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“Say On Pay” In Germany: The Regulatory Framework And Empirical Evidence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Marvin Vesper-Gräske

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A shareholder vote on executive compensation, the so-called “say on pay”, has become one of the most prominent corporate governance tools for regulators in their urge to tackle excessive executive remuneration. Its implementation in the United Kingdom in August 2002 has triggered–not least because of a Recommendation of 2004 by the European Commission–a broader discussion of this instrument which gradually led to the adoption of related rules throughout Europe. In Germany, a “say on pay” was enacted by the German Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag) as part of the Act on the Appropriateness of Management Board Compensation (Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung–VorstAG) on 18 June 2009, it passed the second chamber of the German Parliament (Deutscher Bundesrat) on 5 July 2009 and was promulgated in the legal gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt) on 31 July 2009. The new law became effective on 5 August 2009. In the meantime, the United States also enacted provisions with respect to a shareholder vote on executive compensation. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, often only referred to as the “Dodd-Frank-Act”, introduced a mandatory, non-binding “say on pay”, as well as a more specific shareholder vote on payments in the context of a change of control (“golden parachutes”). The SEC recently adopted rules in order to implement these provisions.

Type
Articles
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 14 , Issue 7 , 01 July 2013 , pp. 749 - 795
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 Now section 439 of the Companies Act 2006. See on this Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say On Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the UK Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 Harv. J. ON Legis. 323, 340–346 (2009); Lieder, Jan & Fischer, Philipp, The Say-on-pay Movement–Evidence from a Comparative Perspective, 10 ECFR 376, 381–383, 399–402 (2011); Fleischer, Holger & Bedkowski, Dorothea, “Say on Pay” im deutschen Aktienrecht: Das neue Vergütungsvotum der Hauptversammlung nach § 120 Abs. 4 AktG (“Say on Pay” in German corporate law: The new remuneration vote of the shareholders’ meeting pursuant to § 120 paragraph 4 of the German Stock Corporation Act), Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG), 677, 678 (2009); Döll, Matthias, Say on Pay: Ein Blick ins Ausland und auf die neue deutsche Regelung (Say on Pay: A look abroad and to the new German regulation), ILF Working Paper No. 107, 6–8, available at: http://www.ilf-frankfurt.de/uploads/media/ILF_WP_107.pdf (last accessed: 27 June 2013). Interestingly, the UK government was about to change (toughen) its “say on pay” provision by proposing inter alia an annual binding vote on a company's proposed remuneration policy; an annual advisory vote on whether the shareholders are satisfied with the implementation of the previously approved remuneration policy; as well as a binding shareholder vote on any exit payment to a director that exceeds the equivalent of one year's base salary. See UK Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Directors’ Pay: Consultation on Enhanced Shareholder Voting Rights (June 20, 2012), available at: http://www.bis.gov.uk/Consultations/executive-pay-shareholder-voting-rights (last accesed: 27 June 2013). Some of these proposals have been enacted by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, April 24, 2013 (Part 6: Miscellaneous and General), available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/24/contents/enacted (last accessed: 27 June 2013).Google Scholar

2 However, it seems that the British model has not yet completely achieved acceptance in Europe, see Guido Ferrarini, Niamh Moloney & Maria Cristina Ungureanu, Understanding Director's Pay in Europe: A Comparative and Empirical Analysis, ECGI Law Working Paper 126, 38–40 (2009), available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1418463 (last accessed: 27 June 2013). See also EU Commission Staff Working Document, Report on the application by Member States of the EU of the Commission Recommendation on director's remuneration of 13 July 2007, SEC (2007) 1022, 6 (“This recommendation [i.e. shareholder vote on the remuneration policy] does not seem to be appropriately implemented in the majority of Member States. About a third of the Member States have such a recommendation in place.”) See also the tables provided at pages 11–12.Google Scholar

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9 Aktiengesetz [German Stock Corporation Act], December, 2012, at § 76.Google Scholar

10 Id. at § 111.Google Scholar

11 In this regard the Code's three-step approach needs to be pointed out: compliance with statutory provisions does not need to be announced; compliance is not an option at the discretion of corporations, but obviously an irrevocable legal obligation of every company. Recommendations (marked in the Code by the use of the word “shall”), though, are not binding, but here the reporting duty is triggered. Mere suggestions (marked as “should” or “can”) are neither binding nor does a company have to disclose that it deviates from these provisions. With regard to the “comply-or-explain principle” it finally has to be mentioned that it was initially actually only a “comply-or-disclose principle”. Until 2009, there was only the legal obligation to disclose, but not to explain, the non-compliance with recommendations. German Parliament has established a real “comply-or-explain principle” in the German Stock Corporation Act, supra note 9, at § 161, by an amendment in the shadow of the enactment of the Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Bilanzrechts [BilMoG] [Accounting Law Modernization Act] May 25, 2009, BGBl. I at 1102 (Ger.).Google Scholar

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16 For an account of the methodical issues involved, see Christine Windbichler & Kaspar Krolop, Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht (European Company Law), in Europäische Methodenlehre–Handbuch für Ausbildung und Praxis § 19 (European Methodology Manual for Education and Practice Karl Riesenhuber ed., 2nd ed., 2010).Google Scholar

17 That is especially true in cases where the EU uses the legislative form of a “regulation” which is binding on the Member States and generally does not need any transformation into national law. See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 288 (2), Mar. 30, 2010, 2012 O.J. (C326). But even in cases of “directives” the room to deviate for the Member States is often limited and differs on how close-meshed the framework of the directive is. A directive is binding on the Member States and has to be implemented into national law. See art. 288 (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.Google Scholar

18 Commission Recommendation (2004/913/EC) 12/2004 of 14 December 2004 fostering an appropriate regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies, 2004 O.J. L. 385/55.Google Scholar

19 See id., explanatory note 2.Google Scholar

20 See Id., sec. 3 (explanatory note 5). According to the European Commission Staff Working Document, Report on the application by Member States of the EU of the Commission Recommendation on director's remuneration, Jul. 13, 2007, SEC (2007) 1022, at 5, this recommendation was followed by about 60 % of the Member States in 2007.Google Scholar

