Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-t5tsf Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-06T01:58:36.997Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Mixed Signals of Europeanization: Revisiting the NPD Decision in Light of the European Court of Human Rights' Jurisprudence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

The Article revisits the German Federal Constitutional Court's NPD decision and the concept of militant democracy regarding party bans in German constitutional law. It argues that the Court's new definition of the free democratic basic order approximates its jurisprudence to the standards developed by the European Court of Human Rights. The Article also compares the German and European standards for party bans. It assesses the respective required risks for democracy that a party needs to pose in order to justify a party ban. In this respect, it is argued that the German standard—though elevated—still falls short of the threshold under European human rights law. Finally, the NPD's anti-constitutional—but not unconstitutional—character is examined, and a recent constitutional amendment to exclude extremist political parties from party financing is evaluated.

Type
The rule of law, constitutionalism and the judiciary
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 by German Law Journal, Inc. 

References

1 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 17, 2017, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 611 [hereinafter Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017].Google Scholar

2 Klein, H., 78th Supplement Art. 21, para. 5, in Maunz-Dürig Grundgesetz-Kommentar (C.H. Beck ed., 2016).Google Scholar

3 Ipsen, J., Art. 21, paras. 24–25, in Sachs Grundgesetz-Kommentar (C.H. Beck ed., 7th ed. 2014).Google Scholar

4 Id. at para. 5 (mentions that this constitutional incorporation had been proposed already by H. Triepel in his book. H. Triepel, Die Staatsverfassung und die politischen Parteien [The State constitution and the political parties] 8 (Preußische Drucks- und Verlags-Aktiengesellschaft 1927)).Google Scholar

5 Ipsen, supra note 3, at para. 65.Google Scholar

6 Christoph Gusy, Die Lehre vom Parteienstaat in der Weimarer Republik [The Teaching from the Party State in the Weimarer Republic] 35 (Nomos 1993).Google Scholar

7 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 23, 1952, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 1407, 73 (225–27) [hereinafter Judgment of Oct. 23, 1952]; See also Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 18, 2003, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 1577, 358 [hereinafter Judgment of Mar. 18, 2003].Google Scholar

8 This term is favored by Ipsen, supra note 3, at paras. 14, 23.Google Scholar

9 Kluth, W., Art. 21, para. 1, in Epping/Hillgruber Beck'scher Online-Kommentar Grundgesetz (C.H. Beck ed., 31st ed. 2016).Google Scholar

10 Id. at para. 19; Ipsen, supra note 3, paras. 15–16.Google Scholar

11 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 20, para. 1.Google Scholar

12 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 3, para. 1.Google Scholar

13 Ipsen, supra note 3, paras. 33–34.Google Scholar

14 See Parteiengesetz [Party Law] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] No. 44/1967 at 773, § 5.Google Scholar

15 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 21, para. 2.Google Scholar

16 See Klein, supra note 2, at paras. 497–498.Google Scholar

17 Term coined by K. Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights I, 31 Am. Pol. Sci. R. 417–32 (1937).Google Scholar

18 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Aug. 17, 1956, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 1393, 138 [hereinafter Judgment of Aug. 17, 1956].Google Scholar

19 Thorough discussion by Klein, supra note 2, at paras. 486–487.Google Scholar

20 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 516.Google Scholar

21 For more, see Judgment of Aug. 17, 1956 at 139; Klein, supra note 2, at para. 491.Google Scholar

22 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 517.Google Scholar

23 Bourne, Angela K. & Fernando Casal Bértoa, Mapping Militant Democracy: Variation in Party Ban Practices in European Democracies (1945-2015), 221 Eur. Const. Law R. 234 (2017).Google Scholar

24 Id. at 14.Google Scholar

25 Id. at 23 (citing G. Bligh, Defending Democracy, A New Understanding of the Party-Banning Phenomenon, 46 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1321, 1354 (2013)).Google Scholar

