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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
The Article revisits the German Federal Constitutional Court's NPD decision and the concept of militant democracy regarding party bans in German constitutional law. It argues that the Court's new definition of the free democratic basic order approximates its jurisprudence to the standards developed by the European Court of Human Rights. The Article also compares the German and European standards for party bans. It assesses the respective required risks for democracy that a party needs to pose in order to justify a party ban. In this respect, it is argued that the German standard—though elevated—still falls short of the threshold under European human rights law. Finally, the NPD's anti-constitutional—but not unconstitutional—character is examined, and a recent constitutional amendment to exclude extremist political parties from party financing is evaluated.
1 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 17, 2017, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 611 [hereinafter Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017].Google Scholar
2 Klein, H., 78th Supplement Art. 21, para. 5, in Maunz-Dürig Grundgesetz-Kommentar (C.H. Beck ed., 2016).Google Scholar
3 Ipsen, J., Art. 21, paras. 24–25, in Sachs Grundgesetz-Kommentar (C.H. Beck ed., 7th ed. 2014).Google Scholar
4 Id. at para. 5 (mentions that this constitutional incorporation had been proposed already by H. Triepel in his book. H. Triepel, Die Staatsverfassung und die politischen Parteien [The State constitution and the political parties] 8 (Preußische Drucks- und Verlags-Aktiengesellschaft 1927)).Google Scholar
5 Ipsen, supra note 3, at para. 65.Google Scholar
6 Christoph Gusy, Die Lehre vom Parteienstaat in der Weimarer Republik [The Teaching from the Party State in the Weimarer Republic] 35 (Nomos 1993).Google Scholar
7 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 23, 1952, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 1407, 73 (225–27) [hereinafter Judgment of Oct. 23, 1952]; See also Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 18, 2003, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 1577, 358 [hereinafter Judgment of Mar. 18, 2003].Google Scholar
8 This term is favored by Ipsen, supra note 3, at paras. 14, 23.Google Scholar
9 Kluth, W., Art. 21, para. 1, in Epping/Hillgruber Beck'scher Online-Kommentar Grundgesetz (C.H. Beck ed., 31st ed. 2016).Google Scholar
10 Id. at para. 19; Ipsen, supra note 3, paras. 15–16.Google Scholar
11 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 20, para. 1.Google Scholar
12 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 3, para. 1.Google Scholar
13 Ipsen, supra note 3, paras. 33–34.Google Scholar
14 See Parteiengesetz [Party Law] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] No. 44/1967 at 773, § 5.Google Scholar
15 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 21, para. 2.Google Scholar
16 See Klein, supra note 2, at paras. 497–498.Google Scholar
17 Term coined by K. Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights I, 31 Am. Pol. Sci. R. 417–32 (1937).Google Scholar
18 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Aug. 17, 1956, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 1393, 138 [hereinafter Judgment of Aug. 17, 1956].Google Scholar
19 Thorough discussion by Klein, supra note 2, at paras. 486–487.Google Scholar
20 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 516.Google Scholar
21 For more, see Judgment of Aug. 17, 1956 at 139; Klein, supra note 2, at para. 491.Google Scholar
22 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 517.Google Scholar
23 Bourne, Angela K. & Fernando Casal Bértoa, Mapping Militant Democracy: Variation in Party Ban Practices in European Democracies (1945-2015), 221 Eur. Const. Law R. 234 (2017).Google Scholar
24 Id. at 14.Google Scholar
25 Id. at 23 (citing G. Bligh, Defending Democracy, A New Understanding of the Party-Banning Phenomenon, 46 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1321, 1354 (2013)).Google Scholar
26 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 9, para. 2 provides: “Associations whose aims or activities contravene the criminal laws, or that are directed against the constitutional order or the concept of international understanding, shall be prohibited.”Google Scholar
27 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 18 provides: Whoever abuses the freedom of expression, in particular the freedom of the press (paragraph (1) of Article 5), the freedom of teaching (paragraph (3) of Article 5), the freedom of assembly (Article 8), the freedom of association (Article 9), the privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications (Article 10), the rights of property (Article 14), or the right of asylum (Article 16a) in order to combat the free democratic basic order shall forfeit these basic rights. This forfeiture and its extent shall be declared by the Federal Constitutional Court.Google Scholar
