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The Prohibition of Amnesties by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Christina Binder

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The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has proven a particularly active defender of human rights in Latin America. The Court has developed an innovative and creative jurisprudence with respect to all kinds of human rights violations, including forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, violations of indigenous peoples' rights or those of undocumented migrants. Legal scholars have praised the Inter-American Court for its effective protection of human rights and even the International Court of Justice has drawn on the judgments of the Inter-American Court. The Inter-American Court has, however, also been criticized for adopting an overly broad standard of review, exceeding the competences conferred on it in the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR, Convention) and for its detailed reparation orders which encroached on the states' internal domestic affairs. Put differently, the Court was blamed for being a too active judicial lawmaker. It has therefore been suggested that the Inter-American Court would be well advised to pay more attention to national sovereignty and the consent of the regional community of states when exercising its adjudicative function.

Type
III. Judicial Lawmaking to Protect the Individual: The IACtHR, the ECtHR, and the ICTY
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 12 , Issue 5: Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as Lawmakers , 01 May 2011 , pp. 1203 - 1230
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 See generally on the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court, IACtHR) Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen & Amaya Úbeda de Torres, Les grandes décisions de la Cour interaméricaine des Droits de l'Homme (2008).Google Scholar

2 See, e.g., Pía Carazo Ortíz, El sistema interamericano de derechos humanos: democracia y derechos humanos como factores integradores en Latinoamérica, in: ¿Integración suramericana a través del Derecho? Un análisis interdisciplinario y multifocal, 231 (Armin von Bogdandy, César Landa Arroyo & Mariela Morales Antoniazzi eds, 2009); see also Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, El Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los Derechos Humanos entre Clasicismo y Creatividad, in: ¿ Integración suramericana a través del Derecho? Un análisis interdisciplinario y multifocal, 311 (Armin von Bogdandy, César Landa Arroyo & Mariela Morales Antoniazzi eds, 2009).Google Scholar

3 The Inter-American Court's interpretation of the right to information on consular assistance as an individual right of arrested persons adopted in the advisory opinion Right to Information on Consular Assistance (Inter-Am. Court H.R., The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of 1 October 1999, Series A, No. 16) was subsequently confirmed by the ICJ in the LaGrand and Avena cases (LaGrand (Germany v. United States), Judgment of 27 June 2001, ICJ Reports 2001, 466; Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), Judgment of 31 March 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, 12). See also the ICJ's reference to the IACtHR in Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of Congo, Judgment of 30 November 2010, para. 68.Google Scholar

4 See, e.g, Neumann, Gerald, Import, Export and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 19 EJIL 101 (2008).Google Scholar

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6 Neumann (note 4).Google Scholar

7 See infra section C.III.Google Scholar

8 See generally on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Scott Davidson, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1992); Burgorgue-Larsen & Úbeda de Torres (note 1); Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen & Amaya Úbeda de Torres, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Case Law and Commentary (forthcoming 2011).Google Scholar

9 The states which have recognized the IACtHR's jurisdiction are Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. (As of June 2010, status of ratifications, available at: http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/firmas/b-32.html.)Google Scholar

10 The ACHR is ratified by 24 states. Grenada, Jamaica and Dominica have ratified the ACHR but not submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. (See id.)Google Scholar

11 See Arts 61-65 ACHR.Google Scholar

12 Arts 52-54 ACHR; Arts 4-9 of the Statute Inter-American Court of Human Rights.Google Scholar

13 Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade (Brazil) acted as judge from 1995 to 2006; Thomas Buergenthal (United States) from 1979 to 1991. As of June 2010, the members of the Court were Rhadys Abreu Blondet (Dominican Republic, Ambassador with human rights portfolio); Leonardo A. Franco (Argentina, Professor for Human Rights Law at the National University of Lanús); Margarette May Macaulay (Jamaica, Attorney at Law at private practice); Diego García-Sayán (Peru, President of the IACtHR, General Director of the Comisión Andina de Juristas); Manuel E. Ventura Robles (Costa Rica, Vice-President of the IACtHR, inter alia former member of the Costa Rican foreign service); Alberto Pérez Pérez (Uruguay, Professor for Constitutional Law and Public International Law at the Universidad de la República in Montevideo) and Eduardo R. Vio Grossi (Chile, Professor for Public International Law at the University Diego Portales and the Academia Diplomática de Chile “Andrés Bello”). See Website of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, available at: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/composicion.cfm.Google Scholar

