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Germany's Mixed-Member Electoral System: A Victim of its Sophistication?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Christian Tomuschat

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To shape a legitimate electoral system is a tremendous challenge for any parliamentary body. It cannot evade the responsibility of enacting the requisite statutory rules since no other State organ has the authority to make determinations which are substantially of a constitutional character. How, and under what conditions, citizens choose their representatives pertains to the key issues in a democratic system. But it is a truism to state that a parliament is not a homogeneous body; it is normally composed of different groups with highly divergent interests. Groups representing large political parties tend to favor a majoritarian electoral system, following with greater or slighter variations the British model of first past the post where the highest number of ballots in a given constituency determines the winner of the seat in issue, even though the candidate may have obtained only a relative plurality. Smaller parties, on the other hand, put their preferences on proportional representation, which ensures them a share of the seats corresponding to their share of the vote. To their regret, parties supported only by a low fraction of the electorate cannot, which is self-evident, impose their preferred option, having to wait for pressure to build up in the general public to promote their concerns. Thus, parliaments are neither neutral nor objective when they make determinations in electoral matters.

Type
Developments
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 14 , Issue 1: Special section - The ESM Before the Courts , 01 January 2013 , pp. 213 - 237
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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23 Id. at 276–77.Google Scholar

24 Id. at 294–308.Google Scholar

25 Federal Electoral Act, supra note 5, at arts. 1–7(establishing the current regulation).Google Scholar

26 In English terminology, this may properly be called a “mixed-member electoral system.”Google Scholar

27 Federal Electoral Act, supra note 5, at art. 6(5).Google Scholar

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34 On the same occasion, in Baden-Württemberg, the CDU obtained 34.4% of the second vote, in Bavaria the CSU reached 42.5%, and in North Rhine Westphalia the SPD stood at 28.5%. See Christian Social Union of Bavaria, Princeton.edu, http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Christian_Social_Union_of_Bavaria.html Google Scholar

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37 The most fervent adversary of surplus seats, raising many sinister speculations, is Hans Meyer in several publications. See, e.g., Demokratische Wahl und Wahlsystem, III Handbuch des Staatsrechts 521, 537 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 3d. ed. 2005); Wahlrechtsgrundsätze, Wahlverfahren, Wahlprüfung, III Handbuch des Staatsrechts 543, 570–77; Die Zukunft des Bundeswahlrechts passim (2010).Google Scholar

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46 No attempt will be made here to explain in detail the legal rules governing this additional aspect of the electoral regime.Google Scholar

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65 Criticism from the viewpoint of political science by Herbert Kleinert, Anmerkungen zum Wahlrechtsstreit—Ein Problem gelöst, ein anderes bleibt. Oder: Ein Blick über die Grenzen lehrt Gelassenheit, 43 Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 185, 187 (2012).Google Scholar

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71 Persuasively demonstrated by Lenz, supra note 48, at 346. This is also acknowledged by Meyer, supra note 37, at 535.Google Scholar

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73 Federal Electoral Act, supra note 5, at 470.Google Scholar

74 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvE 2/56, Jan. 23, 1957, 6 BVerfGE 84 (Ger.).Google Scholar

75 All of these arguments were already considered with thorough attention in the judgment of Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvH 1/52, Apr. 5, 1952, 1 BVerfGE 208, 248 (Ger.).Google Scholar

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78 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 9/56, July 3, 1957, 7 BVerfGE 63, 75 (Ger.); see also Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvC 3/62, May 22, 1963, 16 BVerfGE 130, 140 (Ger.).Google Scholar

79 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvF 3/11, July 25, 2012, 2012 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2869, at margin nn.143–44 (Ger.).Google Scholar

80 Id. (“The Chamber realizes that the number of 15 surplus seats, an act of judicial particularization of the law, cannot completely be supported by reasons.”).Google Scholar

81 See text accompanying supra note 54.Google Scholar

82 See references in the opinion of the four dissenting judges concerning the judgment of Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvF 1/95, Apr. 10, 1997, 95 BVerfGE 335, 373 (Ger.); Dirk Ehlers & Marc Lechleitner, Die Verfassungsmäßigkeit von Überhangmandaten, Juristenzeitung 761, 762 (1997); Lenz, supra note 48, at 345.Google Scholar

