Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-l7hp2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-23T19:55:28.926Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The Nature of Corruption: An Interdisciplinary Perspective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

In response to the many facets of corruption, many scholars have produced interdisciplinary research from both the theoretical and empirical perspective. This paper provides a comprehensive state-of-the-art survey of existing literature on corruption, utilizing these interdisciplinary insights. Specifically, we shed light on corruption research including insights from, among others, the fields of economics, psychology, and criminology. Our systematic discussion of the antecedents and effects of corruption at the micro, meso, and macro level allows us to capture the big picture of not only what drives corrupt behavior, but also its substantial ramifications.

Type
Special Issue Ethical Challenges of Corrupt Practices
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 Aidt, Toke S. et al., Corruption and Sustainable Development, in 2 International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption 3 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Tina Soreide eds., 2011); Noel D. Johnson, Courtney L. LaFountain & Steven Yamarik, Corruption Is Bad for Growth (Even in the United States), 147 Pub. Choice 377 (2011).Google Scholar

2 See Habib, Mohsin & Zurawicki, Leon, Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment, 33 J. Int'l Bus. Stud. 291 (2002); Aparna Mathur & Kartikeya Singh, Foreign Direct Investment, Corruption, and Democracy 135 (Am. Enter. Inst., Working Paper, 2007); S. L. Reiter & H. Kevin Steensma, Human Development and Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries: The Influence of FDI Policy and Corruption, 38 World Dev. 1678 (2010).Google Scholar

3 Hasan Faruq et al., Corruption, Bureaucracy and Firm Productivity in Africa, 17 Rev. Dev. Econ. 117 (2011); Virginie Vial & Julien Hanoteau, Corruption, Manufacturing Plant Growth, and the Asian Paradox: Indonesian Evidence, 38 World Dev. 69 (2010); Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Consequences of Corruption at the Sector Level and Implications for Economic Growth and Development (Mar. 25, 2015).Google Scholar

4 Gonne Beekman et al., Corruption, Investments and Contributions to Public Goods: Experimental Evidence from Rural Liberia, 115 J. Pub. Econ. 37 (2014).Google Scholar

5 See, e.g., Justesen, Mogens K. & Christian Bj&rnskov, Exploiting the Poor: Bureaucratic Corruption and Poverty in Africa, 58 World Dev. 106 (2014); John Christensen, The Looting Continues: Tax Havens and Corruption, 7 Critical Persp. on Int'l Bus. 177 (2011).Google Scholar

6 Eugen Dimant et al., The Effect of Corruption on Migration, 1985–2000, 20 Applied Econ. Letters 1270 (2013).Google Scholar

7 Dimant, Eugen & Deutscher, Christian, The Economics of Corruption in Sports: The Special Case of Doping (Edmond J. Safra, Working Paper No. 55, 2015).Google Scholar

8 See, e.g., Richey, Sean, The Impact of Corruption on Social Trust, 38 Am. Pol. Res. 676 (2010); Augusto López Claros, Removing Impediments to Sustainable Economic Development: The Case of Corruption (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 6704, 2013); Eugen Dimant, The Antecedents and Effects of Corruption—A Reassessment of Current (Empirical) Findings (Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 2014).Google Scholar

9 Tanzi, Vito, Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures, 45 IMF Staff Papers 559 (1998).Google Scholar

10 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Foreign Bribery Report: An Analysis of the Crime of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials (Dec. 2, 2014).Google Scholar

12 Noonan, John T. Jr., Bribes: The Intellectual History of a Moral Idea 700 (1987).Google Scholar

13 Cuervo-Cazurra, Alvaro, Transparency and Corruption, in The Oxford Handbook of Economic and Institutional Transparency 324 (Jens Forssbæck & Lars Oxelheim eds., 2014).Google Scholar

14 Wallis, John Joseph, The Concept of Systematic Corruption in American History, in Corruption and Reform: Lessons from America's Economic History 23 (Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia Goldin eds., 2006).Google Scholar

