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The Dilemma of Blind Spots in Capital Markets - How To Make Efficient Use Of Regulatory Loopholes?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
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The following elaboration has two purposes. One is to invite further reflections on the recent incident of the German sports car manufacturer, Porsche, revealing its until-then unknown substantive holdings in Volkswagen, its much larger competitor. The Porsche incident provoked a host of reactions, ranging from satisfaction to outrage to consternation. The essay's second purpose is to stimulate considerations about likely policy responses and their implications. While the remarkable Porsche incident illustrates the particular nature of the embeddedness of global financial markets, meaning that while investors can inject and pull out of nationally located business opportunities in a seemingly uninhibited fashion, this activity is nevertheless occurring within a complex regulatory setting. As this intervention shows, such transnational settings often require sophisticated regulatory structures and responses. But it is crucial to ensure that – especially in times as the current financial crisis – no excessive accumulation of regulatory actions occurs. Consequently, blind regulatory spots as the ones revealed in this paper will ultimately occur. Nevertheless, it is important that market participants and potential investors are aware of them because then it those blind spots can be used efficiently.
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- Copyright © 2009 by German Law Journal GbR
References
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