83 The most outstanding example is the distancing of the FCC from the “Halbteilungsgrundsatz,” the principle according to which income taxes must not exceed 50% of the taxable revenue. The principle was proclaimed in a decision of Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvL 37/91, June 22, 1995, 93 BVerfGE 121, 138 (Ger.), but abandoned by a decision of Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2194/99, Jan. 18, 2006, 115 BVerfGE 97, 114 (Ger.). The second relevant example is the departure of the FCC from the 5% clause concerning elections to the European Parliament. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvF 3/11, July 25, 2012, 2012 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2869 margin n.143 (Ger.).Google Scholar

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85 Detailed references are given by Dieter Nohlen & Philip Stöver, Elections in Europe, in Elections in Europe 69, 92 (2010).Google Scholar

86 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvC 3/96, Apr. 10, 1997, 95 BVerfGE 408, 418 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvC 1, 7/07, July 3, 2008, 121 BVerfGE 266, 297 (Ger.); see also Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvF 3/11, July 25, 2012, 2012 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2869 margin n.58, 127 (Ger.).Google Scholar

87 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvF 3/11, July 25, 2012, 2012 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2869 margin n.62 (Ger.).Google Scholar

88 The argument has been generally accepted in the jurisprudence of the FCC. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 9/56, July 3, 1957, 7 BVerfGE 63, 74 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvC 3/62, May 22, 1963, 16 BVerfGE 130, 140 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 89/74, Mar. 9, 1976, 41 BVerfGE 399, 423 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvF 1/95, Apr. 10, 1997, 95 BVerfGE 335, 358 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvC 3/96, Apr. 10, 1997, 95 BVerfGE 408, 412 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvC 28/96, Feb. 26, 1998, 97 BVerfGE 317, 327 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvF 3/11, July 25, 2012, 2012 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2869 margin n.133 (Ger.).Google Scholar

89 See Nir Atmor, Reuven Y. Hazan & Gideon Rahat, Candidate Selection, in Personal Representation: The Neglected Dimension of Electoral Systems 21, 28 (Joseph P. Colomer ed., 2011); Matthew Soberg Shugart, “Extreme” Electoral Systems and the Appeal of the Mixed-Member Alternative, in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds? 25, 35–36 (Matthew Soberg Shugart & Martin P. Wattenberg eds., 2001).Google Scholar

90 See, e.g., Pappi & Herrmann, supra note 19, at 270.Google Scholar

91 Meyer, , supra note 19, at 8, 11; see Meyer, Demokratische Wahl und Wahlsystem, supra note 37, at 534.Google Scholar

92 Similar arguments are advanced by Sophie-Charlotte Lenski, Paradoxien der personalisierten Verhältniswahl, 134 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 473, 479–500 (2009); Christoph Möllers, 1 Wahlrecht: Das missverstandene Systemargument im Streit um die Überhangmandate, Recht und Politik 1, 7–8 (2012).Google Scholar

93 See, e.g., Jaap Woldendorp, Hans Keman & Budge, Ian, Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945–1998): Composition, Duration, Personnel, 1–10 (2000).Google Scholar

94 Text accompanying supra note 3.Google Scholar

95 Federal Electoral Act, supra note 5, at art. 1(2).Google Scholar

96 Lenski, , supra note 92, at 502; Meyer, supra note 19, at 36, 59, 72–74, 100. A first hint was given by the FCC itself in its decision of Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 9/56, July 3, 1957, 7 BVerfGE 63, 75 (Ger.).Google Scholar

97 However, where a political party has no allies—like the party “Die Linke” (The Left) or the “National Democratic Party” (NPD) on the extreme right hand side of the political spectrum—voters have no such choice.Google Scholar

98 Thus, in 2009 the FDP obtained 9.4% of the first list votes but 14.7% for their second lists, Der Bundeswahlleiter, Endgültiges Ergebnis der Bundestagswahl 2009, http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/de/bundestagswahlen/BTW_BUND_09/ergebnisse/bundesergebnisse/index.html, the gap was also considerable, but on a lower level, 4.75% against 9.8%. See Der Bundeswahlleiter, Wahl Zum 16 Deutschen Bundestag Am 18 September 2005, at 6, 10, available at http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/de/bundestagswahlen/BTW_BUND_05/downloads/ergebnisse_2005/heft3_mit_grafiken.pdf.Google Scholar

