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Engaging the Fundamentals: On the Autonomous Substance of EU Fundamental Rights Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Daniel Augenstein

Extract

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Some years back, Philip Alston argued that processes of globalization, such as the privatization of state functions and the deregulation of private power, while purportedly value-neutral, have “acquired the status of values in and of themselves.” The market is increasingly seen as “the most efficient and appropriate value-allocating mechanism.” As a consequence, human rights become subjected to a litmus test of their “market-friendliness.” As Alston puts it:

In the world of globalization, a strong reaction against gender and other forms of discrimination, the suppression of trade unions, the denial of primary education or health care, can often require not only a showing that the relevant practices run counter to human rights standards but also a demonstration that they are offensive to the imperatives of economic efficiency and the functioning of the free market … In at least some respects the burden of proof has been shifted—in order to be validated, a purported human right must justify its contribution to a broader, market-based “vision” of the good society.

Type
Lisbon vs. Lisbon Part I: Engaging the Fundamentals
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 14 , Issue 10: Special Issue—Lisbon vs. Lisbon , 01 October 2013 , pp. 1917 - 1938
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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