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More Government with the People: The Crisis of Representative Democracy and Options for Reform in Germany

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Hermann Pünder

Abstract

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Throughout the world, there is debate about how democratic systems should adapt to the demands of their increasingly emancipated citizenries. More than ever, people desire to take part in the creation of their life circumstances. The demand for participation is paired with a growing discontent with the political elites. This article looks at the challenges in the context of Germany's system of government, discussing the leading debates of democratic reform in the EU's largest member state with some incidental remarks on other countries. Specifically, the study analyzes two core components of representative democracy—the electoral process and the parliamentary decision-making procedure—and shows how they should be reformed to ensure political stability in the long run. As a measure for the analysis, the author develops a system of four preconditions, on which successful democratic government depends: Responsiveness and political leadership on the side of the elected representatives; preparedness for participation and acceptance on the part of the represented. The article shows that optimizing democracy on the basis of these pillars is not just advisable as a matter of political prudence. In fact, Germany's constitution, the Basic Law, contains a normative expectation towards the political elites that they continuously improve democracy and ensure its appropriate functioning.

Type
Articles
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 16 , Issue 4 , 01 September 2015 , pp. 713 - 739
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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95 The Bundesverfassungsgericht has stated that there is a legally necessary link between the notion of “the people” in GG art. 20(2) and the German citizenship; 83 BVerfGE 37 (50); 83 BVerfGE 60 (71); 107 BVerfGE 59 (87). As far as the Court sticks to that opinion (which is not beyond doubt), the only possibility is to ease the naturalization by a dual citizenship. See also Dahl, supra note 14, at 76 (describing an “inclusive” citizenship).Google Scholar

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99 See Johnson, Vincent R., Regulating Lobbyists: Law Ethics, And Public Policy, 16 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 1 (2006); Anita Krishnakumar, Towards a Madisonian, Interest-Group-Based, Approach to Lobbying Regulation, 58 Ala. L. Rev. 513 (2007); Angela Lynne Davis, Genuine Reform or Just Another Meager Attempt to Regulate Lobbyists—A Critique of the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act, 18 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 340 (2008/09); Jarica B. Nipper, Lobbying the Lobbyists—A Comparative Analysis of the Lobbying Regulatory and Disclosure Models of the United States and European Union, 14 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l. L. 339 (2007) (comparing the rules in Europe). See generally Open Secrets—Center for Responsive Politics, available at www.opensecrets.org (providing transparency with the help of other public interest groups); Richard A. Smith, Interest Group Influence in the U.S. Congress, 20 Legis. Stud. Q. 89 (1995); Dorie Apollonio et al., Access and Lobbying—Looking Beyond the Corruption Paradigm, 36 Hastings Const. L.Q. 13 (2009); Raj Chari et al, Regulating Lobbying—a Global Comparison (2010) (comparing the law in the US, Canada and in the EU and in some EU countries).Google Scholar

100 See the legislative proposals of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, BT-Drs. 17/6442, 2, and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, BT-Drs. 17/2486, 2. Incomplete and wrong information should result in the deprivation of privileges or in fines. Imprisonment sentences—like in the U.S.—seem not to be necessary.Google Scholar

101 See Ainsworth, Scott, Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence, 55 J. Pol. 41 (1993) (referencing “game theory”).Google Scholar

102 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law] art. 38 (1)(2).Google Scholar

103 See, e.g., the legislative proposal of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, BT-Drs. 17/6442. Like here the legislative proposal of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, BT-Drs. 17/2486.Google Scholar

104 Chari, , supra note 99, at 61.Google Scholar

105 In the actual law there is no legal claim to participate in public hearings of the Bundestag (“öffentlichen Anhörungssitzungen”). See Nr. 4 of appendix 2 to the Geschäftsordnung des Deutschen Bundestages [GO-BT] [Rules of Procedure of the German Bundestag].Google Scholar

106 Similarly—but restricted to lobbyists—the legislative proposal of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, BT-Drs. 17/2486, 5.Google Scholar

