google Scholar
139 Case T-85/94, Eugénio Branco v. Comm'n, 1995 E.C.R. II-45.Google Scholar
140 The Charter art. 41.Google Scholar
141 See TFEU art. 263. See also Case C-327/91, France v. Comm'n, 1994 E.C.R. I-1409 (finding that the Commission lacked competence to conclude an international agreement); Case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Association v. Comm'n, 1974 E.C.R. 1063 (finding that the Commission decision violated a procedural requirement to allow right of reply); Case 105/75, Giuffrida v. Council Case, 1976 E.C.R. 1395 (finding that the Council of Ministers' decision to appoint a principal administrator was a misuse of powers).Google Scholar
142 See TFEU art. 296.Google Scholar
143 See TEU protocol no. 2.Google Scholar
144 See TFEU art. 352(2); TEU protocol no. 2.Google Scholar
145 See June 2013: Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Portugal, and Romania Are Called Upon to Comply with EU Rules on Oil Stocks, European Commission, available at https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/june-2013-belgium-cyprus-czech-republic-portugal-and-romania-are-called-upon-comply-eu-rules-oil (last visited Aug. 3, 2015); see also June Infringements Package: Main Decisions, European Commission 7 (June 20, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/MEMO-13-583_EN.pdf.Google Scholar
146 See TFEU art. 258. The Commission will attempt to resolve matters informally. If the matters remain unresolved, the Commission will issue a letter of formal notice requesting a response from the member state.Google Scholar
147 See Case C-1/00, Comm'n v. France, 2001 E.C.R. I-9989, para. 54; Case C-230/99, Comm'n v. France, 2001 E.C.R. I-1169, para. 31.Google Scholar
148 Case C-439/99, Comm'n v. Italy, 2002 E.C.R. I-305, para. 17; Case C-362/90, Comm'n v. Italy, 1992 E.C.R. I-02353, para. 9.Google Scholar
149 See TFEU art. 228; 2013 Article 25 Report, supra note 125, at 7.Google Scholar
150 See 2013 Article 25 Report, supra note 125, at 7.Google Scholar
151 Id. Google Scholar
152 See Majone, supra note 7, at 20–24.Google Scholar
153 See TEU art. 17(1).Google Scholar
154 See TFEU art. 25.Google Scholar
155 See TEU art. 17(2).Google Scholar
156 See 2013 Article 25 Report, supra note 125, at 6.Google Scholar
157 Id. Google Scholar
158 Id. Google Scholar
159 Id. Google Scholar
160 See European Commission, On the Application of Directive 94/80/EC on the Right to Vote and to Stand as a Candidate in Municipal Elections by Citizens of the Union Residing in a Member State of Which They Are Not Nationals, at 5, COM (2012) 99 final (Mar. 9, 2012).Google Scholar
161 See European Commission, Preparing for the 2014 European Elections: Further Enhancing Their Democratic and Efficient Conduct, COM (2013) 126 final (Mar. 12, 2013); Commission Recommendation No. 2013/142/EU, of 12 March 2013 on Enhancing the Democratic and Efficient Conduct of the Elections to the European Parliament, 2013 O.J. (L 79) 29.Google Scholar
162 See Consular Protection for European Union Citizens Abroad, European Commission, available at http://ec.europa.eu/consularprotection/en/content/home (last visited Aug. 3, 2015).Google Scholar
163 See TFEU art. 25.Google Scholar
164 See id. art. 18.Google Scholar
165 See id. art. 19(1).Google Scholar
166 See id. art. 21(2).Google Scholar
167 See id. art. 46. See also id. arts. 21(3), 48 (enumerating Council powers for social security).Google Scholar
168 See id. arts. 22(1)–22(2).Google Scholar
169 See Council Directive No. 2013/1/EU, of 20 December 2012 Amending Directive 93/109/EC as Regards Certain Detailed Arrangements for the Exercise of the Right to Stand as a Candidate in Elections to the European Parliament for Citizens of the Union Residing in a Member State of Which They Are Not Nationals, 2012 O.J. (L 26), 27.Google Scholar
170 See TFEU art. 23.Google Scholar
171 See Commission Regulation No. 211/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 65).Google Scholar
172 See TFEU art. 20(2)(b).Google Scholar