26 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 9, para. 2 provides: “Associations whose aims or activities contravene the criminal laws, or that are directed against the constitutional order or the concept of international understanding, shall be prohibited.”Google Scholar

27 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 18 provides: Whoever abuses the freedom of expression, in particular the freedom of the press (paragraph (1) of Article 5), the freedom of teaching (paragraph (3) of Article 5), the freedom of assembly (Article 8), the freedom of association (Article 9), the privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications (Article 10), the rights of property (Article 14), or the right of asylum (Article 16a) in order to combat the free democratic basic order shall forfeit these basic rights. This forfeiture and its extent shall be declared by the Federal Constitutional Court.Google Scholar

28 Further examples of militant democracy within the Grundgesetz can be found in Article 79 paragraph 3—the “eternity clause”—, Article 87a paragraph 4, and in Article 91.Google Scholar

29 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 524.Google Scholar

31 For the ban of the Socialist Reich Party (Sozialistische Reichspartei, “SRP”), see Judgment of Oct. 23, 1952; for the ban of the Communist Party of Germany (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, “KPD”), see Judgment of Aug. 17, 1956. Google Scholar

32 Id. at para. 526; for more, see Klein, supra note 2 at paras. 571–572.Google Scholar

33 In German: “freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung. ”Google Scholar

34 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 21, para. 2 provides: “Parties that, by reason of their aims or the behaviour of their adherents, seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany shall be unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court shall rule on the question of unconstitutionality.”Google Scholar

35 See, for instance, the European Court of Human Rights decisions: United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, App. No. 19392/92, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Socialist Party v. Turkey, App. No. 21237/93, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Dicle v. Turkey, App. No. 25141/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; HADEP and Demir v. Turkey, App. No. 28003/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Party for a Democratic Society v. Turkey, App. No. 3840/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.Google Scholar

36 These eight elements have been enumerated by the FCC in the SRP decision, see Judgment of Oct. 23, 1952 at 13.Google Scholar

37 These additional elements stem from the FCC's KPD decision, see Judgment of Aug. 17, 1956 at 199, 230.Google Scholar

38 For these additional elements, see Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 1958, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 3064; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 2, 1977, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 1054, 139; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 1, 1987, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 329, 74; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 22, 2014, 2 BvR 661/12, 303.Google Scholar

39 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 1, para. 1.Google Scholar

40 G. Dürig, Art. 1 paragraph 1, paras. 28, 34, in Maunz-Dürig Grundgesetz-Kommentar (C.H. Beck ed. 1958).Google Scholar

41 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 543.Google Scholar

42 Id. at para. 547.Google Scholar

43 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 79, para. 3 reads: Amendments to the Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.Google Scholar

44 Different opinion: Ipsen, supra note 3, at para. 160 (“identical”).Google Scholar

45 In this direction also M. Sachs, Kein Verbot der NPD trotz Verfassungsfeindlichkeit mangels jeglicher Erfolgsaussichten ihrer Bestrebungen [No NPD ban despite the party's anti-constitutional character due to the lack of potential success], 377 Juristische Schulung 378 (2017).Google Scholar

46 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 146 provides: “This Basic Law, which since the achievement of the unity and freedom of Germany applies to the entire German people, shall cease to apply on the day on which a constitution freely adopted by the German people takes effect.”Google Scholar

47 When addressing the relationship between Article 21 paragraph 2 and Article 146, the FCC touches upon this issue in passing, without resolving it, see Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 518, with further references.Google Scholar

48 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 537.Google Scholar

49 Socialist Party v. Turkey, supra note 35, at para. 47.Google Scholar

50 Freedom and Democracy Party v. Turkey, App. No. 23885/94, para. 41 (1999), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.Google Scholar

51 Parti Socialiste de Turquie v. Turquie, App. No. 26482/95, para. 43 (2003), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.Google Scholar

52 United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-Pirin v. Bulgaria, App. No. 59489/00, para. 61 (Oct. 20, 2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.Google Scholar