14 Art. 22 Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; Arts 11, 12 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.Google Scholar

15 See Art. 63 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The ACHR does not designate a body to supervise the execution of the Inter-American Court's judgments, but merely provides that the Court should indicate those states which have not complied with its judgments in its annual report to the OAS General Assembly (Art. 65 ACHR).Google Scholar

16 Inter-Am. Court H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Compensatory Damages (Art. 63(1) ACHR), Judgment of 21 July 1989, Series C, No. 7.Google Scholar

17 Before, the Inter-American Court issued numerous advisory opinions of major importance. (See, e.g., Inter-Am. Court H.R., “Other Treaties” Subject to the Advisory Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 of the ACHR), Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 of 24 September 1982, Series A, No. 1; Inter-Am. Court H.R., Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts 4.2 and 4.4 of the ACHR), Advisory Opinion OC-3/83 of 8 September 1983, Series A, No. 3.)Google Scholar

18 This is mainly due to a 2001 procedural reform modifying Art. 44.1 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Now, most cases have to be submitted to the Court in accordance with established criteria.Google Scholar

19 As of June 2010; the data are from: IACtHR, Jurisprudence: Decisions and Judgments, available at: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/casos.cfm.Google Scholar

20 See, for instance, the notorious Punto Final and Obediencia Debida acts in Argentina which were passed in 1986 and 1987 and practically brought investigations on human rights violations committed by the military junta between 1976 and 1983 to a halt. See also the Chilean amnesty decreto-ley (decree-law) of 1978 (Amnesty decree law No. 2.191 of 18 April 1978, Diario Oficial [Official Gazette] No. 30.042) which established the non-responsibility for crimes committed between 11 September 1973 (military coup by Pinochet) and 10 March 1978. For Uruguay, see the Law Nullifying the State's Claim to Punish Certain Crimes/Limitations Act/Law of Expiry, Law No. 15.848 of 22 December 1986. For further reference, see, e.g., Steven R. Ratner & Jason S. Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy 153 et seq. (2001).Google Scholar

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22 See, e.g., Argentina, where President Carlos Menem pardoned around 30 top junta leaders in 1989 who had been imprisoned for human rights abuses due to the fear of a new military coup (decree 1002/89). The decree was recently declared unconstitutional by the Argentine Supreme Court in the Mazzeo Case, see infra section D.II.Google Scholar

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25 See Cavallaro & Brewer (note 5), 820.Google Scholar

26 Inter-Am. Court H.R., Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Judgment of 14 March 2001, Series C, No. 75.Google Scholar

27 Inter-Am. Court H.R., La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 29 November 2006, Series C, No. 162.Google Scholar

28 Inter-Am. Court H.R., Almonacid Arellano y otros v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 26 September 2006, Series C, No. 154.Google Scholar

29 Concerning self-amnesties, see also Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 27 November 1998, Series C, No. 42, paras 167 et seq. and operat. para. 2.Google Scholar

30 Laws No. 26.479 and 26.492 (note 21).Google Scholar

31 Barrios Altos v. Peru (note 26), para. 41.Google Scholar

32 “Self-amnesties” are legal acts through which the regime committing the human rights violations shields itself from prosecution.Google Scholar

33 Barrios Altos v. Peru (note 26), para. 43.Google Scholar

34 Id., operat. para. 4.Google Scholar

35 Inter-Am. Court H.R., Barrios Altos v. Peru, Interpretation of the Judgment on the Merits, Judgment of 3 September 2001, Series C, No. 83, para. 18 and operat. para. 2.Google Scholar

36 La Cantuta v. Peru (note 27).Google Scholar

37 Id., paras 188, 189.Google Scholar

38 The Inter-American Court extensively listed Peruvian measures and jurisprudence to reach this conclusion.Google Scholar

39 Almonacid v. Chile (note 28).Google Scholar

40 See, e.g., id., para. 115.Google Scholar

41 Id., para. 111.Google Scholar

42 Amnesty decree law No. 2.191 (note 20).Google Scholar

43 Almonacid v. Chile (note 28), operat. para. 2.Google Scholar

44 Id., operat. para. 3. The fact that the amnesty laws had not been applied by Chilean courts in various cases since 1998 was not considered sufficient to comply with the requirements of Art. 2 ACHR as the implementing authorities could change their approach (id., para. 121).Google Scholar

