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Conference Report—U.S. & German Bench and Bar Gathering: “A New Bridge Across the Atlantic”: The Future of American Patent Litigation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
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The U.S. & German Bench and Bar Gathering, “A New Bridge Across the Atlantic,” held in Washington, DC, in May 2012, was aptly timed to discuss the developments in German and American patent law. The Federal Circuit Bar Association and the Patentanwaltskammer (German Patent Lawyers Association) brought distinguished judges and attorneys from their respective countries to discuss the current state of the two patent systems. This involved consideration of where the two systems might be converging and why the two countries have had dissimilar litigation patterns. Particularly with respect to the latter of these inquiries, much of the debate throughout the conference focused on the differences in litigation discovery and procedural rules. The conference highlighted the fact that, at the most fundamental level, these differences are a product of differing perceptions of how justice should be administered. A brief overview comparing patent litigation in Germany and the United States will help frame this report.
- Type
- Developments
- Information
- German Law Journal , Volume 14 , Issue 1: Special section - The ESM Before the Courts , 01 January 2013 , pp. 269 - 278
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2013 by German Law Journal GbR
References
1 The 2012 German & United States Bench and Bar Gathering—“A New Bridge Across the Atlantic”, Bench and Bar—Federal Circuit Bar Association (May 18, 2012), https://www.signup4.net/public/ap.aspx?EID=20121754E&OID=50.Google Scholar
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36 Whatever that means.Google Scholar
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46 I hold the mildly cynical view that the Apple-Samsung feud is more of a marketing ploy—played out in the drama of a courtroom and motivated by the personalities of the boards of both companies (most notably that of the late co-founder Steve Jobs)—rather than significant legal inquiries. For a summary of the events leading up to litigation and the strategies involved at trial, see Poorrnima Gupta & Dan Levine, Analysis: How Apple Overwhelmed Samsung's Patent Case Tactics, Reuters (Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/27/us-apple-samsung-legal-idINBRE87Q02K20120827.Google Scholar
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