107 See the recently reformed Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] §108 (e).Google Scholar

108 See Kolbe, Andreas et al, Marktordnung für Lobbyisten 57 (2011); Hans-Jörg Schmedes, Mehr Transparenz wagen? Zur Diskussion um ein gesetzliches Lobbyregister, ZParl 543, 548 (2009). Against that Christian Lange, Lobbyistenregister in Deutschland?, RuP 198 (2011).Google Scholar

109 Cf. the legislative proposal of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, BT-Drs. 17/2486, 3, 5.Google Scholar

110 See Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der Bundesministerien [GGO] [Joint Rules of Procedure of the Federal Ministries] §§ 47–48.Google Scholar

111 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law] art. 42(I)(1).Google Scholar

112 Cf. Enquete-Kommission Verfassungsreform, BT-Drs. 7/5924, 80; Ad-hoc-Kommission Parlamentsreform, BT-Drs. 10/3600, 10. To the decision-making in parliamentary committees, see supra Section D. III. 1.Google Scholar

113 Cf. also 40 BVerfGE 296 (318).Google Scholar

114 Cf. Abgeordnetengesetz [AbG] [Delegates' Law] § 44a Abs. 4 S. 1, § 44b Nr. 1 und 2; GO-BT § 18, and §§ 1–4 of the “Verhaltensregeln für Mitglieder des Deutschen Bundestages” [Rules of Conduct for the Delegates] (appendix 1 to GO-BT). See also 135 BVerwGE 77; 118 BVerfGE 277.Google Scholar

115 See Käßner, Anne, Nebentätigkeiten und Nebeneinkünfte der Mitglieder des Deutschen Bundestages 155 (2010).Google Scholar

116 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law] art. 12.Google Scholar

117 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law] art. 38(I)(2).Google Scholar

118 See 118 BVerfGE 277 (333); but see 118 BVerfGE 277 (338) (W. Hassemer, U. Di Fabio, R. Mellinghoff and H. Landau, dissenting). Google Scholar

119 See AbgG § 44d Abs. 1.Google Scholar

120 Kolbe, , supra note 108, at 50.Google Scholar

121 Cf. Davis, , supra note 99, at 362.Google Scholar

122 Cf. Sozialwissenschaftliches Forschungszentrum, supra note 6, at 102.Google Scholar

123 Id. at 100.Google Scholar

124 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law] art. 17.Google Scholar

125 Cf. the rules of procedure (Verfahrensgrundsätze) enacted by the Petition committee on the basis of § 110 Abs. 1 GOBT (Nr. 4 I 2, Nr. 2.2. IV, Nr. 8.4 IV). For details, see Annette Guckelberger, Neue Erscheinungen des Petitionsrechts, DÖV 85 (2008); for an evaluation in a political science perspective, see Jungherr, Andreas & Jürgens, Pascal, E-Petitionen in Deutschland, ZParl 523 (2011).Google Scholar

126 Cf. Ulrich Riehm et al., Bürgerbeteiligung durch E-Petitionen 253, 259 (2009) (giving further reform suggestions). The British www.fixmystreet.com could serve as a role model.Google Scholar

127 See Saalfeld, Thomas, Parliament und Citizens in Germany, in Parliaments and Citizens in Western Europe, 43, 51 (Philip Norton, ed., 2002).Google Scholar

128 Cf. the legislative proposal of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, BT-Drs. 13/3578.Google Scholar

129 See GO-BT §§ 12, 57, 58. To the constitutional rule according to which the committees have to “mirror” Parliament politically, 80 BVerfGE 188 (222); 84 BVerfGE 304 (323); 96 BVerfGE 264 (283); 112 BVerfGE 118 (133).Google Scholar

130 See GO-BT § 112 Abs. 1.Google Scholar

131 Cf. Marschall, Stefan, Parlamentarismus 117 (2005).Google Scholar

132 See (discussing Great Britain) Fox, supra note 8, at 682; Peter Riddell, In Defence of Politicians: In Spite of Themselves, 63 Parl. Aff. 545, 554 (2010).Google Scholar

133 Compare Tenscher, Jens & Will, Laura, Abgeordnete Online?, ZParl 504 (2010) with Ross Ferguson, Convergent Evolution: The Development of Online Engagement in Westminster and Whitehall, 61 Parl. Aff. 216 (2008) (giving a perspective on Great Britain).Google Scholar