45 Id., operat. paras 5, 6.Google Scholar

46 Id., para. 124. For details, see infra sections C.II and III.Google Scholar

47 Id., para. 120.Google Scholar

48 See Barrios Altos v. Peru (note 26), para. 42. The Inter-American Court only generally refers to “amnesties” and “self-amnesties”, without establishing clear procedural criteria as to the (in)admissibility of such laws. Only Judge Cançado Trindade, in a concurring opinion in the Barrios Altos Case, distinguished between amnesties and self-amnesties and considered self-amnesties as “particularly problematic”. (Barrios Altos, Concurring Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade (note 26), para. 7).Google Scholar

49 See, e.g., Barrios Altos v. Peru (note 26), para. 41; Almonacid v. Chile (note 28), para. 111.Google Scholar

50 Arts 8 and 25 ACHR.Google Scholar

51 See Almonacid v. Chile (note 28), para. 119. See also the extensive appraisal of the Inter-American Court's contribution concerning the inadmissibility of self-amnesties by Judge Cançado Trindade, Separate Opinion, La Cantuta v. Peru (note 27), paras 23 et seq. Google Scholar

52 This was stated most clearly in La Cantuta: “such ‘laws’ have not been capable of having effects, nor will they have them in the future.” (La Cantuta v. Peru (note 27), para. 189).Google Scholar

53 While especially the Court's findings in La Cantuta indicate that the Inter-American Court's statement is declaratory and not constitutive, such establishment would have been up to the competent institution at the domestic level (e.g. the constitutional court).Google Scholar

54 See Separate Opinion of Judge García Ramírez, La Cantuta v. Peru (note 27), paras 4 and 5: “Basically, such laws are invalid – with no need for a special decision so holding as, in any event, any such decision would be a mere declaration of invalidity — from the very moment they conflict with the American Convention”.Google Scholar

55 See Néstor Sagüés, El ‘Control de Convencionalidad’ en particular sobre las Constitucionales Nacionales, La Ley of 19 February 2009, 3: “en ciertos veredictos … la Corte Interamericana habría incluso nulificado normas nacionales, como leyes de amnistía, con efectos erga omnes, comportándose así como un verdadero Tribunal Constitucional nacional.” (“in certain judgments … the Inter-American Court has even nullified national norms, such as amnesty laws, with erga omnes effects, acting like a true national Constitutional Court.”)Google Scholar

56 “it's the first time that an international court determines that national laws are devoid of legal effects within the state system where they have been adopted and consequently obliges the state to act as if these laws had never been enacted.” Antonio Cassese, Y-a-t-il un conflit insurmontable entre souveraineté des États et justice pénale internationale? in: Crimes internationaux et juridictions internationales, 13, 16 (Antonio Cassese & Mireille Delmas-Marty eds, 2002).Google Scholar

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58 Almonacid v. Chile (note 28), para. 124.Google Scholar

59 In the interpretation of the Inter-American Court; for further details, see infra sections C.II and III.Google Scholar

60 Almonacid v. Chile (note 28), para. 125.Google Scholar

61 Id., para. 124.Google Scholar

62 See also Inter-Am. Court H.R., Trabajadores Cesados del Congreso (Aguado Alfaro y otros) v. Peru, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 24 November 2006, Series C, No. 158, para. 128.Google Scholar

63 Almonacid v. Chile (note 28), paras 123-125. The effect of such control by national judges is inter partes. (Sagüés (note 55), 2.) The Inter-American Court has not rendered a decision on what happens when the respective national tribunal is competent to invalidate norms erga omnes. Still, according to Sagüés, it might do so. (Id.)Google Scholar

64 See in this sense, Almonacid (note 28), para. 123.Google Scholar

65 Trabajadores Cesados del Congreso v. Peru (note 62), para. 128.Google Scholar

66 Inter-Am. Court H.R., Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 12 August 2008, Series C, No. 186, paras 180-181.Google Scholar

67 Inter-Am. Court H.R., Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 23 November 2009, Series C, No. 209, para. 339. See furthermore Inter-Am. Court H.R., Boyce y otros v. Barbados, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 20 November 2007, Series C, No. 169, para. 78.Google Scholar

68 This facilitates the work of national institutions, especially when the nullification of amnesty laws is met with domestic resistance. The effectiveness of such international human rights protection seems particularly warranted in the Latin American context of fragile democracies and weak domestic institutions (see infra section D).Google Scholar

