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The Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty in Comparative Perspective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Markus Ogorek

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For the German-trained lawyer, the process of coming to terms with the constitutional law of the United Kingdom can be disconcerting. This disorientation arises principally because the study of constitutional law on the other side of the English Channel seems to lack an appropriate object to deal with. State order in the United Kingdom is not based on a definitive constitutional document created at a particular point in history which would be in any way comparable to the German constitutional document, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). In spite of this, as Helmut Weber so aptly noted in a talk before the Centre for British Studies of Berlin's Humboldt University, “British textbooks on constitutional law […] are no less numerous and no less comprehensive than German textbooks on Verfassungsrecht”. This observation is not in the least surprising. Even though it may be disputed that a UK constitution exists in the narrower and more common continental European sense of the term, it cannot be denied that the learned discourse forming the body of constitutional scholarship in the United Kingdom is regarded by jurists not only in Europe, but in all corners of the globe, as an important standard for the scholarly examination of their own constitutional systems. This is certainly due in large measure not only to the centuries-old traditions of English constitutional law, but also to its striking intellectual depth and variety.

Type
Articles
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 6 , Issue 6 , 01 June 2005 , pp. 967 - 980
Copyright
Copyright © 2005 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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