134 Cf. Linck, Joachim, Unmittelbare Bürgerbeteiligung am parlamentarischen Gesetzgebungsprozess, ZG 137, 145 (2004).Google Scholar

135 Cf. Art. 147 of the Swiss Bundesverfassung [Federal Constitution], the Vernehmlassungsgesetz [Consultation act], and the Vernehmlassungsverordnung [Rule on Consultation], with Linck, supra note 134, at 140 (also providing comparable procedures in Austria and some states of the U.S.).Google Scholar

136 But see Enquete-Kommission Verfassungsreform BT-Drs. 7/5924, 12.Google Scholar

137 See Rommelfanger, Ulrich, Das Konsultative Referendum 54, 159, 172, 283 (1987). For Austria, see Bundesverfassungsgesetz, art. 49b, and the Volksbefragungsgesetz of 1989. In Switzerland there are hardly any consultative referenda. Cf. Regine Sträuli, Konsultative Volksabstimmungen in der Schweiz (1982).Google Scholar

138 Schattschneider, Elmer E., The Semisovereign People 34 (1960). See also Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? 305 (1961); Wainer Lusoli et al., (Re)connecting Politics? Parliament, the Public and the Internet, 59 Parl. Aff. 24, 39 (2006); Declan McHugh, Wanting to be Heard But Not Wanting to Act? Addressing Political Disengagement, 59 Parl. Aff. 546, (2006); Aviezer Tucker, Pre-emptive Democracy: Oligarchic Tendencies in Deliberative Democracy, 56 Pol. Stud. 127 (2008); Fishkin, supra note 35, at 49 (“participatory distortion”).Google Scholar

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142 Beyme, Klaus von, Parlamente, in Vergleichende Regierungslehre 264, 273 (Hans-Joachim Lauth ed., 3d ed. 2010).Google Scholar

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144 Cf. Tsebelis, George, Veto Players—How Political Institutions Work (2002).Google Scholar

145 See Cowley, Philip & Stuart, Mark, Parliament: More Revolts, More Reforms, 56 Parl. Aff. 188 (2003) (concerning British parliamentarianism).Google Scholar

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147 See Patzelt, Werner J., Ein latenter Verfassungskonflikt? Die Deutschen und ihr parlamentarisches Regierungssystem, PVS 725, 738 (1998).Google Scholar

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149 Cf. 13 BVerfGE 123 (125); 57 BVerfGE 1 (5); 67 BVerfGE 100 (129); Sven T. Siefken, Parlamentarische Frageverfahren—Symbolpolitik oder wirksames Kontrollinstrument?, ZParl 18 (2010).Google Scholar

150 Critically, e.g., Kurt Biedenkopf, Parlamentsreform—eine demokratische Notwendigkeit, APuZ 48, 49 (1988/B 13) (assesment of a former Ministerpräsident of Sachsen). Google Scholar

151 Compare Schumpeter, , supra note 32, at 428, with Mouffe, supra note 5 (giving a modern view in favor of an “agnostic pluralism”).Google Scholar

152 Cf. András Körösényi, Political Representation in Leader Democracy, 40 Gov't & Opposition 358, 367 (2005). But see Crouch, supra note 2.Google Scholar

153 See Hamm-Brücher, supra note 141, at 5. See also Habermas, Jürgen, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit 304 (1962); Schmitt, supra note 15.Google Scholar

154 Cf. 2 BVerfGE 143 (160); 10 BVerfGE 4 (14); 20 BVerfGE 56 (104); 43 BVerfGE 142 (147); 84 BVerfGE 304 (324); 112 BVerfGE 118 (135); 118 BVerfGE 277 (329).Google Scholar

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156 But see Leibholz, Gerhard, Der Strukturwandel der modernen Demokratie, in Grundprobleme der Demokratie 170, 197 (Ulrich Matz ed., 1973).Google Scholar

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159 Cf. Bartels, Larry M., Unequal Democracy 252 (2010) (“Economic Inequality and Political Representation”).Google Scholar

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161 See, e.g., Giddens, , supra note 46.Google Scholar

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