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European Consensus and the Evolutive Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou

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The European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) should be an instrument of development and improvement rather than an “end game” treaty which froze the state of affairs that existed 60 years ago. At the same time, evolutive interpretation should not be tantamount to arbitrary interpretation. This paper seeks to explain how the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) strikes a balance between development and stability.

Type
Articles
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 12 , Issue 10: Special Issue Legitimacy and the Future of the European Court of Human Rights , 01 October 2011 , pp. 1730 - 1745
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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