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Delimitation of EU-Competences under the First and Second Pillar: A View Between ECOWAS and the Treaty of Lisbon

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Dominik Eisenhut

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Since the European Union (EU) agreed upon the extension of its activities to the fields of foreign, security, and criminal policy in the Maastricht Treaty, the question of the delimitation of those new areas of EU competence towards the “classical” policies under the Treaty of the European Community (TEC) has been present. The broad and rather vague scope of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the so-called second pillar of the EU and the area of political cooperation covered by the third pillar presents several uncertainties. One such uncertainty is the relationship between the supranational legal order under the TEC and the more intergovernmental and diplomacy-based cooperation under the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). Although the EU was organized within a single institutional structure, the substantial differences with regard to voting procedures, competences of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the role of the European Commission rendered a clear separation of competences under the different pillars compulsory: CFSP remains beyond the jurisdiction of the ECJ; the Commission and the European Parliament have only marginal rights of participation; and the legal obligations under the second pillar cannot claim supremacy over national law or direct effect.

Type
Developments
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 10 , Issue 5 , 01 May 2009 , pp. 585 - 604
Copyright
Copyright © 2009 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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