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German Constitutional Foundations of, and Limitations to, EU Integration: A Systematic Analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Erich Vranes

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The relationship between EU law and German constitutional law, and the respective dialogue between the ECJ and the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC), have considerably shaped the EU integration process by creating fields of tension and demarcating possible legal boundaries. The decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice concerning the European Stability Mechanism are only the most recent examples of this phenomenon. These developments have, of course, spilled over to other EU Member States. The German constitutional bases of, and limits to, EU integration—especially as articulated in the relevant decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court—have therefore become a field of particular interest for EU and public lawyers. This article gives an up-to-date overview of relevant constitutional rules, court decisions, and the academic debate in Germany. It does so by systematically distinguishing between an analysis of the German constitutional foundations of EU integration (section B.), constitutional limits to the further transfer of powers to the EU through amendments of EU primary law (section C.I.), and the constitutional confines for the legal effects of EU secondary law in Germany (section C.II.).

Type
Special Section: The ESM Before the Courts
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 14 , Issue 1: Special section - The ESM Before the Courts , 01 January 2013 , pp. 75 - 112
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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153 This section draws on Erich Vranes, European Human Rights Protection and the Contested Relationship of the ECJ and National Courts - Convergent Solutions under International, European and National Law? in The EU Banana Dispute - An Economic and Legal Analysis 195 (Fritz Breuss, Stefan Griller & Erich Vranes eds., 2003). It is an abbreviated version of the respective subsections in the latter contribution, which was updated in 2012 so as to take into account the legal developments in Germany between 2000 and 2012.Google Scholar

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164 Article 38 on elections stipulates:Google Scholar

  1. (1)

    (1) The deputies to the German Bundestag are elected in universal, direct, free, equal and secret elections. They are representatives of the whole people, are not bound by orders and instructions and are subject only to their conscience.Google Scholar

  2. (2)

    (2) Anyone who has attained the age of eighteen is entitled to vote, anyone who has attained the age of twenty-five is eligible for election.Google Scholar

  3. (3)

    (3) Details will be regulated by a Federal law.Google Scholar

165 See Herdegen, , supra note 163, at 235, 239; similarly e.g. Gert Nicolaysen and Carsten Nowak, Teilrückzug des BVerfG aus der Kontrolle der Rechtmäßigkeit gemeinschaftlicher Rechtsakte: Neuere Entwicklungen und Perspektiven, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1233, 34 (2001).Google Scholar

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168 “Es ist nicht erkennbar, dass durch diese Vorentscheidung der vom Grundgesetz als unabdingbar gebotene Grundrechtsschutz generall in Frage gestellt würde.” Id. at II.1.a.Google Scholar

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171 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvL 1/97, June 7, 2000, 102 BVerfGE 147 (Ger.).Google Scholar

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173 See, for example, the 1995 decision on the grant of interim relief for German banana importers, which indicated that the banana market regulation 404/93 is flexible enough to enable interim relief measures in hardship cases. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2689/94, 2 BvR 52/95, Jan. 25, 1995, 1995 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (EuZW) 126 (Ger.).Google Scholar

174 Id. Google Scholar

175 See e.g. Classen, Claus Dieter, Annotation to the 2000 Banana Decision of the German Constitutional Court, JZ 1158 (2000); Nicolaysen & Nowak, supra note 165, at 1233, 1234, 1236; Josef Franz Lindner, Annotation to the 2000 Alcan and Banana Decisions of the German Constitutional Court, Bavarian Official Gazette 758, 759 (2000); Hoffmeister, supra note 167, at 791, 802; Franz C. Mayer, Grundrechtsschutz gegen europäische Rechtsakte durch das BVerG: Zur Verfassungsmäßigkeit der Bananenmarktordnung, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 685 (2000). But see Schmid, supra note 159, at 249 (speaking of a “disappointing retreat” of the Bundesverfassungsgericht); see also Angelika Emmerich-Fritsche, Annotation to the 2000 Banana Decision of the German Constitutional Court, Bavarian Official Gazette 758 (2000) (providing a very trenchant critique and bemoaning the “retrogression of the attainments of the Maastricht judgment.”).Google Scholar