15 Evans, Bryan R., The Cost of Corruption: A Discussion Paper on Corruption, Development and the Poor 20–21 (Tearfund, Discussion Paper, 1999).Google Scholar

16 Myrdal, Gunnar, Corruption as a Hindrance to Modernization in South Asia, in Political Corruption: Concepts & Contexts, 265 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer & Michael Johnston eds., 3d ed. 2011).Google Scholar

17 Nye, Joseph S., Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 417 (1967).Google Scholar

18 Id. at 419.Google Scholar

19 Peters, John G. & Welch, Susan, Gradients of Corruption in Perceptions of American Public Life, in Political Corruption: Concepts & Contexts 155 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer & Michael Johnston eds., 3d ed. 2011).Google Scholar

21 See Axel Dreher & Martin Gassebner. Greasing the Wheels? The Impact of Regulations and Corruption on Firm Entry, 155 Pub. Choice 413 (2013); Vial & Hanoteau, supra note 3.Google Scholar

22 See Aidt, Toke S., Corruption, Institutions, and Economic Development, 25 Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol. 271 (2009); Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Khalid Sekkat, Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of Growth?, 122 Pub. Choice 69 (2005).Google Scholar

23 Effi Lambropoulou et al., The Construction of Corruption in Greece: A Normative or Cultural Issue? 4 (U. Konstanz Res. Grp. Soc. Knowledge, Discussion Paper No. 6, 2007).Google Scholar

24 Becker, Gary S., Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968).Google Scholar

25 Nagin, Daniel S., Deterrence: A Review of the Evidence by a Criminologist for Economists, 5 Ann. Rev. Econ. 83 (2013).Google Scholar

26 Eberhard Feess ET AL., The Impact of Fine Size and Uncertainty on Punishment and Deterrence: Evidence from the Laboratory 25 (Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 2014).Google Scholar

27 Steinrücken, Torsten, Sind härtere Strafen für Korruption erforderlich? Ökonomische Überlegungen zur Sanktionierung illegaler Austauschbeziehungen, 73 Vierteljahreshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 301 (2004).Google Scholar

28 See Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten eds., 2002).Google Scholar

29 Barberis, Nicholas, Psychology and the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008 (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Yale School of Management), http://faculty.som.yale.edu/nicholasbarberis/cp10.pdf.Google Scholar

30 Lambsdorff, Johann Graf, Behavioral and Experimental Economics as a Guidance to Anticorruption, in New Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption Research in Experimental Economics 279 (Danila Serra & Leonard Wantchekon eds., 2012).Google Scholar

31 A well-known game theoretical concept. “A subgame perfect equilibrium is a strategy profile that induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame.” Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory 166 (2004).Google Scholar

32 See, e.g., Evans, William N. et al., Measuring Peer Group Effects: A Study of Teenage Behavior, 100 J. Pol. Econ. 966 (1992); Edward L. Glaeser et al., Crime and Social Interaction, 111 Q. J. Econ. 507 (1996).Google Scholar

33 Akerlof, George A., Social Distance and Social Decisions, 65 Econometrica 1005 (1997); Eugen Dimant et al., On Peer Effects: Behavioral Contagion of (Un)Ethical Behavior and the Role of Social Identity (2015) (unpublished manuscript).Google Scholar

34 LaRossa, Ralph & Reitzes, Donald C., Symbolic Interactionism and Family Studies, in Sourcebook of Family Theories and Methods: A Contextual Approach 135–63 (Pauline G. Boss et al. eds., 1993).Google Scholar

35 See, e.g., Gächter, Simon & Falk, Armin, Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation, 104 Scandinavian J. Econ. 1 (2002); Manfred Milinski, Dirk Semmann & Hans-Jürgen Krambeck, Reputation Helps Solve the “Tragedy of the Commons,” 415 Nature 424 (2002).Google Scholar

