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The Annexation of Crimea and the Boundaries of the Will of the People

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Jure Vidmar

Abstract

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The secession of Crimea and—more broadly—the conflict in Ukraine reopened questions concerning the limits of a democratic expression of the will of the people and the use of force in order to procure annexation of a territory belonging to another State. This article seeks to clarify the law governing the change of the legal status of a territory through secession and merger with another state. It argues not only that the right of self-determination does not grant an entitlement to alter the legal status of a territory, but also that general international law does not prohibit such an alteration. The rules of international law favor the stability of the existing international borders and thus the territorial status quo, but this does not mean that a unilateral attempt at altering an existing territorial arrangement automatically constitutes an internationally wrongful act. Any change of the legal status of a territory becomes illegal, however, upon an outside use of force. Such an illegality cannot be “cured” by a democratically expressed will of the people.

Type
Research Article
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 16 , Issue 3: Special Issue - The Crisis in Ukraine , July 2015 , pp. 365 - 383
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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