176 See the Solange I and Solange II decisions which also emphasized that they were to apply “provisionally”; on this see the preceding analysis.Google Scholar

177 See B.I.:Google Scholar

Submissions of cases to the Federal Constitutional Court for constitutional review under Article 100(1) GG which refer to rules that are part of secondary European Community law are only admissible if their grounds show in detail that the present evolution of law concerning the protection of fundamental rights in European Community law, especially in case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, does not generally ensure the protection of fundamental rights required unconditionally in the respective case.

178 This view has recently also been taken by the President of the FCC. See Voßkuhle, supra note 64, at 1, 6; see also e.g. Classen, supra note 175, at 1158; Nicolaysen & Nowak, supra note 165, at 1233, 1234, 1236; Lindner, supra note 175, at 758, 759; Schmid, supra note 159, at 249; Hoffmeister, supra note 167, at 791, 802; Mayer, supra note 175, at 685; Emmerich-Fritsche, supra note 175, at 758; Rudolf Streinz, Verfassungsvorbehalte gegenüber Gemeinschaftsrecht—eine deutsche Besonderheit? Die Schranken der Integrationsermächtigung und ihre Realisierung in den Verfassungen der Mitgliedstaaten, in Tradition und Weltoffenheit des Rechts: Festschrift für Helmut Steinberger (Hans-Joachim Cremer et al. eds., 2002).Google Scholar

179 See in the following text.Google Scholar

180 Cf., e.g., Emmerich-Fritsche, supra note 175, at 758; Nicolaysen & Nowak, supra note 165, at 1233, 1235; Schmid, supra note 159, at 249, 253 and Hoffmeister, supra note 167, at 791, 797.Google Scholar

181 Zuleeg, Manfred, Bananen und Grundrechte—Anlaß zum Konflikt zwischen europäischer und deutscher Gerichtsbarkeit, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1201 (1997); Huber, supra note 159, at 159, all with further references; Hoffmeister, supra note 167, at 791, 797; see also Hirsch, supra note 163, at 2457, 2460; Günther Hirsch, Der EuGH im Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Gemeinschaftsrecht und nationalem Recht, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1818 (2000); Limbach, supra note 161, at margin numbers 23; Jutta Limbach, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht und der Grundrechtsschutz in Europa, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2913, 2915 (2001) with further references; Nicolaysen, supra note 163, at 101, 102.Google Scholar

182 Cf. Limbach in a speech on 29 June 2000 at the Berlin Walter Hallstein Institut:Google Scholar

Der Grundrechtsschutz auf europäischer Ebene darf hinter dem nationalen deutschen Grundrechtsschutz zurückbleiben,” and “Da sich das Bundesverfassungsgericht auf die generelle Gewährleistung des unabdingbaren Grundrechtsschutzes beschränkt, können Grundrechtsverstöße von europäischen Organen nicht im Einzelfall geltend gemacht werden. Nur dann, wenn der unabdingbare Grundrechtsstandard generell nicht mehr gewährleistet ist, sind Verfassungsbeschwerden und Richtervorlagen zulässig. Also nur dann revitalisiert sich die Reservezuständigkeit, wenn die Rechtsprechung des EuGH allgemein hinter das im Jahre 1986 erreichte Schutzniveau zurückgefallen ist. Der Respekt vor der grundsätzlichen Letztentscheidungskompetenz des EuGH und die Leitidee vom Kooperationsverhältnis vertragen sich nicht mit einer Einzelfallkontrolle durch nationale Verfassungsgerichte und deren Einsatz als “watchdogs.”