69 The Inter-American Court appears to leave open whether such control must also be exercised with respect to other human rights treaties. See Almonacid v. Chile (note 28), para. 124, “an international treaty, such as the American Convention” (emphasis added).Google Scholar

70 Inter-Am. Court H.R., Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala, Judgment of 20 June 2005, Series C, No. 126. In the case at issue, an individual had been condemned to death inter alia on the basis of a provision of the Guatemalan penal legislation which provided for an evaluation of the threat the individual posed pro futuro. Google Scholar

71 Id., operat. para 8.Google Scholar

72 Inter-Am. Court H.R., “La Última Tentación de Cristo” (Olmedo Bustos y otros) v. Chile, Merits and Reparations, Judgment of 5 February 2001, Series C, No. 73, operat. para. 4.Google Scholar

73 The illegality of amnesty laws which establish impunity for the perpetration of most serious human rights violations meets a general trend in international law as evidenced in the practice of the UN Human Rights Committee, the ICTY and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. See, for further reference, Leyla Sadat, Individual Progress in International Law: Considering Amnesty, in: Progress in International Law, 335, especially 348 et seq. (Russel Miller & Rebecca Bratspies eds, 2008).Google Scholar

74 Almonacid v. Chile (note 28), para. 125.Google Scholar

75 See Mark Villiger, Commentary to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 370 et seq. (2009).Google Scholar

76 See reasoning in Almonacid v. Chile (note 28), para. 125.Google Scholar

77 Since the 2005 constitutional reforms and the introduction of a centralized system of norm control this might be problematic also in Chile.Google Scholar

78 In Uruguay, the ACHR has the same rank as statutory laws (Art. 6 of the Constitution of Uruguay). See, for further referente, Allan Brewer Carías, La interrelación entre los Tribunales Constitucionales de America Latina y la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, y la cuestión de la inejecutabilidad de sus decisiones en Venezuela, in: Direitos humanos, democracia, e integração jurídica na América do Sul, 661 (Armin von Bogdandy, Flávia Piovesan & Mariela Morales Antoniazzi eds, 2009).Google Scholar

79 As stated, in “La Última Tentación de Cristo” the Inter-American Court found that a provision of the Chilean Constitution was inconsistent with the ACHR and asked Chile to modify it. “La Última Tentación de Cristo” v. Chile (note 72). Also see Sagüés (note 55), 3. Cf. Hitters (note 57).Google Scholar

80 Trabajadores Cesados del Congreso v. Peru (note 62), para. 128.Google Scholar

81 It has been suggested in literature that in systems with centralized norm control domestic courts should adopt a pragmatic stand and simply refer the respective cases to the competent tribunal. (Sagüés (note 55), 2.)Google Scholar

82 See the Inter-American Court's definition of its role as “the ultimate interpreter of the ACHR” in Almonacid v. Chile (note 28), para. 124.Google Scholar

83 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Court H.R., Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 31 August 2004, Series C, No. 111, paras 115-135 (relying on HRC General Comment No. 27); Inter-Am. Court H.R., Yatama v. Nicaragua, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 23 June 2005, Series C, No. 127, para. 208 (quoting from HRC General Comment No. 25); Inter-Am. Court H.R., Raxcacó Reyes v. Guatemala, Judgment of 15 September 2005, Series C, No. 133 (2005), para. 69 (citing HRC Concluding Observations on reports of Iran and Iraq). See generally Neumann (note 4), 109 et seq. See also, most recently, Inter-Am. Court H.R., Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment of 28 November 2007, Series C, No. 172, paras 92-94, where the Inter-American Court drew inter alia on Arts 1, 27 CCPR, HRC Concluding Observations on the Russian Federation and HRC General Comment No. 23: The Rights of Minorities (Art. 27), to interpret the right to property in Art. 21 ACHR with special focus on indigenous peoples. See, for further reference, Lisl Brunner, The Rise of Peoples’ Rights in the Americas: The Saramaka People Decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 7 Chinese Journal of International Law 699 (2008).Google Scholar

84 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 11 February 1998, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add. 2, relied upon by the Inter-American Court in the Moiwana Village Case. (Inter-Am. Court H.R., Moiwana Village v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 15 June 2005, Series C, No. 124, para. 111.)Google Scholar

