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Legitimacy of International Law and the Exercise of Administrative Functions: The Example of the International Seabed Authority, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and International Fisheries Organizations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Rüdiger Wolfrum

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It is possible to speak of international administration only if an international entity is truly exercising functions equivalent to States. While such cases are rare, as Joseph Weiler emphasized in a different context, they do exist. One such case is the International Seabed Authority, which exercises legislative as well as executive functions concerning the international seabed (Area) and its resources. Furthermore, the legal regime on the international seabed comprises a fully elaborated system for the settlement of disputes available to public and private actors involved in the exploration and exploitation of mineral resources in the Area. The functions assigned to IMO and some fisheries organizations have not quite reached this level. Nevertheless one can observe that these organizations, too, prescribe binding rules, at least de facto. However, they lack the jurisdiction to enforce such rules directly; in that respect they are relying on the enforcement of States to enforce such rules acting under different capacities such as flag States or port States. One may consider these legal regimes as belonging to a multilevel system (Mehrebenensystem) where the prescriptive and executive functions are being vested in different entities.

Type
Cross-cutting Analyses
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 9 , Issue 11: Special issue - The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions , 01 November 2008 , pp. 2039 - 2060
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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6 See G. Dahm, J. Delbrück & R. Wolfrum, I/3 Völkerrecht 743 (2002, 2nd ed.).Google Scholar

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13 Weiler (note 1), at 550 (referring to further examples). Weiler states “The regulatory regime is often associated with an international bureaucratic apparatus, with international civil servants, and, critically, with mid-level State officials as interlocutors. Regulatory regimes have a far greater “direct” and “indirect” effect on individuals, markets and more directly if not always visible as human rights, come into conflict with national social values.”Google Scholar

14 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (concluded 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3.Google Scholar

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16 The “Area” is the deep seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.Google Scholar

17 See Art. 305 of the Convention.Google Scholar

18 The four different voting procedures include a vote by show of hands or a roll-call in the absence of voting by mechanical means and a non-recorded vote or a recorded vote in the case of voting by mechanical means. See Rule 60 in the Part X of the Rules of Procedure of the Council of the International Seabed Authority.Google Scholar

19 Implementation Agreement, Annex, Sec. 3.Google Scholar

20 Article 157 of the Convention, emphasis added.Google Scholar

21 Art. 17 of Annex III to the Convention.Google Scholar

22 Art. 145(a) of the Convention.Google Scholar

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26 Art. 18 Annex III, Convention on the Law of the Sea.Google Scholar

27 Art. 18(3), Annex III, Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that sanctions may, as a matter of principle, be executed only after the operator in question had the opportunity to exhaust the legal remedies available.Google Scholar

28 On details, see Section 2 of the Annex to the Implementation Agreement.Google Scholar

29 See Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the International Maritime Organization, IMO Doc. LEG/MISC/3/Rev.1 (6 January 2003).Google Scholar

30 The procedures are set forth in Part XV of the Convention on the Law of the Sea.Google Scholar

31 See Revised Guidelines for the Identification and Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas, IMO Assembly Resolution A. 982(24), IMO Assembly 24th Session, adopted on 1 December 2005.Google Scholar

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33 See Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSA), (IMO ed., 2007 edition).Google Scholar

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35 Available at: http://www.nafo.int/fisheries/fishery/iuu/list.html.Google Scholar

36 Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.Google Scholar

37 See Art. 53 of the Conservation and Enforcement Measures.Google Scholar

38 See Feinäugle, in this volume.Google Scholar