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Coalition Procurement for the Reconstruction of Iraq in the Crosshairs of WTO Law: The Obligations of the United States under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
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Investigating the legality? Ha ha ha! That cracks me up. There is no international law that would prohibit this action by the Defense Department, nor is there any international court that France may appeal to. I of course think that this is the correct decision. Those countries who did not help win the war – who did not pay the price in blood – have no claim to the postwar profits. – Mike, Why I'm Right, Internet Forum
During the Reagan administration, I helped negotiate … the “GATT Government Procurement Code”, later incorporated into the World Trade Organization's legal framework. The U.S. was the primary force behind this legal agreement. It was not motivated by altruism, but out of a belief that all signatory governments … and their respective tax payers would benefit from basing practices on economic factors rather than national favoritism. - Gene Tuttle, in response
Infrastructure in Iraq lies in tatters. Unscrupulous exploitation by Saddam Hussein's dictatorial regime, burdensome economic sanctions and massive destruction during the U.S.-led military operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’ have turned Iraq into one of the world's most destitute countries. On the UN Human Poverty Index for 2003, Iraq ranks seventy-first out of ninety-six developing nations. The reconstruction of basic infrastructure is but one first step towards development and economic growth. Rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure, however, involves substantial economic interests. After all, the cake to be distributed for rebuilding Iraq is expected to exceed $100 billion. Some companies see on the horizon one of the most rewarding business opportunities “undertaken in over 50 years” At the same time, there is a growing suspicion that political or even personal biases of the United States' administration have a bigger role to play than economic reason when it comes to sharing the cake. In December 2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, announced that some of America's trading partners, among them Canada, France, Germany and Russia, would be altogether excluded from competition for major reconstruction projects in Iraq. Public opinion in Europe was quick to brand the United States an international law-breaker. Can one State simply reserve to itself the final word on the Iraqi reconstruction money?
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- Copyright © 2004 by German Law Journal GbR
References
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6 Currently, only Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the EC, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong China, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, the Netherlands with respect to Aruba, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.Google Scholar
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