53 Party for a Democratic Society, supra note 35, at para. 78.Google Scholar

54 Critical (demanding further privileges also for persons exercising freedom of expression), S. Sottiaux & S. Rummens, Concentric Democracy: Resolving the Incoherence in the European Court of Human Rights' case law on freedom of expression and freedom of association, 10 Int'l J. Con. L. 106, 113 (2012).Google Scholar

55 See Party, United Communist, supra note 35, at paras. 24.Google Scholar

56 Vidmar, J., Multiparty Democracy: International and European Human Rights Law Perspectives, 23 Leiden J. Int'l L. 209, 244 (2010).Google Scholar

57 See Party, United Communist, supra note 35, at para. 45.Google Scholar

58 Id. at paras. 25, 43.Google Scholar

59 Id. at para. 46.Google Scholar

60 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 26, 2004, 2 BvR 955/00, 25.Google Scholar

61 In German: “verfassungsfeindlich.”Google Scholar

62 Klein, supra note 2, at para. 486.Google Scholar

63 In German: “darauf ausgehen.”Google Scholar

64 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 574, with reference to Judgment of Aug. 17, 1956 at 141: “aktiv kämpferische, aggressive Haltung.”Google Scholar

65 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 570.Google Scholar

66 K.H. Seifert, Die politischen Parteien im Recht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland [The political parties in the law of the Federal Republic of Germany] 466 (Heymanns ed. 1975).Google Scholar

67 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 579.Google Scholar

68 See the Court's KPD decision, Judgment of Aug. 17, 1956 at 142.Google Scholar

69 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 570, 585–586 (in German: “Potentialität”); justifying the old approach, Klein, supra note 2, at para. 527.Google Scholar

70 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 586.Google Scholar

71 See Gusy, C., Verfassungswidrig, aber nicht verboten! [Unconstitutional, but not banned!], Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 601, 602 (2017); C. Hillgruber, NPD–verfassungsfeindlich, aber nicht verfassungswidrig [NPD–anti-constitutional, but not unconstitutional], Juristische Ausbildung 398, 399 (2017); H.W. Laubinger, Entscheidung durch den Bundestagspräsidenten? [Decision by the President of the Bundestag?], Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 55, 56 (2017); Sachs, supra note 45, at 379.Google Scholar

72 Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. No. 41340/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.Google Scholar

73 Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).Google Scholar

74 Article 11 paragraph 2 of the Convention.Google Scholar

75 Yazar v. Turkey, App. Nos. 22723/93, 22724/93, 22725/93, para. 49, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.Google Scholar

76 Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey, supra note 72, at para. 104.Google Scholar

77 See, for instance, Partidul Comunistilor v. Romania, App. No. 46626/99, para. 48, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Herri Batasuna v. Spain, App. No. 25803/04, para. 83, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.Google Scholar

78 Refah Partisi v. Turkey, supra note 72, at para. 11.Google Scholar

79 S. Emek & H. Meier, Über die Zukunft des Parteiverbots [On the future of the party ban], in Verbot der NPD–ein deutsches Staatstheater in zwei Akten [Ban of the NPD–a German state play in two acts] 309, 314 (H. Meier ed., Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag 2015); compare Pabel, K., Parteiverbote auf dem europäischen Prüfstand [Party bans under European scrutiny], 63 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 921, 932 (2003).Google Scholar

80 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 607.Google Scholar

81 Refah Partisi, supra note 72, at para. 102; Herri Batasuna, supra note 77, at para. 81.Google Scholar

82 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 613.Google Scholar

83 Id. at para. 619.Google Scholar

84 Id. at para. 620, with reference to Herri Batasuna, supra note 77, at paras. 85; Eusko Abertzale Ekintza—Acción Nacionalista Vasca v. Espagne, App. No. 40959/09, paras. 67, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.Google Scholar

