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Safety Valves and Complete Exits in European Treaty Politics
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
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It is common to describe the European Union as “new,” “unique,” “sui generis,” and hard to fit into existing categories of institutional arrangements, national or international. Indeed, debates on how to describe the EU are often lively and sometimes illuminating. In concrete terms, however, one of the best ways to understand the EU's distinction from other forms of treaty-based trade and integration regimes is the EU's distinctive lack of unilateral safeguard and escape valve mechanisms available to policy-makers in the various Member States.
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- Brexit Special Supplement
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- Copyright © 2016 by German Law Journal, Inc.
References
1 B. Peter Rosendorff & Milner, Helen V., The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape, 55 International Organization 829 (2001).Google Scholar
2 ECJ Case 7/61 Commission v Italy [1961] ECR 317.Google Scholar
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