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183 See id. Google Scholar

184 Classen, , supra note 175, at 1158 (“nicht der Einzelfall, sondern das Gesamtbild ist ausschlaggebend”).Google Scholar

185 Hoffmeister, , supra note 167.Google Scholar

186 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 1 BVR 1036/99, Jan. 9, 2001, 2001 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1267, para. 15 (Ger.). (“Gemeinschaftsrecht wird grunds tzlich nicht am Maßstab der Grundrechte durch das Bundesverfassungsgericht geprüft; Verfassungsbeschwerden und Vorlagen von Gerichten sind von vornherein unzulässig, wenn ihre Begründung nicht darlegt, dass die europäische Rechtsentwicklung einschließlich der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs unter den erforderlichen Grundrechtsstandard abgesunken ist.”).Google Scholar

187 Id. at paras. 16.Google Scholar

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189 See. Pernice, , supra note 9, at margin numbers 30–31.Google Scholar

190 See Pernice, , supra note 9; Schmid, supra note 159, at 249, 256.Google Scholar

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193 Bäcker, Matthias, Solange II a oder Basta I? EuR 103, 107 (2011); see also Dietrich Westphal, Leitplanken für die Vorratsdatenspeicherung, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 494 (2010).Google Scholar

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In cases in which joint action and measures pursuant to Titles V and VI of the Maastricht Treaty impose a binding obligation upon the Member States under international law to interfere with basic rights, any such interference which takes place in Germany may be subjected to full review before the German courts. In this respect the protection of basic rights for which the Basic law provides is not eclipsed by supranational legislation which may take precedence.

Id.

197 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 1826/09, Sept. 3, 2009, 16 BVerfGK 177 (Ger.).Google Scholar

198 Schmahl, Stefanie, Art. 23 in Grundgesetz: Beck'scher Kompakt-Kommentar margin number 25 (Helge Sodan ed., 1st ed., 2009).Google Scholar

199 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92, Oct. 12, 1993, 89 BVerfGE 155 (Ger.).Google Scholar

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201 On this, see Vranes, supra note 153, at 195; Erich Vranes, Introduction to the Problems of EU Fundamental Rights Protection, the Status of WTO Law Within the EU, and Community Liability for Infringements of WTO Law, in The Eu Banana Dispute—An Economic And Legal Analysis 185.Google Scholar

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206 Lisbon ruling, supra note 2, at para. 239–40. On the instrument of identity review, see Frank Schorkopf, The European Union as an Association of Sovereign States: Karlsruhe's Ruling on the Treaty of Lisbon, 10 German L.J. 1219–40 (2009).Google Scholar

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208 Id. at para. 339.Google Scholar

209 Id. at para. 340.Google Scholar

210 See, e.g., Bogdandy, von, supra note 57, at 1, 4.Google Scholar

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215 Id. at 7 (“theoretisch Rechtsakte aller Gemeinschaftsorgane … auch Entscheidungen des EuGH”).Google Scholar

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220 On this and the following cf. Vranes, supra note 153, at 195 with further references.Google Scholar

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222 On this reading of Articles 6 and 7 TEU see Vranes, supra note 153 at 195.Google Scholar

223 See Pernice, , supra note 9, at margin numbers 29 (referring to “constitutional necessity”).Google Scholar

224 This approach is taken by Schmid, supra note 197, at 415. A similar approach was proposed by Gerhard Eibach, Das Recht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften als Prüfgegenstand des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 107 (1986).Google Scholar

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From the continuing sovereignty of the people which is anchored in the Member States and from the circumstance that the states remain the masters of the Treaties, it follows - at any rate until the formal foundation of a European federal state and the change of the subject of democratic legitimisation which must be explicitly performed with it - that the member states may not be deprived of the right to review adherence to the integration programme.

This consideration constitutes the basis for the FCC's claim to its competence to “exceptionally, and under special and narrow conditions” review, and declare inapplicable, EU law. Id. at para. 340.

226 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2661/06, July 6, 2010, 126 BVerfGE 286 (Ger.) [hereinafter Honeywell]; see also Heiko Sauer, Europas Richter Hand in Hand? Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 94 (2011); Mehrdad Payandeh, Constitutional Review of EU Law after Honeywell, 48 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 9 (2011).Google Scholar

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229 See the possible judicial re-orientation as regards fundamental rights in the data retention case in Section C.II.3.a.Google Scholar

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