85 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 621.Google Scholar

86 Yazar, supra note 75, at para. 49.Google Scholar

87 Refah Partisi, supra note 72, at para. 105; Parti pour une société démocratique v. Turquie, supra note 35, at para. 105.Google Scholar

88 For both citations, see Partidul Comunistilor & Ungureanu v. Romania, supra note 77, at para. 58.Google Scholar

89 See Party, United Communist, supra note 35, at para. 46.Google Scholar

90 Refah Partisi, supra note 72, para. 102; Herri Batasuna, supra note 77, at para. 81.Google Scholar

91 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 3.Google Scholar

92 In comparison, Germany has a population of about 81 million.Google Scholar

93 Judgment of Mar. 18, 2003. Google Scholar

94 The judges were Hassemer, Broß, and Osterloh.Google Scholar

95 See Judgment of Mar. 18, 2003 at para. 64–65; Kluth, supra note 9, at para. 210.Google Scholar

96 See Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz [BVerfGG] [Law on the Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 12, 1951, BGBl I at 1473, § 15, para. 4.Google Scholar

97 Between May 2013 and July 2018, one NSU member, Ms. Beate Zschäpe, and four potential assistants were standing criminal trial in Munich. They were convicted on Jul., 11, 2018.Google Scholar

98 See Hillgruber, supra note 71, at 399.Google Scholar

99 According to Sec. 43 para. 1 BVerfGG, the Federal Government, the Federal Parliament, or the Federal Council are authorized to file a motion for a party ban. Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz [BVerfGG] [Law on the Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 12, 1951, BGBl I at 1473, § 43, para. 1.Google Scholar

100 See Judgment of Aug. 17, 1956 at 113, 129.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

101 Klein, supra note 2, at para. 546: an unsuccessful motion may result in a political triumph for the targeted political party; similarly, Ipsen, supra note 3, para. 177, however assuming the Federal Government's duty to bring a motion if sufficient evidence has been gathered.Google Scholar

102 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017, paras. 400–401, particularly 427–428.Google Scholar

103 Id. at para. 405.Google Scholar

104 Id. at paras. 635–636.Google Scholar

105 Id. at paras. 640–641.Google Scholar

106 Id. at para. 654 (“Deutsche afrikanischer Herkunft oder Afro-Deutsche kann es sowenig geben wie schwangere Jungfrauen”).Google Scholar

107 Id. at para. 679 (“Europa ist das Land der weißen Rasse”).Google Scholar

108 Id. at para. 671 (“Weiß ist nicht nur eine Trikotfarbe – für eine echte deutsche Nationalmannschaft”).Google Scholar

109 Id. at para. 702 (“Deutsche Frauen und Mädchen, lasst euch nicht mit Negern ein!”).Google Scholar

110 Id. at para. 711 (“entartete Menschen”).Google Scholar

111 Id. at para. 730 (“Kampf gegen den Islam”).Google Scholar

112 Id. at para. 747.Google Scholar

113 Id. at paras. 758–759.Google Scholar

114 Id. at para. 777 (“Einem System, das sich auf Mehrheitsentscheidungen stützt, kann demnach auch keine Ewigkeitsgarantie ausgesprochen werden”).Google Scholar

115 Id. at para. 789 (“Wir wollen diesen Staat nicht ändern, wir wollen ihn abschaffen, wir wollen die Revolution, bringt dieses System endlich zu Fall”).Google Scholar

116 Id. at para. 772 (“Herrschaft der Minderwertigen”).Google Scholar

117 Id. at para. 799 (“Das Reich ist unser Ziel, die NPD unser Weg”).Google Scholar

118 Id. at paras. 805–806, including slogans such as “the people rise, a storm breaks forth” (“Das Volk steht auf, der Sturm bricht los”), “with our flags is victory” (“Mit unseren Fahnen ist der Sieg”), and symbols such as the swastika, SS signs and pictures of Adolf Hitler.Google Scholar