85 The Inter-American Court stated respectively that “a certain tendency to integrate the regional and universal systems for the protection of human rights can be perceived in the Convention” (“Other Treaties” (note 17), para. 41) and also relied on Art. 29(b) ACHR. See critically Neumann (note 4), 111 et seq; and Cavallaro & Brewer (note 5), 817.Google Scholar

86 Certain national constitutions enumerate exhaustively the human rights treaties which are incorporated at constitutional level. (See, e.g., Art. 75.22 of the Argentine Constitution).Google Scholar

87 Under Art. 68 ACHR states undertake “to comply with the judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.”Google Scholar

88 Arts 55-57 of the Peruvian Constitution. The Peruvian Constitution does not provide for an incorporation of international (human rights) treaties at a certain rank in legal hierarchy. Still, Art. 55 of the Constitution states that international treaties are “part of national law” and its final provisions establish that constitutional rights and freedoms have to be interpreted in accordance with international human rights treaties ratified by Peru.Google Scholar

89 See, e.g., Law No. 27.775 Regula el procedimiento de ejecución de sentencias emitidas por Tribunales Supranacionales (Regulating the procedure for the execution of judgments handed down by Supranational Tribunals); Art. 115 Código Procesal Constitucional (Constitutional procedure Code).Google Scholar

90 The Peruvian Constitutional Court acts as the final interpreter of the Constitution with the competence to derogate, with erga omnes effects, unconstitutional legislation. In addition, ordinary judges may decide not to apply or enforce unconstitutional laws with effects inter partes. (System of judicial diffuse norm control in combination with a centralized control in a specialized court, see Arts 138, 201, 202 and 204 of the Peruvian Constitution.) (See Néstor Sagüés, Regional Report Latin America, VII. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Conference on International Law, The Contribution of Constitutional Courts in Safeguarding Basic Rights, Democracy and Development 10 [2009]). As to the Peruvian Constitutional Court's composition of June 2010: all seven judges were professors of law at different Peruvian Universities. (See Website of the Peruvian Constitutional Court, available at: http://www.tc.gob.pe/magistrados/magistrados.html.)Google Scholar

91 This even in cases where Peru was not a party to the dispute, see infra note 133.Google Scholar

92 See Constitutional Court of Peru, Santiago Martín Rivas, Expediente N° 4587-2004-AA/TC, 29 November 2005.Google Scholar

93 See id., para 63.Google Scholar

94 Sala Penal Especial, Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sentencia Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, Expediente N° AV-19-2001, 7 April 2009. The Special Criminal Chamber was composed of three Supreme Court judges. The charges were grouped into three different public trials, with the first trial focussing on human rights issues including the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta massacres. The decision was rendered on 7 April 2009 with Fujimori being found guilty on all charges. As of June 2010 it was under appeal before a second panel of five Supreme Court judges whose decision will be final. For details, see Jo-Marie Burt, Guilty as Charged: The Trial of Former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori for Human Rights Violations, 3 International Journal of Transnational Justice 384, 396 (2009).Google Scholar

95 Resolución de cumplimiento de sentencia del 22 de Septiembre de 2005. See also La Cantuta v. Peru (note 27), para. 179.Google Scholar

96 Peruvian judicial authorities declared “amnesty exceptions” or the denial of the opening of criminal investigations as inadmissible arguing with the inapplicability of amnesty laws in reliance on the Barrios Altos Case. See, e.g., Segundo Juzgado Penal Especializado, Causa Pedro Yauri Bustamante, Causa N° 044-2002, 20 October 2004; Juez Penal Titular Superior de Justicia de Lima, Caso Acumulado Barrios Altos, La Cantuta, Pedro Yauri y El Santa, Causa N° 032-2001, 7 December 2004.Google Scholar

97 Consejo Supremo de Justicia Militar, Sala Plena, Judgment of 1 June 2001; Sala Revisora (second instance tribunal in the Peruvian military justice system), Decision of 4 June 2001.Google Scholar

98 See, e.g., the findings of the Inter-American Court in La Cantuta where the Court establishes that Peru had fully implemented the Barrios Altos judgment (La Cantuta v. Peru (note 27), para. 186).Google Scholar

99 See Burt (note 94).Google Scholar

100 Id., 403.Google Scholar

101 For a general appraisal, see Brian D. Tittemore, Ending Impunity in the Americas: The Role of the Inter-American Human Rights System in Advancing Accountability for Serious Crimes under International Law, 12 Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas 429, 455 (2005-2006).Google Scholar

