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Constitutional Reasoning as Legitimacy of Constitutional Comparison

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Konrad Lachmayer

Extract

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For ten years, the legitimacy of constitutional comparison in courts has been intensely debated. The case law of the U.S. Supreme Court led to an intense discussion on constitutional comparison and reached its peak with the Great Debate between Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer. Justice Breyer argued in favor of constitutional comparison while Justice Scalia refused the comparative approach. Justice Scalia stated:

[Y]ou are talking about using foreign law to determine the content of American constitutional law—to be sure that we're on the right track, that we have the same moral and legal framework as the rest of the world. But we don't have the same moral and legal framework as the rest of the world, and never have. If you told the framers of the Constitution that we're to be just like Europe, they would have been appalled. If you read the Federalist Papers, they are full of statements that make very clear the framers didn't have a whole lot of respect for many of the rules in European countries. Madison, for example, speaks contemptuously of the countries of continental Europe, “who are afraid to let their people bear arms.’

Type
Part B: Technique, Doctrine and Internal Logic of Constitutional Reasoning
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 14 , Issue 8: Special Issue - Constitutional Reasoning , 01 August 2013 , pp. 1463 - 1491
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 by German Law Journal GbR 

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