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A “Global Theory of Federalism”: The Nature and Challenges of a Federal State

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Anna Gamper

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Innumerable attempts have been made to explore the theoretical nature of federalism. Due to the long history, worldwide existence and interdisciplinary character of federalism, a plethora of literature has been written on the topic. Yet, these endeavours have not even resulted in a clear and commonly used definition of the term. Surely, it is one of the great dilemmas of this field of research that despite so much discussion, there is no settled common denominator of ‘federalism'. Whereas practical studies and exchange of experience between the various federal systems offer a more conventional research arena, comparative theoretical approaches are much more seldom. This is not the least because of the tremendous semantic challenges of a comparative theoretical approach. At first glance, it is sometimes difficult to understand the terminology of federalism, the meaning of which differs according to the perspectives of constitutional law, political science or economics. Even more difficulty arises when the substance of federal theories is discussed. Again, differences between theories may be due to different academic approaches, particularly between understanding federalism as an overall principle or as a more concrete concept of a federal state and, in particular, whether the constituent units of a federal state are states, and, if states, whether they are sovereign.

Type
Research Article
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 6 , Issue 10: Special issue - Articles German Federalism: Theory and Recent Developments , 01 October 2005 , pp. 1297 - 1318
Copyright
Copyright © 2005 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 See, e.g., Kenneth C. Wheare, Federal Government 1 (1947); Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems 6 (2nd ed., 1999); exemplary for the Germanic law tradition: Martin Usteri, Theorie des Bundesstaates 4 (1954); Fried Esterbauer, Kriterien föderativer und konföderativer Systeme 175 (1976); Otto Kimminich, Der Bundesstaat, in Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. I: Grundlagen von Staat und Verfassung, 1113, 1115 (Josef Isensee/Paul Kirchhof eds., 1987); Karl Weber, Elemente eines umfassenden Föderalismusbegriffes, in Auf dem Weg zur Menschenwürde und Gerechtigkeit, 1013, 1016 (Ludwig Adamovich/Peter Pernthaler eds., 1989); Peter Pernthaler, Österreichische Föderalismusbegriffe, in Festschrift Guy Héraud, 315, 318 (Franz Hieronymus Riedl/Theodor Veiter eds., 1989); Peter Pernthaler, Zum Begriff von Föderalismus und Bundesstaat in Österreich, in Föderalismus und Parlamentarismus in Österreich, 35, 38 (Herbert Schambeck ed., 1992); Ludger Helms, Strukturelemente und Entwicklungsdynamik des deutschen Bundesstaates im internationalen Vergleich, Zeitschrift für Politik (ZfP) 125 (2002); Anna Gamper, Die Regionen mit Gesetzgebungshoheit 16 (2004); Matthias Jestaedt, Bundesstaat als Verfassungsprinzip, in Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. II: Verfassungsstaat, 785, 793 (Josef Isensee/Paul Kirchhof eds., 3rd ed., 2004).Google Scholar

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17 Within this context, the Germanic tradition roughly comprises the German, Austrian and Swiss theory of federalism.Google Scholar

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