21 See 2004/913/EC, supra note 18, section 3.1.Google Scholar

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23 See 2004/913/EC, supra note 18, explanatory note 5.Google Scholar

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25 See 2004/913/EC, supra note 18, section 5.1.Google Scholar

26 For details, see id., sections 5.4 and 5.5.Google Scholar

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28 See id., section 4.1 and explanatory note 7.Google Scholar

29 See id., section 4.2 and explanatory note 8.Google Scholar

30 Döll, supra note 1, at 3.Google Scholar

31 This recommendation was followed by about a third of the Member States in 2007. See SEC (2007) 1022, supra note 20, at 6.Google Scholar

32 See id., section 4.2. For the UK model, see the references given at supra note 1.Google Scholar

33 For a detailed elaboration on “short-termism” in the context of the financial crisis, see Lynne Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. of Corp. L. 264 (2011); in a broader context Colin Mayer, Firm Commitment: Why the corporation is failing us and how to restore trust in it (2013).Google Scholar

34 Commission Recommendation (2009/385/EC) of 30 April 2009, complementing Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as regards the regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies, 2009 O.J. L. 120/58.Google Scholar

35 As an accompanying communication from the Commission points out, the lack of a requirement to align executive compensation with the long-term interest of companies was a shortcoming of Recommendation 2004/913/EC. See Commission Communication (COM (2009) 211 final) of 30 April 2009 accompanying Commission Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as regards the regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies and Commission Recommendation on remuneration policies in the financial services sector, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/directorsremun/COM(2009)_211_EN.pdf (last accessed: 27 June 2013), at 3.Google Scholar

36 For further details, see 2009/385/EC, supra note 34, section II.3.2, explanatory note 6. See also Gordon, supra note 1, at 333–335, who is generally skeptical concerning the opportunity to easily measure “pay for performance” (stating that “‘pay for performance’ is a complex phenomenon, not an easily measurable output variable, and that the attempt to reduce it to a simple output may lead boards, and the evaluators of boards, astray.”).Google Scholar

37 For further details, see 2009/385/EC, supra note 34, sections II.3.5., II.4, explanatory notes 7, 8.Google Scholar

38 Id. at section II.5.1.Google Scholar

39 For further details, see id. at section II.5.2.Google Scholar

40 Id., section II.6.1, explanatory note 10; see also COM (2009) 211 final, supra note 35, at 3.Google Scholar

41 See supra, note 13.Google Scholar

42 See supra, notes 14 and 15.Google Scholar

43 See Bundestag, Deutscher, Drucksachen und Protokolle (Printed materials and protocols, BT-Drs.), 15/5577 at 5 (Ger.).Google Scholar

44 See Gesetz über die Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütungen-Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungs-Gesetz [VorstOG] (Act on the Disclosure of Management Board Compensation), August 3, 2005, BGBl. I at 2267 (Ger.); on this in detail, see Theodor Baums, Zur Offenlegung von Vorstandsvergütungen (Disclosure of Management Board Compensation), Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht [ZHR 169], 299 (2005); Fleischer, Holger, Das Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz (The Act on the Disclosure of Management Board Compensation), Der Betrieb [DB] 1611 (2005).Google Scholar

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46 See Handelsgesetzbuch (German Commercial Code), December, 2012, at §§ 285 No. 9 lit. a) sentence 5, 314 (1) No. 6 lit. a) sentence 5. The German legislature acknowledged that they fall behind the EC Recommendation in this regard since the breakdown of information that has been recommended by the EC Commission was regarded as more detailed. The legislation was still convinced of having struck the right balance. See Deutscher Bundestag, supra note 43, at 6.Google Scholar

47 See German Commercial Code, supra note 46 at §§ 286 (5), 314 (2) sentence 2.Google Scholar

48 See id. at §§ 289 (2) No. 5, 315 (2) No. 4.Google Scholar

49 The unclear language (“shall”) has been subject to argument whether or not, and if yes, under which circumstances, this disclosure can be left out; see for further references Döll, supra note 1, at 4 (note 17). Furthermore, nothing in the law provided for an explanation of the (salient points of the) remuneration system to the shareholders. Only the German Corporate Governance Code contained–ever since its first amendment on May 21, 2003–a recommendation in this respect by suggesting that the chairman of the supervisory board shall outline the salient points of the compensation system and any changes thereto to the general meeting. See § 4.2.3 (at the end) of the different versions of the German Corporate Governance Code, available at: http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/eng/archiv/index.html (last accessed: 27 June 2013). According to empirical studies this recommendation has been complied with by a vast majority of corporations, see Axel v. Werder & Till Talaulicar, Kodex Report 2009: Die Akzeptanz der Empfehlungen und Anregungen des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex (Code Report 2009: The acceptance of the recommendations and suggestions of the German Corporate Governance Code), Der Betrieb [DB] 689, 691 (2009). There, the authors note that 100 % of the DAX-, 93.9 % of the MDAX- and 95.2 % of the SDAX-companies have followed this recommendation in 2009. See also Axel v. Werder & Till Talaulicar, Kodex Report 2010: Die Akzeptanz der Empfehlungen und Anregungen des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex (Code Report 2010: The acceptance of the recommendations and suggestions of the German Corporate Governance Code), Der Betrieb [DB] 853, 855 (2010), where the authors note that 100 % of the DAX-, 94.1 % of the MDAX- and 87 % of the SDAX-companies have followed this recommendation in 2010.Google Scholar

50 See Bundestag, Deutscher, supra note 43 at 5.Google Scholar

51 See German Stock Corporation Act, supra note 9 at § 87 (1). According to §§ 116 and 93 the members of the supervisory board are personally liable for the violation of that duty.Google Scholar

52 See Bundestag, Deutscher, supra note 43, at 5.Google Scholar

53 See also Schüppen, Matthias, Vorstandsvergütung-(K)ein Thema für die Hauptversammlung? (Management Board Compensation – (not) a subject for the shareholders’ meeting?), Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP] 905, 912 (2010). There, the author denies the constitutionality of the individualized disclosure requirements on grounds of a violation of the manager's right of privacy [Persönlichkeitsrecht] and his right of informational self-determination [Recht auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung].Google Scholar