36 Haidt, Jonathan, The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology, 316 Sci. 998 (2007).Google Scholar

37 Husted, Bryan W., Wealth, Culture and Corruption, 30 J. Int'l Bus. Stud. 339, 354 (1999).Google Scholar

38 Getz, Kathleen A. & Volkema, Roger J., Culture, Perceived Corruption, and Economics: A Model of Predictors and Outcomes, 40 Bus. Soc'y 7 (2001).Google Scholar

39 Sims, Randi L., Gong, Baiyun & Ruppel, Cynthia P., A Contingency Theory of Corruption: The Effect of Human Development and National Culture, 49 Soc. Sci. J. 90, 95 (2012).Google Scholar

40 Dimant, Eugen, Krieger, Tim & Redlin, Margarete, A Crook is a Crook … But is He Still a Crook Abroad? On the Effect of Immigration on Destination-Country Corruption, 16 German Econ. Rev. 464 (2015).Google Scholar

41 Treisman, Daniel, The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study, 76 J. Pub. Econ. 399 (2000).Google Scholar

42 Truex, Rory, Corruption, Attitudes, and Education: Survey Evidence from Nepal, 39 World Dev. 1133 (2011).Google Scholar

43 See, e.g., Sung, Hung-En & Chu, Doris, Does Participation in the World Economy Reduce Political Corruption? An Empirical Inquiry, 3 Int'l J. Comp. Criminology 94 (2003); Hung-En Sung, Fairer Sex or Fairer System? Gender and Corruption Revisited, 82 Soc. Forces 703 (2003); Hung-En Sung, Women in Government, Public Corruption, and Liberal Democracy: A Panel Analysis, 58 Crime L. & Soc. Change 195 (2012).Google Scholar

44 Dollar, David, Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, Are Women Really the “Fairer” Sex? Corruption and Women in Government, 46 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 423 (2001).Google Scholar

45 Swamy, Anand, Knack, Stephen, Young, Lee & Azfar, Omar, Gender and Corruption, 61 J. Dev. Econ. 25 (2001).Google Scholar

46 See Esarey, Justin & Gina Chirillo. “Fairer Sex” or Purity Myth? Corruption, Gender, and Institutional Context, 9 Pol. & Gender 361, 382–87 (2013); Björn Frank, Johann Graf Lambsdorff & Frédéric Boehm, Gender and Corruption: Lessons from Laboratory Corruption Experiments, 23 Eur. J. Dev. Res. 59 (2011).Google Scholar

47 See, e.g., Huisman, Wim & Walle, Gudrun Vande, The Criminology of Corruption, in The Good Cause: Theoretical Perspectives on Corruption 115–45 (Gjalt de Graaf et al. eds., 2010); Louise I. Shelley, Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, Crime, and Terrorism 15 (2014).Google Scholar

48 Glueck, Eleanor & Glueck, Sheldon, Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency, in Criminological Theory: Past to Present 47–58 (Frances T. Cullen, Robert Agnew & Pamela Wilcox eds., 2014).Google Scholar

49 Sutherland, Edwin H. & Cressey, Donald R., A Theory of Differential Association, in Criminological Theory: Past to Present, supra note 48, at 136–39.Google Scholar

50 Akers, Ronald, A Social Learning Theory of Crime, Criminological Theory: Past to Present, supra note 148, at 140– 53 Albert K. Cohen, Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang, in Criminological Theory: Past to Present, supra note 48, at 186–90.Google Scholar

51 Merton, Robert K., Social Structure and Anomie, 3 Am. Soc. Rev. 672 (1938).Google Scholar

52 Hirschi, Travis & Gottfredson, Michael, A General Theory of Crime (1990).Google Scholar

53 See Cohen, , supra note 50; Steven F. Messner & Richard Rosenfeld, Crime and the American Dream, in Criminological Theory: Past to Present, supra note 48, at 191–201.Google Scholar