28 Further examples of militant democracy within the Grundgesetz can be found in Article 79 paragraph 3—the “eternity clause”—, Article 87a paragraph 4, and in Article 91.Google Scholar
29 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 524.Google Scholar
30 Id. Google Scholar
31 For the ban of the Socialist Reich Party (Sozialistische Reichspartei, “SRP”), see Judgment of Oct. 23, 1952; for the ban of the Communist Party of Germany (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, “KPD”), see Judgment of Aug. 17, 1956. Google Scholar
32 Id. at para. 526; for more, see Klein, supra note 2 at paras. 571–572.Google Scholar
33 In German: “freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung. ”Google Scholar
34 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 21, para. 2 provides: “Parties that, by reason of their aims or the behaviour of their adherents, seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany shall be unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court shall rule on the question of unconstitutionality.”Google Scholar
35 See, for instance, the European Court of Human Rights decisions: United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, App. No. 19392/92, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Socialist Party v. Turkey, App. No. 21237/93, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Dicle v. Turkey, App. No. 25141/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; HADEP and Demir v. Turkey, App. No. 28003/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Party for a Democratic Society v. Turkey, App. No. 3840/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.Google Scholar
36 These eight elements have been enumerated by the FCC in the SRP decision, see Judgment of Oct. 23, 1952 at 13.Google Scholar
37 These additional elements stem from the FCC's KPD decision, see Judgment of Aug. 17, 1956 at 199, 230.Google Scholar
38 For these additional elements, see Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 1958, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 3064; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 2, 1977, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 1054, 139; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 1, 1987, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 329, 74; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 22, 2014, 2 BvR 661/12, 303.Google Scholar
39 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 1, para. 1.Google Scholar
40 G. Dürig, Art. 1 paragraph 1, paras. 28, 34, in Maunz-Dürig Grundgesetz-Kommentar (C.H. Beck ed. 1958).Google Scholar
41 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 543.Google Scholar
42 Id. at para. 547.Google Scholar
43 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 79, para. 3 reads: Amendments to the Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.Google Scholar
44 Different opinion: Ipsen, supra note 3, at para. 160 (“identical”).Google Scholar
45 In this direction also M. Sachs, Kein Verbot der NPD trotz Verfassungsfeindlichkeit mangels jeglicher Erfolgsaussichten ihrer Bestrebungen [No NPD ban despite the party's anti-constitutional character due to the lack of potential success], 377 Juristische Schulung 378 (2017).Google Scholar
46 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 146 provides: “This Basic Law, which since the achievement of the unity and freedom of Germany applies to the entire German people, shall cease to apply on the day on which a constitution freely adopted by the German people takes effect.”Google Scholar
47 When addressing the relationship between Article 21 paragraph 2 and Article 146, the FCC touches upon this issue in passing, without resolving it, see Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 518, with further references.Google Scholar
48 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 537.Google Scholar
49 Socialist Party v. Turkey, supra note 35, at para. 47.Google Scholar
50 Freedom and Democracy Party v. Turkey, App. No. 23885/94, para. 41 (1999), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.Google Scholar
51 Parti Socialiste de Turquie v. Turquie, App. No. 26482/95, para. 43 (2003), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.Google Scholar
52 United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-Pirin v. Bulgaria, App. No. 59489/00, para. 61 (Oct. 20, 2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.Google Scholar
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57 See Party, United Communist, supra note 35, at para. 45.Google Scholar
58 Id. at paras. 25, 43.Google Scholar
59 Id. at para. 46.Google Scholar
60 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 26, 2004, 2 BvR 955/00, 25.Google Scholar
61 In German: “verfassungsfeindlich.”Google Scholar
62 Klein, supra note 2, at para. 486.Google Scholar
63 In German: “darauf ausgehen.”Google Scholar