54 Bundestag, Deutscher, supra note 43, at 7.Google Scholar

55 See Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung [VorstAG] (Act on the Appropriateness of Management Board Compensation), July 31, 2009, BGBl. I at 2509 (Ger.).Google Scholar

56 See part C of this paper.Google Scholar

57 See German Stock Corporation Act, supra note 9, at § 113.Google Scholar

58 See id. at § 179.Google Scholar

59 See id. at §§ 84, 87.Google Scholar

60 It is sufficient just to point out here that after the enactment of the “say on pay” provision, there has been some debate about whether a comparable shareholder vote would have been already available to shareholders in the past, i.e. before the enactment of the Act on the Appropriateness of Management Board Compensation. Occasionally it has been argued that such a vote would have indeed been possible within the framework of the annual shareholder vote on the approval of the actions of the supervisory board (see id. at § 120 (Entlastung)) because one of the statutory duties of the supervisory board is to set the executive compensation (id. at § 87). Proponents of this view argued that the general meeting has the competence to isolate the compensation issue of the general approval of the supervisory board's past actions (so-called “Teilentlastung”), see Theodor Baums, Vorschlag eines Gesetzes zur Offenlegung von Vorstandsvergütungen (Draft law for an act on the disclosure of Management Board Compensation), Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP] 1877, 1884 (2004); Döll, supra note 1, at 11–12; for the majority view that rejects this idea see e.g. Julia Redenius-Hövermann, Das Votum zum Vergütungssystem (The vote on the remuneration system), Der Aufsichtsrat 173 (2009); Schick, Werner Paul, Praxisfragen zum Vergütungsvotum der Hauptversammlung nach § 120 Abs. 4 AktG (Practical issues concerning the shareholder resolution on the remuneration system pursuant to § 120 paragraph 4 of the German Stock Corporation Act), Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP] 593, 599 (2011); Schüppen, supra note 53, at 907. Although one might be inclined to argue that this debate is wholly theoretically because–as far as it is apparent–no such shareholder vote has ever been cast in the past and now the shareholder vote on the executive compensation system has been introduced. This question has nevertheless some practical relevance since–as we will see later–the “say on pay” provision only applies to listed corporations. Thus, the notion of a “Teilentlastung” could play a role in non-listed companies in which shareholders would like to vote on the executive compensation system, but whose corporation does not fall within the scope of the new rule.Google Scholar

61 Fleischer, Holger, Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (The Act on the Appropriateness of Management Board Compensation, VorstAG), Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] 801, 805 (2009).Google Scholar

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67 See Döll, supra note 1, at 4–5 (note 22, 24 and 25) for further references.Google Scholar

68 The provision deals with that objection in prescribing that the shareholder vote does not have any legal significance. On this, see part C.II.6 of this paper.Google Scholar

69 See part C.I of this paper for the legislative perception of the effects of the “say on pay” provision.Google Scholar

70 See Bundestag, Deutscher, supra note 66, at 5; see also Deutscher Bundestag, supra note 63, at 10.Google Scholar

71 See German Stock Corporation Act, supra note 9, at § 87 (1), sentence 1.Google Scholar

72 See id. at § 87 (1), sentence 2.Google Scholar

73 See id. at § 87 (1), sentence 3.Google Scholar

74 See id. at § 87 (2). For comments on the new provision–especially with regard to the new criteria of a “standard remuneration” (übliche Vergütung)– see Deutscher Bundestag, supra note 63, at 10; Fleischer, supra note 61, at 802–804; Spindler, supra note 7, at 3283–3287; Lingemann, supra note 7, at 1918–1922; Klaus-Stefan Hohenstatt, Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (The Act on the Appropriateness of Management Board Compensation), Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP] 1349, 1350–1353 (2009); Hoffmann-Becking, Michael & Krieger, Gerd, Leitfaden zur Anwendung des Gesetzes zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (Guidance on the Application of the Act on the Appropriateness of Management Board Compensation, VorstAG), 26 Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG]-Beilage, 1, 1–6 (2009); Jaspers, Philipp, Mehr Demokratie wagen–Die Rolle der Hauptversammlung bei der Festsetzung der Vergütung des Vorstands (More democracy—The role of the shareholders’ meeting in determining the remuneration of the Management Board), Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik [ZRP] 8, 8–9 (2010).Google Scholar

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76 See German Stock Corporation Act, supra note 9, at § 116 sentence 3 (in connection with § 93).Google Scholar

77 See id. at § 193 (2), No. 4.Google Scholar

78 See part B.III of this paper.Google Scholar

79 See German Commercial Code, supra note 46, at § 285 No. 9 lit. a) sentence 6, § 314 (1) No. 6 lit. a) sentence 6. For comments, see Fleischer, supra note 61, at 805; Lingemann, supra note 7, at 1923.Google Scholar

80 See German Stock Corporation Act, supra note 9 at § 93 (2) sentence 3. For a more detailed account see e.g. Lingemann, supra note 7 at 1922; Hoffmann-Becking & Krieger, supra note 74 at 6–7.Google Scholar

81 See § 5.4.4 of the German Corporate Governance Codes from June 2, 2005 to June 18, 2009, available at: http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/eng/archiv/index.html (last accessed: 27 June 2013).Google Scholar

82 Note the flexible language “shall not be the rule” in § 5.4.4, sentence 1 of the German Corporate Governance Codes, supra note 81, which allowed for the corporation to make a declaration of compliance even in case that a former management board member was appointed to the supervisory board in the year of the declaration. As long as such an immediate appointment was not the norm in the corporation, it arguably complied with § 5.4.4, sentence 1 of the Code. This might explain why empirical studies have not provided as devastating figures as one might have expected taken the public debate about this practice, see v. Werder & Talaulicar, supra note 15 at 851, stating that 77.8 % of the DAX-, 94.1 % of the MDAX- and 95.0 % of the SDAX companies complied with the provision in 2006; Axel v. Werder & Till Talaulicar, Kodex-Report 2007-Die Akzeptanz der Empfehlungen und Anregungen des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex (Code Report 2007-The acceptance of the recommendations and suggestions of the German Corporate Governance Code), Der Betrieb [DB] 869, 871 (2007), which states that 79.3 % of the DAX-, 88.9 % of the MDAX- and 86.2 % of the SDAX companies complied with the provision in 2007; Axel v. Werder & Till Talaulicar, Kodex-Report 2008: Die Akzeptanz der Empfehlungen und Anregungen des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex (Code Report 2008-The acceptance of the recommendations and suggestions of the German Corporate Governance Code), Der Betrieb [DB] 825, 828 (2008), which states 75.0 % of the DAX-, 96.6 % of the MDAX- and 82.6 % of the SDAX companies complied with the provision in 2008; v. Werder & Talaulicar, supra note 49, at 693, which states that 81.5 % of the DAX-, 87.9 % of the MDAX- and 89.5 % of the SDAX companies complied with the provision in 2009.Google Scholar