173 See R (on the application of James Alistair Preston) v. Lord President of the Council, [2012] EWCA (Civ) 1378, [2013] Q.B. 687 (Eng.) (rejecting a UK national's right to vote after living in Spain for over 15 years). See also Parliamentary Election Act of Denmark, 2009, pt. 1(2)(3) (allowing Danish citizens leaving the country to remain on the electoral roll only if they have registered their intention to return within two years).Google Scholar
174 In 2013, sixty-five percent of EU citizens favored not losing the right to vote in the citizen's country of nationality; sixty-seven percent favored non-national EU citizens having the right to vote in the citizen's country of residence. See EU Citizenship Report 2013, supra note 132, at 21–22.Google Scholar
175 See id. at 24; Commission Recommendation No. 2014/53/EU of 29 January 2014, Addressing the Consequences of Disenfranchisement of Union Citizens Exercising Their Rights to Free Movement, 2014 O.J. (L 32) 34.Google Scholar
176 See TEU art. 12.Google Scholar
177 See id. protocol no. 1.Google Scholar
178 See id. art. 12(a).Google Scholar
179 See id. protocol no. 1., arts. 1, 2, 5, 7.Google Scholar
180 For a “holistic approach” to EU lawmaking and implementation involving active and responsible involvement by national institutions see Piqani, supra note 8, at 493. National court decisions have called for greater involvement of legislatures in scrutinizing EU legislation and as guardians of the balance of power between member states and the EU. See Ústavní soud České republiky ze dne 26.11.2008 (ÚS) [Decision of the Constitutional Court of Nov. 26, 2008], sp.zn. Pl. ÚS 19/08, para. 165 (Czech); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2BvE 2/08, para. 409 (June 30, 2009), https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html.Google Scholar
181 See TEU protocol no. 1.Google Scholar
182 See European Commission, A Citizens' Agenda: Delivering Results for Europe, at 9, COM (2006) 211 final (May 10, 2006).Google Scholar
183 Cygan, Adam, The Parliamentarisation of EU DecisionMaking? The Impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on National Parliaments, 36 Eur. L. Rev. 480, 494-95 (2011).Google Scholar
184 See European Commission, Annual Report 2012 on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, at 3, COM (2013) 566 final (July 30, 2013) [hereinafter Annual Report 2012]; Adam Cygan, The UK Parliament and European Union Legislation ch. 3 (1998); Klaus Goetz & Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling, The Europeanisation of National Political Systems: Parliaments and Executives, 3 Living Rev. Eur. Gov. (2008), http://europeangovernance.livingreviews.org/Articles/lreg-2008-2/download/lreg-2008-2Color.pdf; Philipp Kilver, The National Parliaments in the European Union: A Critical View on EU Constitution Building 162-63 (2006).Google Scholar
185 Wendel, Mattias, Lisbon Before the Courts: Comparative Perspectives, 7 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 96, 117 (2011). See also Ústavní soud České republiky ze dne 26.11.2008 (ÚS) [Decision of the Constitutional Court of Nov. 26, 2008], sp.zn. Pl. ÚS 19/08, para. 173 (Czech); Ústavní soud České republiky ze dne 03.11.2009 (ÚS) [Decision of the Constitutional Court of Nov. 3, 2009], sp.zn. Pl. ÚS 29/09, para. 138.Google Scholar
186 See TEU art. 12(b).Google Scholar
187 See id. art. 5(3); id. protocol no. 2.Google Scholar
188 See id. Preamble; id. art. 1; id. protocol no. 2, Preamble.Google Scholar
189 See European Commission, On Subsidiarity and Proportionality, at 2, COM (2008) 586 final (Sept. 26, 2008). For a single test approach, see Wyatt, Derrick, Could a Yellow Card for National Parliaments Strengthen Judicial as Well as Political Policing of Subsidiarity, 2 Croatian Y.B. Eur. L. & Pol'y 1, (2006).Google Scholar
190 Wendel, , supra note 185, at 117.Google Scholar
191 See TEU protocol no. 2, arts. 5–6.Google Scholar
192 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Exercise of the Right to Take Collective Action Within the Context of the Freedom of Establishment and the Freedom to Provide Services, at 8, COM (2012) 130 final (Mar. 21, 2012). For the background to this proposal, see Monti, Mario, A New Strategy for the Single Market (May 9, 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/strategy/docs/monti_report_final_10_05_2010_en.pdf; European Commission, Towards a Single Market Act: For a Highly Competitive Social Market Economy, COM (2010) 623 (Oct. 27, 2010).Google Scholar