102 The 2005 reforms of the Chilean Constitution introduced a system of centralized norm control located at the Constitutional Court, which is vested with a monopoly to rule on the constitutionality of legislation with erga omnes effects (Art. 82 of the Chilean Constitution). Still, the Chilean Supreme Court is tasked to engage in norm control until the end of its term of office (Cuadragesimacuarta, Chilean Constitution). Art. 5 of the Chilean Constitution establishes the obligation to respect the fundamental rights of persons as recognized in the Constitution and international human rights treaties ratified by Chile. Thus, international human rights treaties arguably have constitutional rank.Google Scholar

103 Interview with Gonzalo Aguilar Cavallo, Professor for Public International Law and Human Rights Law at the Universidad de Talca, Heidelberg, 29 June 2010; see also Human Rights Watch, Chile, Events of 2009, available at: http://www.hrw.org/en/node/87512.Google Scholar

104 See id. Google Scholar

105 Supreme Court of Chile, Criminal Chamber, Molco Case, No. 559-2004, 13 December 2006, paras 19-20, available at: http://www.cecoch.cl/htm/htm/revista/docs/estudiosconst/revistaano-5-1-htm/sentencimolco5_l-2007.pdf. (See, however, the Inter-American Court's findings in Almonacid v. Chile (note 28), para. 121; see, for further reference, note 44).Google Scholar

106 Interview with Gonzalo Aguilar Cavallo (note 103). See, e.g., Carlos M. Ayala Corao, La ejecución de sentencias de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos / The execution of the decisions of the Inter-American Human Rights Court, 5/1 Estudios Internacionales 127 (2007), available at: http://www.cecoch.cl/htm/revista/revistaano_5_1_2007.html; see more generally publications by Centro de Estudios Constitucionales de Chile (CECOCH), available at: http://www.cecoch.cl/htm/Imagenes.htm; and Scientific Electronic Library Online (SciELO Chile), available at: http://www.scielo.cl.Google Scholar

107 See, for further reference, Brewer Carías (note 78). See generally Thomas Buergenthal, Self-executing and Non-self-executing Treaties in National and International Law, 235 Recueil des Cours 303, 326 (1992).Google Scholar

108 See, e.g., María Angélica Gelli, El Liderazgo Institucional de la Corte Suprema y las Perplejidades del Caso “Mazzeo”, La Ley of 7 December 2007, 1.Google Scholar

109 For a detailed appraisal, see Tittemore (note 101), 449 et seq. Google Scholar

110 Argentina has a system of diffuse norm control where judges are obliged not to apply unconstitutional legal provisions to a particular case with effects inter partes. Thus, the legislation remains in force. Still, as Argentina applies a doctrine similar to the American “stare decisis“ doctrine, this implies a certain binding effect on later decisions. (See Sagüés (note 90), 3 et seq.) In Argentina, certain international human rights treaties, including the ACHR, are incorporated at constitutional level in accordance with Art. 75.22 of the Argentine Constitution.Google Scholar

111 Argentine Supreme Court, Recurso de hecho deducido por la defensa de Julio Héctor Simón en la causa Simón, Julio Héctor y otros s/ privación ilegítima de la libertad, etc., Causa No. 17.768, Judgment of 14 June 2005. See, for further reference, Diego García-Sayán, Justicia interamericana y tribunales nacionales, in: ¿Integración suramericana a través del derecho? Un análisis interdisciplinatio y multifocal, 463, 473 (Armin von Bogdandy, César Landa Arroyo & Mariela Morales Antoniazzi eds, 2009).Google Scholar

112 See Julio Héctor Simón (note 111), para. 24.Google Scholar

113 Id. Google Scholar

114 Id. Argentine appeals courts, such as the Cámara Federal de Apelaciones de Salta, also referred to the Inter-American Court's reasoning in the Barrios Altos Case when stating that the Argentine amnesty laws Obediencia Debida and Punto Final were unconstitutional. (See García-Sayán (note 111), 474.)Google Scholar

115 Argentine Supreme Court, Mazzeo Julio Lilo y otros, Judgment of 13 July 2007, Jurisprudencia Argentina 2007-III-573, para. 21.Google Scholar