119 Id. at paras. 845–846.Google Scholar

120 The “Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident (”Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes“)—PEGIDA—is a nationalist, anti-Islam, far-right political movement founded in Dresden in 2014, with mimics in other German cities.Google Scholar

121 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at paras. 896–897.Google Scholar

122 The total number of available municipal mandates nationwide is 200,000, id. at para. 904.Google Scholar

123 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at paras. 900–02.Google Scholar

124 Id. at para. 905.Google Scholar

125 Id. at paras. 910–911.Google Scholar

126 Id. at para. 896.Google Scholar

127 See also Steinbeis, M., Die eventuell, aber nicht potenziell verfassungswidrige NPD [The possibly, but not potentially, unconstitutional NPD], Verfassungsblog (Jan. 17, 2017), http://verfassungsblog.de/die-eventuell-aber-nicht-potenziell-verfassungswidrige-npd/.Google Scholar

128 Vidmar, supra note 56, at 231.Google Scholar

129 Bourne & Bértoa, supra note 23, at 15–16.Google Scholar

130 H.-M. ten Napel, The European Court of Human Rights and Political Rights, The Need for More Guidance, 5 Eur. Const. L. R. 464, 467 (2009).Google Scholar

131 Vidmar, supra note 56, at 223–224.Google Scholar

132 Macklem, P., Militant democracy, legal pluralism, and the paradox of self-determination, 4 Int'l J. Const. L. 488 (2006).Google Scholar

133 Kluth, supra note 9, at para. 187.Google Scholar

134 See Parteiengesetz [Party Law], supra note 14, at § 18, para. 1.Google Scholar

135 In comparison, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) received 50.79 million Euro, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) 49.5 million Euro, the Greens (Grüne) 15.85 million Euro, the Christian Social Union (CSU) 12.1 million Euro and the Left Party (Linke) 11.52 million Euro. See Bundestag, Deutscher, Festsetzung der staatlichen Mittel für das Jahr 2016 [Allocation of state funds for the year 2016], https://www.bundestag.de/blob/503226/eb02070236090c98b3ca24ce9dfc57fa/finanz_16-data.pdf.Google Scholar

136 See, for instance, S. Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, Nach der Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts im NPD-Verbotsverfahren–Kein Geld mehr für Verfassungsfeinde!? [After the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in the NPD party ban proceedings–No more money for enemies of the constitution!?], Verfassungsblog (Jan. 21, 2017), http://verfassungsblog.de/nach-der-entscheidung-des-bundesverfassungsgerichts-im-npd-verbotsverfahren-kein-geld-mehr-fuer-verfassungsfeinde/.Google Scholar

137 See Morlok, Kein Geld für verfassungsfeindliche Parteien? [No money for anti-constitutional parties?], Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 66 (2017).Google Scholar

138 Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes und weiterer Gesetze zum Zweck des Ausschlusses extremistischer Parteien von der Parteienfinanzierung [Draft bill of a law to change the Grundgesetz and other laws for the purpose of excluding extremist parties from party financing], Bundesrat Drucksachen [BR] 113/17.Google Scholar

139 Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes (Artikel 21) [Draft bill of a law to change the Grundgesetz (Article 21)], Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen [BT] 18/12357; Entwurf eines Gesetzes zum Ausschluss verfassungsfeindlicher Parteien von der Parteienfinanzierung [Draft bill of a law to exclude anti-constitutional parties from party financing], Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen [BT] 18/12358.Google Scholar

140 In German: “ausgerichtet sind.”Google Scholar

141 Gusy, supra note 71, at 603; Laubinger, supra note 71, at 56.Google Scholar

142 Hillgruber, supra note 71, at 400; Laubinger, supra note 71, at 57.Google Scholar

143 Morlok, M., supra note 137, at 68; undecided: Gusy, supra note 71, at 603.Google Scholar

144 See the regulations of the Parteiengesetz [Party Law], supra note 14.Google Scholar