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A Close Look at the Mannesmann Trial

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Stefan Maier

Extract

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In German post-war history, hardly any other trial concerning economic criminal cases attracted as much interest as the so-called Mannesmann trial. This is for two main reasons. First, the facts that form the basis of the decision, that is, the hostile takeover of the German Mannesmann AG by the British Vodafone, attracted much attention and sparked public discussion about eliminating the very possibility of hostile takeovers in general in Germany. Second, interest in the case was due to the magnitude of the bonuses granted and the significance this had for the public at large. As a consequence of this trial and the settled payments, the debate around the appropriateness of executive compensations, existing prior to the case, grew more acute. After all, the current draft law to disclose executive pay resulted from these debates about the size of the compensations.

Type
Developments
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 7 , Issue 6 , 01 June 2006 , pp. 603 - 610
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 BGH, Decision of 21 December 2005 3 StR 470/04 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 522 (2006); Kolla, The Mannesmann Trial and the Role of the Courts, 5 German Law Journal No. 7 (1 July 2004); see for the decision of the regional court (Landgericht Düsseldorf) in the first judgement Landgericht Düsseldorf, Decision of 22 July 2004 – 28 Js 159/00 the note of Rolshoven, The Last Word? – The July 22, 2004 Acquittals in the Mannesmann Trial, 5 German Law Journal No. 8 (1 August 2004).Google Scholar

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Section 266 Breach of Trust Google Scholar

(1) Whoever abuses the power accorded him by statute, by commission of a public authority or legal transaction to dispose of assets of another or to obligate another, or violates the duty to safeguard the property interests of another incumbent upon him by reason of statute, commission of a public authority, legal transaction or fiduciary relationship, and thereby causes detriment to the person, whose property interests he was responsible for, shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine.Google Scholar

(2) Sections 243 subsection (2), 247, 248a and 263 subsection (3), shall apply accordingly.Google Scholar

21 See, Tröndle/Fischer, StGB, Section 266 margin number 5 (53rd ed. 2006) Article 103 (II) GG reads as:Google Scholar

(1) In the courts every person shall be entitled to a hearing in accordance with law.Google Scholar

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34 Section17 StGB reads as:Google Scholar

Section 17 Mistake of Law Google Scholar

If upon commission of the act the perpetrator lacks the appreciation that he is doing something wrong, he acts without guilt if he was unable to avoid this mistake. If the perpetrator could have avoided the mistake, the punishment may be mitigated pursuant to Section 49 subsection (1).Google Scholar

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36 BGH (supra, note 1).Google Scholar

37 Tröndle/Fischer, (note 20) Section 17 margin number 6.Google Scholar

38 Kort, (note 12), 333; Liebers/Hoefs (note 12), 97.Google Scholar