116 Decree 1002/89 (note 22).Google Scholar

117 Mazzeo (note 115), para. 21: “En otras palabras, el Poder Judicial debe ejercer una especie de “control de convencionalidad“ entre las normas jurídicas internas que aplican en los casos concretos y la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. En esta tarea, el Poder Judicial debe tener en cuenta no solamente el tratado, sino también la interpretación que del mismo ha hecho la Corte Interamericana, intérprete última de la Convención Americana.” (“Put differently, the judiciary must exercise a sort of “conventionality control” between internal legal norms which apply in concrete cases and the American Convention on Human Rights. In so doing, the judiciary must not only take into consideration the Convention, but also the interpretation which is made thereof by the Inter-American Court, the ultimate interpreter of the American Convention”).Google Scholar

118 The Argentine Supreme Court also referred to the IACHR and the UN-HRC.Google Scholar

119 Mazzeo (note 115), paras 21 and 29.Google Scholar

120 Tittemore (note 101), 455.Google Scholar

121 For details, see id., 457 et seq. and 463 et seq. Google Scholar

122 For instance, former IACHR Member and President Oscar Luján Fappiano served as the Secretary for Human Rights in the Argentine Ministry of Justice, Security and Human Rights. Jorge E. Taiana, who had been the IACHR's Executive Secretary from 1997 to 2001 held the position of Secretary of Foreign Affairs with the Government of President Nestor Kirchner. Taiana had also been political prisoner under the Argentine military dictatorship. See id., 463.Google Scholar

123 Id., 465.Google Scholar

124 In Colombia, a decentralized system of norm control, where all judges are bound to use the “unconstitutionality exception” with effect inter partes, coexists with a control exercised by the Constitutional Court which declares unconstitutional laws to be unenforceable with general effects. (Arts 241-243 of the Colombian Constitution). Pursuant to Art. 93 of the Colombian Constitution, international human rights treaties are arguably incorporated at constitutional rank (so called “bloque constitucional“). See Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, Country Report Colombia, VII. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Conference on International Law. The Contribution of Constitutional Courts in Safeguarding Basic Rights, Democracy and Development 5 (2009).Google Scholar

125 For a full list of cases, see http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co. For further reference, see Tittemore (note 101), 457 et seq. Google Scholar

126 Art. 13 of Law 733 of 29 January 2002.Google Scholar

127 Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment C-695/02 of 28 August 2002, para. 8.Google Scholar

128 Law 742 of 5 June 2002.Google Scholar

129 Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment C-578/02 of 30 July 2002, 4.3.1.2.5.Google Scholar

130 Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment C-875/02 of 15 October 2002. The Colombian Constitutional Court distinguished the case under review from a different decision in an earlier case (1995) with reference to the 2001 Barrios Altos Case.Google Scholar

131 See Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgments T-568 of 10 August 1999, C-010 of 19 January 2000 and C-200 of 19 March 2002, available at: http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co.Google Scholar

132 This was also the case in Chile, where judgments of the Inter-American Court were relied upon for interpretative guidance when dealing with problematic amnesty laws which were not applied to a particular case already before the Almonacid decision. For example, the Appellate Court of Santiago de Chile, when rejecting the appeal presented by those prosecuted for the detention and later disappearance in the case of Miguel Ángel Sandoval Rodríguez, referred to the Barrios Altos case. See, for further reference, Humberto Nogueira Alcalá, Una senda que merece ser transitada: la sentencia definitiva de casación de la Quinta Sala de la Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago, Rol 11.821-2003, Caso Miguel Ángel Sandoval Rodríguez, 9 Revista Ius et Praxis 233 (2003). See also García-Sayán (note 111), 473.Google Scholar

133 The Peruvian Constitutional Court generally affirmed that even when Peru had not been party to the proceedings, the Inter-American Court's judgments were binding on the state. Peruvian Constitutional Court, Caso Arturo Castillo Chirinos, Expediente N° 2730-06-PA/TC, Judgment of 21 July 2006, para. 12.Google Scholar

134 For the case of Peru, see Burt (note 94). See generally Tittemore (note 101), 461, “courts in [the OAS] region are playing an increasingly proactive and independent role in addressing issues involving accountability for serious violations of human rights, and are drawing considerably upon the instruments and doctrine of the inter-American human rights system in this effort.”Google Scholar