99 Formally acknowleged by the FCC in Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvC 2/06, Apr. 21, 2009, 124 BVerfGE 1, 21 (Ger.). See Isensee, supra note 55, at 276; Hans-Dieter Klingemann & Bernhard Wessels, The Political Consequences of Germany's Mixed-Member System: Personalization at the Grass Roots?, in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems the Best of Both Worlds? 279, 285–88 (Matthew Soberg Shugart & Martin P. Wattenberg eds., 2001).Google Scholar

100 For the contrary view, see Meyer, supra note 19, at 100, 108.Google Scholar

101 See supra note 98.Google Scholar

102 However, it is striking that the Green Party, too, scored much better on its second than on its first lists. In 2005, the percentages were 5.4 and 8.1 respectively. See Der Bundeswahlleiter, Wahl Zum 16 Deutschen Bundestag Am 18 September 2005, at 6, 10, available at http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/de/bundestagswahlen/BTW_BUND_05/downloads/ergebnisse_2005/heft3_mit_grafiken.pdf. In 2009, the score was 9.2 to 10.7 respectively. See Der Bundeswahlleiter, Endgültiges Ergebnis der Bundestagswahl 2009, http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/de/bundestagswahlen/BTW_BUND_09/ergebnisse/bundesergebnisse/index.html.Google Scholar

103 Article 63(1) of the Basic Law provides: “The Federal Chancellor shall be elected by the Bundestag without debate on the proposal of the Federal President.” Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundegesetz] [GG] [Basic Law] (Ger.).Google Scholar

104 They materialized, for example, at the federal elections of 2009 when the CDU, for which Angela Merkel was the top candidate, obtained 24 surplus seats which gave a comfortable majority to the coalition government of CDU/CSU and FDP.Google Scholar

105 In a somewhat naive manner, Lenski, supra note 92, at 501, argues that the legislature had expected that voters would regularly cast their vote in an uniform manner.Google Scholar

106 See Electoral Act of 8 July 1953, Bundesgesetzblatt 1953 I, 470, at Article 9(4). For the actual practice see Geschichte der Überhangmandate im Deutschen Bundestag, wahlrecht.de (Nov. 1, 2009), http://www.wahlrecht.de/ueberhang/ueberhist.html.Google Scholar

107 For a comprehensive discussion see Meyer, supra note 19, at 68.Google Scholar

108 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvC 3/62, May 22, 1963, 16 BVerfGE 130, 136 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Nov. 24, 1988, 79 BVerfGE 169, 171 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvF 1/95, Apr. 10, 1997, 95 BVerfGE 335, 353 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvC 1, 7/07, July 3, 2008, 121 BVerfGE 266, 295 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvC 2/06, Apr. 21, 2009, 124 BVerfGE 1, 18 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvF 3/11, July 25, 2012, 2012 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2869 margin n.60 (Ger.).Google Scholar

109 As already indicated, the FCC emphasized already in early decisions of 1961 and 1963 that to the extent possible the size of the population in the different constituencies should be “approximately” equal. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Aug. 26, 1961, 13 BVerfGE 127, 128 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvC 3/62, May 22, 1963, 16 BVerfGE 130, 140 (Ger.).Google Scholar

110 A common proposal was introduced by all parties represented in the Bundestag, with the exception of “The Left,” on 11 December 2012. See Bundestag document 17/11819 (2012).Google Scholar

111 In 2009, the CSU obtained 42.5% of the vote in Bavaria according to the Land list but won all seats available on the first lists, which resulted in three surplus seats. Should its general approval rate shrink even further, it might still be able to take all of the direct seats.Google Scholar

112 See Report of the Committee of Elders, Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache [BT] 13/1803, at 7–8.Google Scholar

113 Severin Weiland, Bundestag nach der Wahlrechtsreform: Größer als Nordkorea, Spiegel Online, Oct. 18, 2012, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundestagsfraktionen-einigen-sich-auf-neues-wahlrecht-a-863199.html.Google Scholar

114 Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 31 I.L.M. 253, art. 14(2).Google Scholar