Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-hc48f Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T07:34:53.640Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 25 August 2005 Regarding the Dissolution of the National Parliament

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Simon Apel ,
Christian Körber  and
Tim Wihl

Extract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

Thanks to Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's decision to ask the German Bundestag (Federal Parliament) for a vote of confidence on 1 July 2005, and following on the Federal President's dissolution of the Parliament on 21 July 2005 in response thereto, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court) was pressed into service to finally decide whether federal elections should go forward nearly a year ahead of schedule. With the Court's affirmative decision of 25 August 2005, Germany now finds itself in a turbulent national election campaign.

Type
Developments
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 6 , Issue 9 , 01 September 2005 , pp. 1243 - 1254
Copyright
Copyright © 2005 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug. 25, 2005, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html.Google Scholar

2 Id. at paras. 9-13.Google Scholar

3 See Ubber, Thomas, Agenda 2010: Reform of German Labour Law: Impact on Hiring and Firing Staff, 5 German Law Journal 135 (2004), at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=380.Google Scholar

4 See Niclauß, Der Weg zum Grundgesetz 200-202 (1998).Google Scholar

5 See Kommers, Donald P., The Basic Law: A Fifty Years Assessment, 53 SMU L. Rev. 477, 480 (2000); Katharina Pistor, The Demand for Constitutional Law, 13 Constitutional Political Economy 73, 80-81 (2002).Google Scholar

6 See Zippelius, Zippelius Kleine deutsche 137 (2002); Lovik, Mary, The Constitutional Court Reviews the Early Dissolution of the West German Parliament, 7 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 79, 85 (1983).Google Scholar

7 Art. 67.1 GG reads:Google Scholar

The Bundestag may express its lack of confidence in the Federal Chancellor only by electing a successor by the vote of a majority of its Members and requesting the Federal President to dismiss the Federal Chancellor. The Federal President must comply with the request and appoint the person elected.Google Scholar

8 Art. 68.1 GG reads:Google Scholar

If a motion of the Federal Chancellor for a vote of confidence is not supported by the majority of the Members of the Bundestag, the Federal President, upon the proposal of the Federal Chancellor, may dissolve the Bundestag within twenty-one days. The right of dissolution shall lapse as soon as the Bundestag elects another Federal Chancellor by the vote of a majority of its members.Google Scholar

9 Schlaich/Korioth, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht 68-69 (2004).Google Scholar

10 BVerfG, 2 BvE 5/05 of Aug. 23, 2005, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050823_2bve000505.html.Google Scholar

11 BVerfGE 62, 1 (32); BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug 25, 2005, para. 124, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html.Google Scholar

12 BVerfGE 62, 1. For general information about the decision and a substantiated critique, see Menzel/Ritgen, Verfassungsrechtsprechung 338-343 (2000). For analysis in English, see Lovik, supra note 6.Google Scholar

13 See Richter/Schuppert/Bumke, Casebook Verfassungsrecht 407-409 (2001).Google Scholar

14 The decision is hardly consistent. See Ipsen, Staatsrecht I 140 (2003).Google Scholar

15 See Lovik, supra note 6, at 81-85.Google Scholar

16 BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug. 25, 2005, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html.Google Scholar

17 Parliamentary Protocol of July 1, 2005, available at http://www.bundestag.de/bic/plenarprotokolle/plenarprotokolle/15185.html; BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug. 25, 2005, para. 73, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html.Google Scholar

18 BVerfGE 62, 1 (44).Google Scholar

19 Id. at 40.Google Scholar

20 Id. at 42-44; BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug. 25, 2005, para. 201, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html.Google Scholar

21 BVerfGE 62, 1 (50-51).Google Scholar

22 Id. at 51.Google Scholar

23 Id. at 50; BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug. 25, 2005, para. 149, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html.Google Scholar

24 BVerfGE 62, 1 (39); BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug. 25, 2005, para. 155, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html.Google Scholar

25 BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug. 25, 2005, para. 166, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html.Google Scholar

26 For Müntefering's exact words, see BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug. 25, 2005, para. 57-59, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html.Google Scholar

27 Id. at para. 180.Google Scholar

28 Id. at para. 183.Google Scholar

29 BVerfGE 62, 1 (50).Google Scholar

30 BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug. 25, 2005, para. 185-186, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html.Google Scholar

31 Thus, her opinion could be seen as a concurrence. However, under German Constitutional Law, her opinion counts as a dissent. BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug. 25, 2005, para. 213-243, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html.Google Scholar

32 BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug. 25, 2005, para. 242, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html (“Kontrollfassade”).Google Scholar

33 Id. at para. 213. The analogy is not unproblematic: even marriage vows can be held ineffective in the case of sham marriages.Google Scholar

34 Guaranteed in Art. 38 I GG.Google Scholar

35 BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug. 25, 2005, para. 218, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html. Of course, the Federal Constitutional Court remains obliged to determine whether the formal conditions of Art. 68 I have been fulfilled.Google Scholar

36 Id. at para. 220-221.Google Scholar

37 Id. at para. 243.Google Scholar

38 Id. at para. 193.Google Scholar

39 Id. at para. 196.Google Scholar

40 Id. at para. 190 (“Konstruiertes Misstrauen”)‥Google Scholar

41 Id. at para. 198.Google Scholar

42 Id. at para. 207.Google Scholar

43 See, e.g., H. Prantl, Ein Gericht steht Spalier, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26 Aug 2005, at 4; B. Kohler, Schrödersieg, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 Aug 2005, at 1.Google Scholar

44 The concept of “Parteienstaat” was invented by former Justice Gerhard Leibholz. See Ipsen, supra note 14, at 86.Google Scholar

45 See, e.g., Kerscher, H./Fried, N., Urteil stärkt das Amt des Kanzlers, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26 Aug 2005, at 1. For similar debates in 1982, see Lovik, supra note 6, at 93-94.Google Scholar

46 See Bracher/Funke/Jacobsen/Boldt, Die Weimarer Republik 1918-1933 52-53 (1988); Stolleis, Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts in Deutschland – Weimarer Republik und Nationalsozialismus 103-05, 114-16 (2002).Google Scholar