83 See German Stock Corporation Act, supra note 9, at § 100 (2) sentence 1, No. 4.Google Scholar

84 Bundestag, Deutscher, supra note 63, at 12.Google Scholar

85 Id. Google Scholar

86 Döll, supra note 1, at 3.Google Scholar

87 Bundestag, Deutscher, supra note 63, at 12.Google Scholar

88 Hanau, Peter, Der (sehr vorsichtige) Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (The (very cautious) Draft Act on the Appropriateness of Management Board Compensation), 62 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 1652, 1653 (2009).Google Scholar

89 Begemann, & Laue, , supra note 7, at 2443; Spindler, supra note 7, at 3290.Google Scholar

90 Vetter, , supra note 7, at 2143.Google Scholar

91 Fleischer, & Bedkowski, , supra note 1, at 685.Google Scholar

92 See supra note 63 at 12. See also from the legal literature Barbara Deilmann & Sabine Otte, “Say on Pay”–erste Erfahrungen der Hauptversammlungspraxis (“Say on Pay”-first experiences on shareholder meetings), Der Betrieb [DB] 545 (2010); Schüppen, supra note 53, at 908; Fleischer/Bedkowski, supra note 1, at 685; Döll, supra note 1, at 21.Google Scholar

93 Fleischer, & Bedkowski, , supra note 1, at 685.Google Scholar

94 See the definition of “listed companies” in German Stock Corporation Act, supra note 9, at § 3 (2). See also Uwe Hüffer, Aktiengesetz–Kommentar (Commentary on the German Stock Corporation Act, 9th ed., 2010) at § 3, note 5–6.Google Scholar

95 Doralt, Peter & Diregger, Christoph, in Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (Munich Commentary on the German Stock Corporation Act, Wulf Goette, Mathias Habersack & Susanne Kalss eds., 3rd ed., 2008), at § 3 note 38.Google Scholar

96 Redenius-Hövermann, supra note 60, at 173.Google Scholar

97 Fleischer, , supra note 61, at 801.Google Scholar

98 See Hüffer, supra note 94, at § 3 note 5, stating that the listing of a corporation usually marks the dividing line between small stock corporations and larger ones.Google Scholar

99 The legislative implementation of the notion that listed and non-listed companies pose different concerns as to corporate governance issues started in 1994 and has been reinforced in 1998 with the introduction of the definition of “listed company” in § 3 (2) and the respective changes to the German Stock Corporation Act, supra note 9. See for further details Doralt & Diregger, supra note 95, at § 3 note 40–43.Google Scholar

100 See part B.III of this paper for further details.Google Scholar

101 See German Stock Corporation Act, supra note 9, at § 124 (4) sentence 1.Google Scholar

102 See id. at § 121 (2) sentence 1, § 121 (3) sentence 2.Google Scholar

103 See id. at § 120 (4) (“The shareholders’ meeting […] may resolve [‥].”; “Die Hauptversammlung […] kann […] beschließen.”). See further the official legislative materials, Deutscher Bundestag, supra note 63, at 12, and the unanimous opinion in the corporate literature, e.g. Schick, supra note 60, at 599; Schüppen, supra note 53, at 908; Vetter, supra note 7, at 2139; Jochen Hoffmann, in Aktiengesetz–Kommentar (Commentary on the German Stock Corporation Act, Gerald Spindler & Eberhard Stilz eds., 2nd ed., 2010) at § 120, note 54; Lieder & Fischer, supra note 1, at 386.Google Scholar

104 This state of affairs explains some doctrinal efforts to virtually limit the management board's discretion in favor of a decision-making authority of the supervisory board, see Döll, supra note 1, at 16; Redenius-Hövermann, supra note 60, at 174, who wants to grant the right to make the respective proposal in analogy to § 124 (3) sentence 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act, supra note 9, to the supervisory board. In contrast, the prevailing opinion in the corporate literature adheres to the statutory distribution of competences, see e.g. Vetter, supra note 7, at 2139; Joachim Frhr. v. Falkenhausen & Dirk Kocher, Erste Erfahrungen mit dem Vergütunsgvotum der Hauptversammlung (First experiences with the vote of the shareholders’ meeting on the remuneration system), Die Aktiengesellschaft [AG] 623, 626 (2010).Google Scholar

105 See German Stock Corporation Act, supra note 9, at § 122 (2). On this more detailed in connection with the shareholder vote on executive remuneration see Schick, supra note 60, at 600.Google Scholar

106 Hüffer, supra note 94, at § 120 note 21.Google Scholar

107 German Stock Corporation Act, supra note 9, at § 120 (1) and (2) (so-called “Entlastung”). Google Scholar

108 See supra note 60 for references.Google Scholar

109 Hoffmann-Becking & Krieger, , supra note 74, at 10–11; Vetter, supra note 7, at 2138; Deilmann & Otte, supra note 92, at 545; v. Falkenhausen & Kocher, supra note 104, at 626; Schüppen, supra note 53, at 907; Daniel Wilm, Beobachtungen der Hauptversammlungssaison 2010 (Observations of the shareholders’ meeting season in 2010), Der Betrieb [DB] 1686 (2010); Schick, , supra note 60, at 599.Google Scholar

110 Therefore, some scholars are arguing in favor of decreasing the threshold for a shareholder request in § 122 (2) of the German Stock Corporation Act, supra note 9, see Lieder & Fischer, supra note 1, at 414.Google Scholar