135 See, e.g., Burt (note 94), 385-386, as regards the Peruvian civil society's search for accountability: “Of special importance was their increasingly effective use of the inter-American system of human rights protection to advance this agenda: once Peru's transition to democracy was under way, the rich jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court), as well as the recommendations by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), fundamentally shaped the policies regarding truth, justice and reparations adopted by the transitional government and key judicial bodies.”Google Scholar

136 See id. See also Tittemore (note 101), 469, “over time, the inter-American human rights system has had a domestic political impact in some Member States upon efforts to ensure accountability for serious human rights violations and thereby combat impunity in the region. Moreover, these effects, together with the influences upon the judiciary, can be viewed as potentially long-term and enduring, as they have contributed to the consolidation of a culture of democracy and the rule of law within the Member States concerned. In this way, the Inter-American system has helped to empower member States themselves to be the principal guarantors and defenders of fundamental human rights”.Google Scholar

137 Osuna, Karla Quintana, Diálogo entre la jurisprudencia interamericana y la legislación interna: el deber de los estados de adoptar disposiciones de derecho interno para hacer efectivos los derechos humanos, in: ¿Integración suramericana a través del Derecho? Un análisis interdisciplinario y multifocal, 573 (Armin von Bogdandy, César Landa Arroyo & Mariela Morales Antoniazzi eds, 2009).Google Scholar

138 Cavallaro & Brewer (note 5), 82.Google Scholar

139 Peru, For, see, e.g., Burt (note 94).Google Scholar

140 Tribunal Supremo Venezolano, Sala Constitucional, Caso Abogados Gustavo Álvarez Arias y otros, Judgment No. 1.939 of 18 December 2008. See, for further reference, Brewer Carías (note 78), 669.Google Scholar

141 Inter-Am. Court H.R., Apitz Barbera y otros (“Corte Primera de lo Contencioso Administrativo”) v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 5 August 2008, Series C, No. 182. The Inter-American Court established in Apitz Barbera that Venezuela had violated the right to a fair trial of the judges of the Venezuelan Corte Primera de lo Contencioso Administrativo, who had been destituted. The Inter-American Court ordered that Venezuela compensate the judges and re-institute them in their posts or in similar positions.Google Scholar

142 Inter-Am. Court H.R., Castillo Petruzzi y otros v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 30 May 1999, Series C, No. 52, paras 1, 86.Google Scholar

143 The main characteristic of faceless judges (jueces sin rostro) is their secrecy, with judges and prosecutors only being identified by codes, judges at all time invisible to the defendants and their council and trial proceedings being conducted in private. See UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Addendum: Report on the Mission to Peru, 19 February 1998, II (B), para. 4.Google Scholar

144 Legislative Resolution No. 27.152 of 8 July 1999. See also Inter-Am. Court H.R., Castillo Petruzzi y otros v. Peru, Compliance with Judgment, Resolution of 17 November 1999, Series C, No. 59, para. 3. The situation changed some years after Fujimori had left power. For example, in 2003 Peru's Constitutional Court cited Castillo Petruzzi to strike down several pieces of antiterrorist legislation. See Peruvian Constitutional Court, Marcelino Tineo Silva y más de 5,000 ciudadanos, Expediente N° 010-2002-AI/TCLIMA, Judgment of 1 March 2003, available at: http://www.tc.gob.peljurisprudencia/2003/00010-2002-AI.html . For further reference, see Cavallaro & Brewer (note 5), 789 et seq. See also Trinidad and Tobago's withdrawal from the ACHR when confronted with its capital punishment procedures’ inconsistency with the Convention. Notification of withdrawal by the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Trinidad y Tobago to the Secretary General of the OAS, 26 May 1998. The text of the notification is available at: http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/firmas/b-32.html. See Sergio García Ramírez, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Death Penalty, Biblioteca Jurídica Virtual del Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas del UNAM, 2009, available at: http://info8.juridicas.unam.mx/pdf/mlawrns/cont/5/nte/nte5.pdf, for details.Google Scholar

145 Sagüés (note 55), 3.Google Scholar

146 Helfer, Laurence R. & Slaughter, Anne-Marie, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 Yale Law Journal 273, 300 (1997-1998).Google Scholar

147 E.g., to apply an overly strict standard of review to state actions may be detrimental to the Court's cause.Google Scholar

148 In this respect, the Court's reference to non-derogable norms when nullifying unconventional amnesty laws introduced a welcome hierarchy and indicated the required prudence in the Court's approach.Google Scholar

149 Cavallaro & Brewer (note 5), 770.Google Scholar