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Euratom, the European Court of Justice, and the Limits of Nuclear Integration in Europe

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Sebastian Wolf

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Only a few European integration experts know that Jean Monnet, one of the masterminds of the European Coal and Steel Community, strongly preferred the European Atomic Energy Community to the European Economic Community in the 1950s and 1960s. From his point of view, sectoral and technical cooperation in the field of nuclear energy seemed to be much more promising in order to foster European integration than cross-sectoral economic integration. Monnet and others believed that nuclear energy could, inter alia, solve all energy supply problems, would revolutionize research and technical development, and could contribute to unifying the peoples of Europe in a few decades. However, nuclear energy in general and Euratom in particular have belied these expectations.

Type
Developments
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 12 , Issue 8 , 01 August 2011 , pp. 1637 - 1659
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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104 For similar conclusions see generally Grunwald, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and Wolf, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.Google Scholar