111 Similarly, though with a view to the general meetings’ season of 2010, see Reinhard Marsch-Barner, Ausblick auf die Hauptversammlungssaison 2011 (Prospects for the shareholders’ meeting season 2011), 1 Corp. Fin. L. [CFL] 35 (2011); skeptical about the practical implications of the provision at the time of its enactment on the other hand, see Lingemann, supra note 7, at 1923.Google Scholar

112 See part D.III.2 of this paper for further details.Google Scholar

113 See part C.II.1 of this paper.Google Scholar

114 See e.g. Hoffmann, , supra note 103, at § 120 note 53; Schick, supra note 60, at 594; Fleischer & Bedkowski, supra note 1, at 681.Google Scholar

115 See German Stock Corporation Act, supra note 9, at §§ 84, 87.Google Scholar

116 Fleischer, & Bedkowski, , supra note 1, at 681–682, 685, stating also the border line for such an informal contact: the autonomous decision of the supervisory board as to the determination of the executive compensation into which the general meeting may not interfere.Google Scholar

117 Vetter, , supra note 7, at 2138; v. Falkenhausen & Kocher, supra note 104, at 625; Hohenstatt, supra note 74, at 1356.Google Scholar

118 Hoffmann, , supra note 103, at § 120 note 53; Hüffer, supra note 94, at § 120 note 20.Google Scholar

119 Redenius-Hövermann, supra note 60, at 174; Döll, supra note 1, at 19; Schick, supra note 60, at 595.Google Scholar

120 See Fleischer, & Bedkowski, , supra note 1, at 682; Döll, supra note 1, at 18.Google Scholar

121 See Vetter, , supra note 7, at 2138; Hohenstatt, supra note 74, at 1356; Schüppen, supra note 53, at 907; Schick, supra note 60, at 594; Hoffmann, supra note 103, at § 120 note 53; this “detail” has been overlooked by Rosemarie Koch & Georg Stadtmann, Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (The Act on the Appropriateness of Management Board Compensation), 60 Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik 212, 229 (2011) in their short (positive) appreciation of the new advisory vote.Google Scholar

122 See part B.III of this paper.Google Scholar

123 See Hohenstatt, , supra note 74, at 1356; Vetter, supra note 7, at 2138; v. Falkenhausen & Kocher, supra note 104, at 625; from a comparative law perspective, see Fleischer & Bedkowski, supra note 1, at 682.Google Scholar

124 Deilmann, & Otte, , supra note 92, at 546; v. Falkenhausen & Kocher, supra note 104, at 626. This differentiates the German from the British “say on pay” provision to a considerable extent, because the latter provides for a connection between the information (remuneration report) and the shareholder vote; see Fleischer & Bedkowski, supra note 1, at 682; Lieder & Fischer, supra note 1, at 381; Gordon, supra note 1, at 341–342.Google Scholar

125 Dissenting, , i.e. arguing that relying on a voluntary reporting by the company is inadequate and therefore a respective duty needs to be imposed by law, e.g. Redenius-Hövermann, supra note 60, at 175. From my perspective, this view seems to neglect two things: firstly, the strong incentives the company has to report, and secondly, the empirical data that proves that companies are actually providing the information. See accompanying text.Google Scholar

126 See Bundestag, Deutscher, supra note 63, at 12.Google Scholar

127 See 2004/913/EC, supra note 18, at section 3 (so-called “remuneration statement”); for further details, see part B.II.1 of this paper.Google Scholar

128 See German Corporate Governance Code, supra note 8, at § 4.2.5.Google Scholar

129 See v. Werder & Talaulicar, supra note 82 at 871, stating that 100 % of the DAX-, 92.9 % of the MDAX- and 83.3 % of the SDAX-corporations have complied with that recommendation in 2007; v. Werder & Talaulicar, supra note 82 at 827, stating that 100 % of the DAX-, 96.6 % of the MDAX- and 84.0 % of the SDAX-corporations have complied with that provision in 2008; v. Werder & Talaulicar, supra note 49 at 691, stating that 100 % of the DAX-, 97.0 % of the MDAX- and 95.0 % of the SDAX-corporations have complied with that provision in 2009; v. Werder & Talaulicar, supra note 49 at 855, stating that 100 % of the DAX-, 94.3 % of the MDAX- and 95.7 % of the SDAX-corporations have complied with that provision in 2010.Google Scholar

130 Schick, , supra note 60 at 597; Deilmann & Otte, supra note 92 at 546; v. Falkenhausen & Kocher, supra note 104 at 627.Google Scholar

131 See e.g. Fleischer, supra note 61 at 805; Fleischer & Bedkowski, supra note 1 at 682; Vetter, supra note 7 at 2138; Deilmann & Otte, supra note 92 at 546.Google Scholar

132 See German Corporate Governance Code, supra note 8, at § 4.2.3 (6). This recommendation is also complied with by a vast majority of companies, see supra note 49.Google Scholar

133 Schick, , supra note 60, at 597.Google Scholar

134 See German Stock Corporation Act, supra note 9, at § 131 (1) and (3).Google Scholar

135 This seems to be a unanimous opinion, see Vetter, supra note 7, at 2139; Fleischer, supra note 61, at 805; Deilmann & Otte, supra note 92, at 546; Schüppen, supra note 53, at 907–08.Google Scholar

136 See Deutscher Bundestag, supra note 63, at 12.Google Scholar

137 For example the British “say on pay” demands an annual vote, see on this e.g. Lieder & Fischer, supra note 1, at 382, 386. The newly implemented “say on pay” provision in the US also provides for a time frame, see Sec. 14A (a)(1) and (2) Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (a shareholder approval not less frequent than once every three years; but the shareholders must get the opportunity to vote not less often than every six years on the issue as to whether a different frequency of the vote (annual, biennial or triennial) is preferred).Google Scholar

