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Constitutional Courts, Preliminary Rulings and the “New Form of Law”: The Adjudication of the European Stability Mechanism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Samo Bardutzky

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In 2012 and 2013, we observed how the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was adjudicated by “EU courts, plural”: a number of high courts of the Member States (among them “Kelsenian” constitutional courts as well as representatives of a more hybrid model of judicial review of constitutionality) and the European Court of Justice (CJEU) were seized by challenges to the mechanism. What attracted attention was the fact that only one court, the Supreme Court of Ireland, decided to submit a preliminary reference to the CJEU, while the other courts, as would appear from their judgments, did not even consider the option. This was a suboptimal example of judicial dialogue in the case of ESM adjudication.

Type
Part Five
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 16 , Issue 6: Special issue – Preliminary References to the Court of Justice of The European Union by Constitutional Courts , December 2015 , pp. 1771 - 1790
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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