193 For a restrictive interpretation, see Fabbrini, Federico & Granat, Katarzyna, Yellow Card, But No Foul: The Role of the National Parliaments Under the Subsidiarity Protocol and the Commission Proposal for an EU Regulation on the Right to Strike, 50 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 115 (2013). For a broad interpretation, see Davies, Gareth, Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place, at the Wrong Time, 43 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 63 (2006); Jukka Snell, ‘European Constitutional Settlement,‘ an Ever Closer Union, and the Treaty of Lisbon: Democracy or Relevance?, 33 Eur. L. Rev. 619, 627–30 (2008).Google Scholar
194 See Annual Report 2012, supra note 184.Google Scholar
195 See id. at 3–4, 10. For Commission criteria, see Commission Impact Assessment Guidelines, SEC (2009) 92 (Jan. 15, 2009).Google Scholar
196 See Peters, Jit, National Parliaments and Subsidiarity: Think Twice, 1 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 68, 71 (2005).Google Scholar
197 See TEU protocol no. 2, arts. 7(2)–7(3).Google Scholar
198 See id. protocol no. 2, arts. 4–5.Google Scholar
199 See id. protocol no. 1, arts. 3–4.Google Scholar
200 See id. protocol no. 2, art. 2.Google Scholar
201 For an analysis of variation in reasoned opinions in the Proposed Monti II Regulation, see Fabbrini & Granat, supra note 193, at 115.Google Scholar
202 See Cygan, , supra note 183, at 484.Google Scholar
203 See Cooper, Ian, A ‘Virtual Third Chamber’ for the European Union? National Parliaments After the Treaty of Lisbon 10 (Centre for European Studies, ARENA Working Paper No. 7, 2011). For example, in 2015 the opposition Labour Party in the UK backed down from its original position not to hold an EU membership referendum, due to perceived public appetite for a referendum and the government's intention to hold one. See Labour to Back EU Referendum Bill, Says Harman, BBC (May 24, 2015), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-32863749.Google Scholar
204 See TEU protocol no. 2, art. 7(2).Google Scholar
205 See id. Google Scholar
206 See Annual Report 2012, supra note 184, at 6–7.Google Scholar
207 See TFEU art. 352. For detailed analysis of reasoned opinions, see Fabbrini, supra note 193, at 115.Google Scholar
208 Annual Report 2012, supra note 184, at 8.Google Scholar
209 See id. Google Scholar
210 See Fabbrini & Granat, supra note 193, at 115.Google Scholar
211 See cases on parliamentarians' access to information. See, e.g., Case C-350/12P, Council v. in 't Veld (July 3, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu; C-280/11P, Council v. Access Info Europe (Oct. 17, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu.Google Scholar
212 For the German Constitutional Court's development of the concept of parliamentary responsibility owed to the people, see Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2BvE 2/08, paras. 210, 243, 246–60 (June 30, 2009), https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html. For the UK House of Lords, scrutinizing, influencing, and holding national governments accountable should be recognized as “core business” for national parliaments. See European Union Committee, The Role of National Parliaments in the European Union, 2013–14, H.L. 151, at 11 (U.K.).Google Scholar
213 See TEU protocol no. 2, art. 7(3).Google Scholar
214 See id. art. 7(3)(a)–(b).Google Scholar
215 European Scrutiny Committee, Subsidiarity, National Parliaments and the Lisbon Treaty, 2007-8, H.C. 563, para. 36 (U.K.).Google Scholar
216 Council of Europe Working Group IV, Final Report of Working Group IV on the Role of National Parliaments, CONV 353/02, paras. 21–26, 33 (Oct. 22, 2002).Google Scholar
217 See TEU art. 48(7).Google Scholar
218 Art. 294 TFEU sets out the procedure that involves the European Parliament.Google Scholar
219 See TEU protocol no. 1, art. 6.Google Scholar
220 See id. art. 15.Google Scholar
221 See TFEU art. 81(3).Google Scholar
222 See TEU art. 48(7).Google Scholar
223 See id. art. 11(4).Google Scholar
You have
Access