138 See German Stock Corporation Act, supra note 9 at § 122 (2); see also part C.II.2 of this paper.Google Scholar

139 Deilmann, & Otte, , supra note 92, at 546.Google Scholar

140 Id. Google Scholar

141 Redenius-Hövermann, supra note 60, at 174; Döll, supra note 1, at 17.Google Scholar

142 See Döll, supra note 1, at 17.Google Scholar

143 The question raised here has to be sharply distinguished from the question of whether the articles of incorporation may provide for a substantial regulation of executive compensation (e.g. prescribe the percentage of variable components of the overall compensation package). The latter question is–as far as can be seen-unanimously treated as a violation of the supervisory board's authority of setting the management compensation. Therefore, the shareholders do not have a right to implement substantial regulation as to management compensation into the articles of incorporation. See on this Vetter, supra note 7, at 2143.Google Scholar

144 For an answer in the affirmative, see Schüppen, supra note 53, at 911; Döll, supra note 1, at 16. In contrast, see v. Falkenhausen & Kocher, supra note 104, at 628; Vetter, supra note 7, at 2143.Google Scholar

145 See German Stock Corporation Act, supra note 9, at § 23 (5) sentence 1–2 (so-called “Grundsatz der Satzungsstrenge”); for a concise overview, see Hüffer, supra note 94, at § 23 note 34–38a.Google Scholar

146 See part C.II.6 of this paper.Google Scholar

147 Similarly, see Schüppen, supra note 53, at 911; Döll, supra note 1, at 16.Google Scholar

148 Recommendations that either prescribe annual or regular votes that should take place every two or three years are conceivable; alternatively, one could imagine a recommendation that the shareholders should be granted with a vote every time the executive compensation system has been changed by the supervisory board.Google Scholar

149 See Vetter, , supra note 7, at 2142.Google Scholar

150 See German Stock Corporation Act, supra note 9, at § 161 (comply-or-explain principle). See also the description already given in part B.I of this paper, as well as note 11.Google Scholar

151 The problem results from uncertainty about how the (non-)compliance with the German Corporate Governance Code translates into (negative or) positive capital market reactions. I am not aware of any empirical study that would address this question satisfactorily.Google Scholar

152 Begemann, & Laue, , supra note 7, at 2444 (also discussing the legal nature of a mere advisory vote); see also Holger Fleischer, Konsultative Hauptversammlungsbeschlüsse im Aktienrecht-Rechtsdogmatik, Rechtsvergleichung, Rechtspolitik (Advisory shareholder resolutions in Corporate Law-legal doctrine, comparative law, legal policy), Die Aktiengesellschaft [AG] 681, 682–684, 688–691 (2010), who examines the broader concept of advisory votes in German Corporate Law.Google Scholar

153 See German Stock Corporation Act, supra note 9 at § 120 (4) sentence 2.Google Scholar

154 See id. at § 120 (4) second half sentence of sentence 2; see also part B.IV.2 of this paper regarding § 87 and its changes in 2009.Google Scholar

155 See also Begemann & Laue, supra note 7, at 2444; v. Falkenhausen & Kocher, supra note 104, at 627.Google Scholar

156 See German Stock Corporation Act, supra note 9, at § 120 (4) sentence 3.Google Scholar

157 For further details, see German Stock Corporation Act, supra note 9, at § 243. It is quite unclear whether the exclusion of the action of voidance (Anfechtungsklage) also comprises an exclusion of an action for nullification (Nichtigkeitsklage). On this, see Fleischer, supra note 61, at 805; Döll, supra note 1, at 23; v. Falkenhausen & Kocher, supra note 104, at 628; Begemann & Laue, supra note 7, at 2445.Google Scholar

158 See Deutscher Bundestag, supra note 63, at 12.Google Scholar

159 See Fleischer & Bedkowski, supra note 1, at 685; Fleischer, supra note 152, at 682; Vetter, supra note 7, at 2140. But see also the criticism as to this explanation, e.g. Döll, supra note 1, at 24 (raising doubts that the “say on pay” resolution can be a leverage for frivolous shareholders to pursue special benefits at the corporation's and other shareholders’ expense); Lieder, & Fischer, , supra note 1, at 416.Google Scholar

160 Commonly referred to in Germany as “räuberische Aktionäre” or “Berufskläger”.Google Scholar

161 Fleischer, , supra note 61, at 805.Google Scholar

162 Fleischer, & Bedkowski, , supra note 1, at 685.Google Scholar

163 See v. Falkenhausen & Kocher, supra note 104, at 625, stating that 1/3 of the companies of the MDAX, about 1/2 of the corporations of the TEC-DAX and more than the majority of the SDAX corporations refrained from holding a shareholder vote in 2010. And these figures do not seem to have changed significantly in the following year, cf. Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapierbesitz (DSW) e.V. (Press Release), Say on Pay: 78% der MDAX Unternehmen stimmen über Vergütung ab / Bei SDAX Unternehmen herrscht noch ein großer Nachholbedarf, August 12, 2011, available at: http://www.dsw-info.de/Say-on-Pay-78-der-MDAX-Unter.1807.0.html (last accessed: 27 June 2013), which states that taking 2010 and 2011 together, 78 % of all MDAX, about 63% of all TEC-DAX and about 42 % of all SDAX corporations have granted their shareholders a “say on pay”.Google Scholar

164 In the same direction, see v. Falkenhausen & Kocher, supra note 104, at 625.Google Scholar

165 See also Lieder, & Fischer, , supra note 1, at 411.Google Scholar

166 See Lieder, & Fischer, , supra note 1, at 412–413, stating that they have determined a free float in the DAX 30 of about 82.6 %, of 52.5 % in the MDAX and of 42.2 % in the SDAX.Google Scholar

167 Infrequently, though, I will take into consideration the ownership structure of some of the DAX 30 corporations set forth in the table below, in order to interpret some peculiarities of that data. Anyhow, the focus then will not so much rest on whether there exist controlling or dominant shareholders or widely dispersed ownership; instead, I will focus on the nationality of these shareholders.Google Scholar