54 Benson, Michael L., Denying the Guilty Mind, in Criminological Theory: Past to Present, supra note 48, at 398– 406.Google Scholar

55 Fleming, Peter & Zyglidopoulos, Stelios C., Charting Corporate Corruption: Agency, Structure and Escalation 9 (2009).Google Scholar

56 Millington, Andrew, Eberhardt, Markus & Wilkinson, Barry, Gift Giving, “Guanxi” and Illicit Payments in Buyer-Suppliers Relations in China: Analysing the Experience of UK Companies, 57 J. Bus. Ethics 255 (2005); Paul Steidlmeier, Gift Giving, Bribery and Corruption: Ethical Management of Business Relationships in China, 20 J. Bus. Ethics 121 (1999).Google Scholar

57 Tina S&reide, Drivers of Corruption: A Brief Review 29 (World Bank, 2014).Google Scholar

58 Lambsdorff, Johan Graf & Günther G. Schulze, What Can We Know About Corruption? A Very Short History of Corruption Research and a List of What We Should Aim For, 235 Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 101 (2015).Google Scholar

59 Claros, , supra note 8.Google Scholar

60 Tanzi, Vito, Governance, Corruption, and Public Finance: An Overview, in Governance, Corruption, and Public Financial Management 1 (Salvatore Schiavo-Campo ed., 1999).Google Scholar

61 Dreher, & Gassebner, , supra note 21.Google Scholar

62 Tanzi, , supra note 9.Google Scholar

64 Ades, Alberto & Tella, Rafael Di, Rents, Competition, and Corruption, 89 Am. Econ. Rev. 982 (1999).Google Scholar

65 Treisman, Daniel, What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?, 10 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 211, 241–42 (2007).Google Scholar

66 Ali, Abdiweli M. & Isse, Hodan Said, Determinants of Economic Corruption: A Cross-Country Comparison, 22 Cato J. 449, 461–62 (2003).Google Scholar

67 See Ades, & Tella, Di, supra note 64; Jana Kunicová & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structure as Constraints on Corruption, 35 Brit. J. Pol. Sci., 573 (2005); Treisman, supra note 65.Google Scholar

68 See generally Jie, Bai, Jayachandran, Seema, Malesky, Edmund J. & Olken, Benjamin A., Does Economic Growth Reduce Corruption? Theory and Evidence from Vietnam (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).Google Scholar

69 Gundlach, Erich & Paldam, Martin, The Transition of Corruption: From Poverty to Honesty 6 (Kiel Inst. for the World Econ., Working Paper No. 1411, 2008). For a more detailed discussion of economic factors, see Dimant, Antecedents, supra note 8.Google Scholar

70 North, Douglas C., Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance 3 (1990).Google Scholar

71 See Dreher, Axel, Christos Kotsogiannis & Steve McCorriston, Corruption Around the World: Evidence From a Structural Model, 35 J. Comp. Econ. 443, 461–62 (2007).Google Scholar

72 Lederman et al., supra note 72.Google Scholar

74 Gerring, & Thacker, , supra note 74.Google Scholar

75 Fisman, & Gatti, , supra note 75.Google Scholar

76 See generally Svensson, Jakob, Eight Questions About Corruption, 19 J. Econ. Persp. 19 (2005).Google Scholar

77 Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution, 117 Q. J. Econ. 1231, 1278–79 (2002).Google Scholar

78 Treisman, , supra note 41.Google Scholar

79 See Bloch, Harry & Sam Hak Kann Tang, Deep Determinants of Economic Growth: Institutions, Geography, and Openness to Trade, 4 Progress in Dev. Stud. 245, 248–53 (2004).Google Scholar

81 Goel, Rajeev K. & Nelson, Michael A., Causes of Corruption: History, Geography, and Government, 32 J. Pol'y Modeling 433, 444 (2010) (emphasis in original).Google Scholar