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Should We Polish It Up? The Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the Idea of Supremacy of EU Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Krystyna Kowalik-Bańczyk

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Just one year after Polish accession to the European Union, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal was provided the opportunity to clarify its position regarding the supremacy of EC and EU law. In its two recent judgments, it joined the long tradition of a rather uneasy relationship between national Constitutional Courts and European Court of Justice (ECJ). The uneasiness of this relationship results from an ever-unsolved dilemma – which of the two judicial fora should have the last word in case of conflict between European norms and national constitution norms? The solution given by European Court of Justice in a series of early judgments seems obvious. It opted for an absolute supremacy of EC norms over national norms. On the other hand, the national Constitutional Courts usually accept the supremacy of EC law - but only as a consequence of transfer of some competences under strict conditions set by national constitutions. They thus accept the concept named by Neil Walker “constitutional pluralism”, meaning that the states are no longer the sole source of constitutional authority. However, national constitutions are still the “primary” source of any such authority.

Type
Developments
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 6 , Issue 10: Special issue - Articles German Federalism: Theory and Recent Developments , 01 October 2005 , pp. 1355 - 1366
Copyright
Copyright © 2005 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 See for instance judgments of the German Federal Constitutional Court: judgment of 29 May 1974, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr – und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (Solange I), 2 BVL 52/71; judgment of 22 October 1986, Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft (Solange II), 2 BVL 197/83; judgment of 12 October 1993, Brunner v. Treaty on European Union, 2 BVR 2134/92; judgment of 7 June 2002, Banana Market, 2 BVL 1/97. Italian Constitutional Court: Frontini, 183/73 [1973] Giurisprudenza Constitutionale, 2406. P. Craig, G. de Burca, EU: Law: Texts, Cases and Materials, (2003, 285-315); D. Simon, Le système jurdique communautaire, (2001, 455-458; J. Rideau, Droit institutionel de l'Union et des Communautés européennes (1995) Paris; I. Schübel, La primauté du droit communautaire en Allemagne, une etude de la jurisprudence de la Cour constitutionnelle fédérale allemande et de la principale doctrine allemand, RMC (1997. 621); Wł. Czapliński, Prawo wspólnotowe a prawo wewnętrzne w praktyce sądów konstytucyjnych państw członkowskich, KWARTALNIK PRAWA PUBLICZNEGO 2 (2004, 7).Google Scholar

2 The dilemma is not really exposed by authors dealing with European Union law, as the supremacy of Community law seems an ‘archetype” since Costa v. ENEL and Simmenthal judgments. However, for constitutional lawyers used to the idea of supremacy of national constitutions, the question is still open.Google Scholar

3 In German doctrine this dilemma is referred as “the ultimate arbiter” issue – M. Aziz, Sovereignty Lost, Sovereignty Regained? The European Integration Project and the Bundesverfassungsgericht, during 2000-2001 European Forum, S. Bartolini, T. Risse, B. Strath (Dir.): Between Europe and the National State: the Reshaping of Interests, Identities and Political Representation, RSCAS-EUI, EUR 81, 15, 23-24 and the doctrine cited there.Google Scholar

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9 M. Aziz refers to this state of affairs in a very critical way, naming those taking part in the discussion “Polemicists disguised as legal scholars” (2000-2001, 7). She also – even more sarcastically – speaks about “constitutional patriotism”, for instance, implying that as regards human rights protection, “there is no place like home”, (19). She suggests that because “our state fixation is based on ideology”, there is no room for serious legal argumentation, (29-30).Google Scholar

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12 The exceptions from this rule being: art. 34.2 c in fine and art. 34.4 TUE.Google Scholar

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14 Only fourteen Member States deposited the declarations accepting ECJ's jurisprudence in the third pillar, according to art. 35.2 TEU.Google Scholar

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19 Art. 55 states: 1. The extradition of a Polish citizen shall be forbidden. 2. The extradition of a person suspected of the commission of a crime for political reasons but without the use of force shall be forbidden. 3. The courts shall adjudicate on the admissibility of extradition.Google Scholar

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22 By contrast, the corresponding provisions on extradition – art. 604 of Criminal Procedure Code, enlists such ground for refusal of extradition.Google Scholar

23 The translation into English of this provision from www.trybunal.gov.pl is the following: Where a European Arrest Warrant has been issued for the purposes of prosecuting a person holding Polish citizenship or enjoying the right of asylum in the Republic of Poland, the surrender of such a person may only take place upon the condition that such person will be returned to the territory of the Republic of Poland following the valid finalization of proceedings in the State where the warrant was issued.Google Scholar

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29 Art. 188 states: The Constitutional Tribunal shall adjudicate regarding the following matters: 1) conformity of statutes and international agreements to Constitution, 2) the conformity of statute to ratified international agreements whose ratification required prior consent granted by statute, 3) the conformity of legal provisions issued by central State organs to the Constitution, ratified international agreements and statutes, 4) the conformity to the Constitution of the purposes or activities of political parties, 5) complaints concerning constitutional infringements, as specified in Article 79 (1).Google Scholar

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