64 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 574, with reference to Judgment of Aug. 17, 1956 at 141: “aktiv kämpferische, aggressive Haltung.”Google Scholar
65 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 570.Google Scholar
66 K.H. Seifert, Die politischen Parteien im Recht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland [The political parties in the law of the Federal Republic of Germany] 466 (Heymanns ed. 1975).Google Scholar
67 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 579.Google Scholar
68 See the Court's KPD decision, Judgment of Aug. 17, 1956 at 142.Google Scholar
69 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 570, 585–586 (in German: “Potentialität”); justifying the old approach, Klein, supra note 2, at para. 527.Google Scholar
70 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 586.Google Scholar
71 See Gusy, C., Verfassungswidrig, aber nicht verboten! [Unconstitutional, but not banned!], Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 601, 602 (2017); C. Hillgruber, NPD–verfassungsfeindlich, aber nicht verfassungswidrig [NPD–anti-constitutional, but not unconstitutional], Juristische Ausbildung 398, 399 (2017); H.W. Laubinger, Entscheidung durch den Bundestagspräsidenten? [Decision by the President of the Bundestag?], Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 55, 56 (2017); Sachs, supra note 45, at 379.Google Scholar
72 Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. No. 41340/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.Google Scholar
73 Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).Google Scholar
74 Article 11 paragraph 2 of the Convention.Google Scholar
75 Yazar v. Turkey, App. Nos. 22723/93, 22724/93, 22725/93, para. 49, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.Google Scholar
76 Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey, supra note 72, at para. 104.Google Scholar
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78 Refah Partisi v. Turkey, supra note 72, at para. 11.Google Scholar
79 S. Emek & H. Meier, Über die Zukunft des Parteiverbots [On the future of the party ban], in Verbot der NPD–ein deutsches Staatstheater in zwei Akten [Ban of the NPD–a German state play in two acts] 309, 314 (H. Meier ed., Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag 2015); compare Pabel, K., Parteiverbote auf dem europäischen Prüfstand [Party bans under European scrutiny], 63 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 921, 932 (2003).Google Scholar
80 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 607.Google Scholar
81 Refah Partisi, supra note 72, at para. 102; Herri Batasuna, supra note 77, at para. 81.Google Scholar
82 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 613.Google Scholar
83 Id. at para. 619.Google Scholar
84 Id. at para. 620, with reference to Herri Batasuna, supra note 77, at paras. 85; Eusko Abertzale Ekintza—Acción Nacionalista Vasca v. Espagne, App. No. 40959/09, paras. 67, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.Google Scholar
85 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 621.Google Scholar
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90 Refah Partisi, supra note 72, para. 102; Herri Batasuna, supra note 77, at para. 81.Google Scholar
91 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017 at para. 3.Google Scholar
92 In comparison, Germany has a population of about 81 million.Google Scholar
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94 The judges were Hassemer, Broß, and Osterloh.Google Scholar
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97 Between May 2013 and July 2018, one NSU member, Ms. Beate Zschäpe, and four potential assistants were standing criminal trial in Munich. They were convicted on Jul., 11, 2018.Google Scholar
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102 Judgment of Jan. 17, 2017, paras. 400–401, particularly 427–428.Google Scholar
103 Id. at para. 405.Google Scholar
104 Id. at paras. 635–636.Google Scholar
105 Id. at paras. 640–641.Google Scholar
106 Id. at para. 654 (“Deutsche afrikanischer Herkunft oder Afro-Deutsche kann es sowenig geben wie schwangere Jungfrauen”).Google Scholar
107 Id. at para. 679 (“Europa ist das Land der weißen Rasse”).Google Scholar
108 Id. at para. 671 (“Weiß ist nicht nur eine Trikotfarbe – für eine echte deutsche Nationalmannschaft”).Google Scholar
109 Id. at para. 702 (“Deutsche Frauen und Mädchen, lasst euch nicht mit Negern ein!”).Google Scholar
110 Id. at para. 711 (“entartete Menschen”).Google Scholar
111 Id. at para. 730 (“Kampf gegen den Islam”).Google Scholar
112 Id. at para. 747.Google Scholar
113 Id. at paras. 758–759.Google Scholar
114 Id. at para. 777 (“Einem System, das sich auf Mehrheitsentscheidungen stützt, kann demnach auch keine Ewigkeitsgarantie ausgesprochen werden”).Google Scholar
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116 Id. at para. 772 (“Herrschaft der Minderwertigen”).Google Scholar
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