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Strategic Surveillance and Extraterritorial Basic Rights Protection: German Intelligence Law After Snowden

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Christian Schaller

Abstract

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This Article examines the statutory and constitutional legal framework governing the bulk collection of communication data by the German Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND). German intelligence law distinguishes between certain categories of communications depending on the nationality and location of the participants. The provisions on the surveillance of foreigners abroad are far more permissive than those applying to the monitoring of communications that involve German nationals or foreigners in Germany. This differentiation is the consequence of a narrow interpretation by the German legislator of the personal and territorial scope of the right to privacy enshrined in Article 10 of the Basic Law. While there is no doubt that German nationals enjoy protection under Article 10 wherever their privacy is affected by the actions of the German State, current intelligence legislation is based on the understanding that foreigners are entitled to such protection only while staying in Germany. It will be argued that such discrimination is difficult to reconcile with German constitutional law because Article 10 protects every natural person without regard to nationality and because the Article's applicability is not limited to the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. This means that the BND is bound by Article 10 irrespective of whether its surveillance activities affect German nationals, foreigners in Germany, or foreigners abroad. Arguably, the level of protection in transnational constellations may be subject to certain modifications. But if basic rights protection is taken seriously, the existing fragmented legislation should be replaced by a uniform statutory regime for strategic surveillance of international communications that meets the minimum standards of Article 10 without bearing reference to a person's nationality or location.

Type
Developments
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 19 , Issue 4 , 01 July 2018 , pp. 941 - 980
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 by German Law Journal, Inc. 

References

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56 Some provisions contained in the BND Act are rather unspecific. The exact legal consequences of their application can be identified only in conjunction with the more comprehensive and detailed provisions of another law to which the BND Act extensively refers: Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit des Bundes und der Länder in Angelegenheiten des Verfassungsschutzes und über das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz [BVerfSchG] [Act on Cooperation Between the Federation and the Federal States in Matters Relating to the Protection of the Constitution, and on the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution], Dec. 20, 1990, BGBl. I at 2954, 2970, last amended by Gesetz [G], June 30, 2017 BGBl. I at 2097 (Ger.).Google Scholar

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64 G10 Act § 10(5).Google Scholar

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70 G10 Act § 5(2)2(lit. 2), (2)3.Google Scholar

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84 BND Act § 6(1)1.Google Scholar

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87 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 67 BVerfGE 100 (139); 110 BVerfGE 199 (214); 124 BVerfGE 78 (120); 131 BVerfGE 152 (206); 137 BVerfGE 185 (234) (Ger.).Google Scholar

88 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 40 BVerfGE 141 (178); 55 BVerfGE 349 (365) (Ger.).Google Scholar

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90 Id. at para. 127.Google Scholar

91 See Infra note 163 and accompanying text.Google Scholar

92 BND Act § 9.Google Scholar

93 G10 Act § 10(4).Google Scholar

94 BND Act § 9(1). Paragraph 2 stipulates that the use of search terms that directly lead to EU institutions or authorities of EU Member States require a separate order.Google Scholar

95 G10 Act § 10(4).Google Scholar

96 The order must identify only the relevant telecommunication network. See BND Act § 6(1)2, § 9(1)2 (lit. 2). But the notion “telecommunication network” is fairly broad under German telecommunication law. See Gesetzesentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Draft Act by the Parliamentary Groups CDU/CSU and SPD], Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen [BT] 18/9041, at 22–3 (Ger.) (commenting on this notion).Google Scholar

97 BND Act § 9(3).Google Scholar

98 BND Act § 10(4). In this case, as far as German nationals, domestic legal persons, or foreign nationals staying in Germany are concerned, the procedure for notification is the same as the procedure envisioned in Section 12 of the G10 Act.Google Scholar

99 BND Act § 11.Google Scholar

100 BND Act §§ 6(6), 10, 19, 20.Google Scholar

101 The G10 Commission will only be involved in exceptional circumstances—if a measure of surveillance under Section 6(1) of the BND Act accidentally leads to the collection of data relating to German nationals, domestic legal persons, or foreign nationals staying in Germany (BND Act § 10(4)).Google Scholar

102 BND Act § 16.Google Scholar

103 BND Act § 9(4). See also § 9(5).Google Scholar

104 Additional competences of the Independent Panel are provided by Section 15(3) of the BND Act.Google Scholar

105 BND Act § 16(2).Google Scholar

106 See, e.g., G10 Act § 7a(1)1(lit. 3).Google Scholar

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112 G10 Act § 7a(1)2, (3)1.Google Scholar

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114 G10 Act § 7a(4).Google Scholar

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119 Section 15(1) of the BND Act contains additional safeguards for the protection of personal data of German nationals, EU institutions, authorities of EU Member States, and EU citizens, as well as for the protection of the national interests of the Federal Republic of Germany.Google Scholar

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121 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvE 2/15, Oct. 13, 2016, para. 171, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2016/10/-es20161013_2bve000215.html (Ger.). In an earlier decision, the Court already stressed that an exchange of data served to maintain inter-State relations and the freedom of action of the Federal Government on the international plane. See BVerfG, 1 BvR 966/09, 1 BvR 1140/09, Apr. 20, 2016, para. 325, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2016/04/-rs20160420_1bvr096609.html (Ger.).Google Scholar

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131 BND Act § 6(3)1.Google Scholar

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144 See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 67 BVerfGE 157 (172); 100 BVerfGE 313 (358); 106 BVerfGE 28 (36); 113 BVerfGE 348 (383); 120 BVerfGE 274 (307) (Ger.).Google Scholar

145 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 115 BVerfGE 166, (183) (Ger.).Google Scholar

146 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 100 BVerfGE 313 (359, 366); 125 BVerfGE 260 (309) (Ger.).Google Scholar

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149 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 80 BVerfGE 367 (375) (Ger.).Google Scholar

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151 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 113 BVerfGE 348 (391); 120 BVerfGE 274 (337) (Ger.).Google Scholar

152 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 115 BVerfGE 166 (183) (Ger.).Google Scholar

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154 Id. For a summary of this case, see Kommers, supra note 52, at 417.Google Scholar

155 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 65 BVerfGE 1 (Ger.). See also Kommers, supra note 52, at 408.Google Scholar

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157 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 120 BVerfGE 378 (398) (Ger.).Google Scholar

158 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 120 BVerfGE 274 (311–13) (Ger.).Google Scholar

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187 While States are generally prevented by international law from exercising their authority and enforcing their laws on the territory of other States (unless they are specifically entitled to do so), they are not prevented from enacting legislation that defines for their own agencies the scope and parameters for intelligence operations abroad. Theoretically, the German legislator could therefore also adopt provisions regulating the BND's engagement in such operations, which would further enhance legal certainty.Google Scholar

188 Supra note 81.Google Scholar

189 But see Gärditz, Legal Restraints, supra note 30, at 419 (doubting that the qualitative threshold for triggering protection by Article 10 of the Basic Law is reached when a measure of strategic surveillance merely scans metadata to reveal potential patterns without individualizing the participants).Google Scholar

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206 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 18(1), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 (“Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.”).Google Scholar

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