168 Furthermore, my research has not yielded any empirical study as to the effects of the new “say on pay” provision on management compensation in Germany. For an empirical study that tries–much more general–to measure the influence of the VorstOG as well as of the VorstAG on executive remuneration, see Alexander Götz & Niklas Friese, Empirische Analyse der Vorstandsvergütung im DAX und MDAX nach Einführung des Vorstandsvergütungsangemessenheitsgesetzes (Empirical analysis of executive compensation in DAX and MDAX after the introduction of the Act on the Appropriateness of Management Board Compensation), 6 Corporate Finance biz 410 (2010), stating that the absolute amount of executive remuneration in the period from 2005–2009 has reduced for the DAX 30 as well as for the MDAX companies due to a decline in variable and stock-based remuneration–a result that seems to be intuitive because of the financial crisis and thus cannot really be generalized. The authors have continued their study and added the year 2010, see Alexander Götz & Niklas Friese, Vorstandsvergütung im DAX und MDAX–Weiterführung der empirischen Analyse 2010 nach Einführung des Vorstandsvergütungsangemessenheitsgesetzes (Executive compensation in the DAX and MDAX-continuation of the empirical analysis in 2010 after the introduction of the Act on the Appropriateness of Management Board Compensation), 8 Corp. Fin. biz 498 (2011), stating that in 2010 the overall remuneration of the DAX and MDAX companies has increased again and reached the level of 2006-this finding suggests that Götz & Friese measured less the influence of the VorstOG/VorstAG than the impact of the financial crisis on the executive compensation of DAX- and MDAX-companies. For an assessment of the economic consequences of the VorstAG see also Koch & Stadtmann, supra note 121 at 212, expecting that the VorstAG will have the effect of increasing management compensation because managers–anticipating the facilitated corporate means to decrease their remuneration, see German Stock Corporation Act, supra note 9 at § 87 (2), in case of a malposition of the corporation–will demand a higher compensation in the first place. For an interesting and fact-intensive study of the development of the executive compensation of the DAX 30 corporations in Germany from 1987 to 2010, see Joachim Schwalbach, Vergütungsstudie 2011–Vorstandsvergütung, Pay-for-Performance und Fair Pay–DAX 30-Unternehmen 1987–2010 (Compensation Study 2011-Management Board remuneration, pay for performance and fair pay-DAX 30 companies 1987–2010), available at: http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/professuren/bwl/management/managerverguetung (last accessed: 27 June 2013).Google Scholar

169 See especially the notice of the general meeting of Infineon Technologies AG (11 February 2010), item 2, available at: http://www.infineon.com/cms/en/corporate/investor/reporting/agm2010/index.html (last accessed: 27 June 2013).Google Scholar

170 Id. Google Scholar

171 The corporations in question were Daimler AG, Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Henkel KGaA, Linde AG, Metro AG, Siemens AG and ThyssenKrupp AG.Google Scholar

172 See id. for the names of these corporations; only Linde AG did not provide for a new vote in 2011.Google Scholar

173 See part C.II.2 of this paper.Google Scholar

174 See for the same observation for the general meetings’ season of 2010 Marsch-Barner, supra note 111, at 35; Schick, supra note 60, at 600.Google Scholar

175 See Palan, Dietmar & Werres, Thomas, Mit welchen Methoden sich Topmanager hohe Gehälter sichern–trotz Krise und neuer gesetzlicher Vorschriften (How top managers secure high salaries-despite the crisis and new legislation), 12 Manager-Magazin 56 (2009).Google Scholar

176 See Vergütungsvotum-Premiere gelungen, FOCUS Money (July 7, 2010), available at: http://www.focus.de/finanzen/boerse/verguetungsvotum-premiere-gelungen_aid_527649.html (last accessed: 27 June 2013).Google Scholar

177 Deilmann, & Otte, , supra note 92, at 545; Schick, supra note 60, at 600.Google Scholar

178 See e.g. the recent discussion of Patrick Bernau & Georg Meck, Dürfen Top-Manager ihre Gehälter an Star-Gagen messen? (Can top managers measure their salaries to star salaries?), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (March 24, 2012), available at: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/pro-contra-duerfen-topmanager-ihre-gehaelter-an-star-gagen-messen-11695994.html (last accessed: 27 June 2013).Google Scholar

179 See Vetter, , supra note 7, at 2141.Google Scholar

180 Of the same general opinion, see Carsten Wettich, Aktuelle Entwicklungen in der Hauptversammlungssaison 2011 und Ausblick auf 2012 (Current developments in the shareholders’ meeting season of 2011 and prospects for 2012), 19 Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] 721, 726 (2011).Google Scholar

181 The notice of the general meeting in 2012 does not state that alterations to the executive compensation system have been made. Only the remuneration report section of the financial statements of 2012 states that there has been an increase of the fixed compensation components for the management board members, see BMW AG–Annual Report 2011 at 165, available at: http://www.bmwgroup.com/bmwgroup_prod/e/0_0_www_bmwgroup_com/investor_relations/corporate_events/hauptversammlung/2012/BMW-Annual-Report-2011.pdf (last accessed: 27 June 2013).Google Scholar

182 See the respective invitations to its general meetings during the sample period (2010-2012), available at: http://www.beiersdorf.com/Investors/Annual_General_Meeting/Archive.html (last accessed: 27 June 2013).Google Scholar

183 See Löhr, Julia & Jahn, Joachim, Aktionäre halten deutsche Vorstandsgehälter für angemessen (Executive pay according to German shareholders appropriate), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (June 23, 2010), available at: http://m.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/unternehmen/manager-verguetung-aktionaere-halten-deutschevorstandsgehaelter-fuer-angemessen-1635139.html (last accessed: 27 June 2013); Stocker, Franck, Die Wut der Aktionäre über die Vorstandsgehälter (Franck Stocker, Shareholders’ anger concerning executive compensation), Die Welt (June 27, 2010), available at: http://www.welt.de/finanzen/article8191205/Die-Wut-der-Aktionaere-ueber-die-Vorstandsgehaelter.html (last accessed: 27 June 2013).Google Scholar

184 See Strenger, Christian, Wichtige Neuerungen im Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex aus Sicht institutioneller Investoren (mportant innovations in the German Corporate Governance Code from the perspective of institutional investors), 36 Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] 1401 (2010).Google Scholar

