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Genocidal Politics and Racialization of Intervention: From Rwanda to Darfur and Beyond

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Shedrack C. Agbakwa

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Last year marked the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide when more than 800,000 people were slaughtered within 100 days under the watch of the international community. As the United Nations has since acknowledged, “[t]he international community did not prevent the genocide, nor did it stop the killing once the genocide had begun.” The whole world failed the victims – a failure the UN Report called a fundamental “failure of the international community [and] failure of the United Nations system as a whole.” Those who could did little or nothing to help. Indeed, some actively concealed or denied the unfolding genocide. Interestingly, the genocide took place more than half a century after the victorious allies of World War II vowed “Never Again!” to genocide in response to the Nazi holocaust. Also, by 1994 the 1948 Convention on the Punishment and the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide under which states assumed a legal duty to prevent and punish the crime of genocide was nearly half a century old.

Type
Developments
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 6 , Issue 2: Article: Special Issue - Confronting Memories: European „Bitter Experiences“ and the Constitutionalization Process , 01 February 2005 , pp. 513 - 531
Copyright
Copyright © 2005 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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