185 See Stocker, , supra note 183; see also Strenger, supra note 184, at 1402.Google Scholar

186 See AG, Deutsche Bank, Shareholder Structure, available at: https://www.deutsch.ebank.de/ir/en/content/shareholder_structure.htm (last accessed: 27 June 2013).Google Scholar

187 See Strenger, , supra note 184, at 1402.Google Scholar

188 See Deutsche Börse AG, Shareholder Structure, available at: http://deutsche-boerse.com/dbg/dispatch/en/kir/dbg_nav/investor_relations/20_The_Share/40_Shareholder_Structure (last accessed: 27 June 2013).Google Scholar

189 Similar to this view, see Lieder & Fischer, supra note 1, at 413.Google Scholar

190 See the average figure for the year 2008, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Aktionärsstruktur von DAX-Unternehmen (September 25, 2010), available at: http://www.bpb.de/wissen/0ZUWM5,0,0,Aktion%E4rsstruktur_von_DAXUnternehmen.html (last accessed: 27 June 2013).Google Scholar

191 See Bayer, AG, Ownership Structure, available at: http://www.investor.bayer.com/no_cache/en/stock/ownership-structure/overview/ (last accessed: 27 June 2013); Daimler, AG, Shareholder Structure, available at: http://www.daimler.com/investor-relations/daimlershares/shareholder-structure (last accessed: 27 June 2013).Google Scholar

192 See the notice of the general meeting of Deutsche Bank AG, General Meeting 2012 (May 31, 2012), item 8, available at https://www.deutsche-bank.de/ir/en/download/HV2012_Tagesordnung_en_2304.pdf, stating that some smaller adjustments had to be implemented–not least because of some newly enacted requirements for the banking system.Google Scholar

193 See Wettich, , supra note 180 at 726.Google Scholar

194 See the notice of the general meeting of Merck KGaA, Annual General Meeting 2012 (20 April 2012), item 7, available at: http://www.merckgroup.com/company.merck.de/en/images/HV_2012_Agenda_EN_tcm1612_87388.pdf?Version= (last accessed: 27 June 2013).Google Scholar

195 This differentiates Merck KGaA from Deutsche Bank AG; the latter had had its comparatively poor result already in 2010 and has altered its executive compensation system only by now. This appears to support the assumption that the amendments for Deutsche Bank AG rest more on the implementation of regulatory changes for the financial industry–as it is also stated in Deutsche Bank's notice of 2012–than on a response to the low approval rate in 2010.Google Scholar

196 See Commerzbank, AG, Total number of shares and voting rights at the time the meeting was convened, available at: https://www.commerzbank.de/media/en/aktionaere/haupt/2010/Anzahl_Stimmrechte.pdf (last accessed: 27 June 2013).Google Scholar

197 For the same conclusion, see Commerzbank-Vorstandsgehälter: Bund enthält sich bei Abstimmung (Commerzbank executive pay: federal government abstains from voting), Frankfurter Rundschau (May 20, 2010), available at: http://www.fr-online.de/wirtschaft/commerzbank-vorstandsgehaelter-bund-enthaelt-sich-beiabstimmung,1472780,4461466.html (last accessed: 27 June 2013); see also Jutta Maier, Commerzbank setzt sich bei den Gehältern durch (Commerzbank prevails in salaries), Berliner Zeitung (May 21, 2010), available at: http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/archiv/bund-enthaelt-sich-bei-entscheidender-abstimmung-commerzbank-setztsich-bei-gehaeltern-durch,10810590,10718226.html (last accessed: 27 June 2013)Google Scholar

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199 On the other hand, this explanation would have suggested a withdrawal from voting on other items of the general meeting's agenda as well, which has not been the case. The federal government has voted on every other issue which can be inferred from the share capital that is represented by the respective votes, see Commerzbank AG, Annual General Meeting–Voting on proposals contained in the agenda (May 19, 2010), available at: https://www.commerzbank.de/media/aktionaere/haupt/2010/Abstimmungsergebnisse_HV2010_e_2.pdf (last accessed: 27 June 2013).Google Scholar

200 See parts B.II.2 and C.I of this paper.Google Scholar

201 These corporations are Deutsche Bank AG (in 2010), Deutsche Börse AG, Merck KGaA (in 2011), HeidelbergCement AG (in 2010), and SAP AG (in 2012). See the data set forth in the table above (part D.II).Google Scholar

202 For observations in the same direction for 2010, see Wilm, supra note 109, at 1687.Google Scholar

203 These corporations are Adidas AG (in 2010 and 2012), Allianz SE, MAN SE, Siemens AG (in 2010), Merck KGaA (in 2012) and Munich Re AG (in 2011 and 2012), see the data set forth in the table above (part D.II).Google Scholar

204 There is one seemingly and one real exception to this observation. The first concerns the general meeting of Siemens AG in 2010 where two items have been denied; but these points were introduced by minority shareholders and not put on the agenda by a management board initiative. The only case in which the approval to another item has been lower than to the “say on pay” for the companies stated in note 203 was on the general meeting of MAN SE in 2011 (re reappointment of two members of the MAN supervisory board).Google Scholar

205 Bundesregierung, Die, Regierungspressekonferenz vom 8. Mai 2013 (government press conference, May 8, 2013), available at: http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2013/05/2013-05-08-regpk.html (last accessed: 27 June 2013); see also Bundesministerium der Justiz, Mehr Kontrolle für Manager (More control over managers), press release (May 8, 2013), available at: http://www.bmj.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2013/20130508_Mehr_Kontrolle_fuer_Manager.html?nn=1468684 (last accessed: 27 June 2013).Google Scholar

206 See on this, The Economist, Executive pay: Fixing the fat cats-Switzerland votes to curb executive pay (May 9, 2013), available at: http://www.economist.com/news/business/21573169-switzerland-votes-curb-executive-payfixing-fat-cats/ (last accessed: 27 June 2013).Google Scholar

207 For further details on the envisaged provision, see Ulrich Noack, Unternehmensrechtliche Notizen: Vorstandsvergütung, mal wieder (ergänzt) (Corporate Legal notes: Executive compensation, again (updated), May 8, 2013), available at: http://notizen.duslaw.de/vorstandsvergutung-mal-wieder/ (last accessed: 27 June 2013).Google Scholar