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American Liberalism and Germany's Rejection of the National Socialist Past—The 1973 Roe v. Wade Decision and the 1975 German Abortion I Case in Historical Perspective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Felix Lange

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“The right of privacy … is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”

Type
German/European Law Conversation Series
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 12 , Issue 11: Special section - The Hartz IV Case and the German Sozialstaat , 01 November 2011 , pp. 2033 - 2058
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).Google Scholar

2 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 39 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] 1 (1), 1975 (Ger.), translated in Robert E. Jonas & John D. Gorby, West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade—with Commentaries, 9 John Marshall J. of Prac. and Proc. 605 (1976) (translating the First Abortion Judgment).Google Scholar

3 In 1992, the Bundestag (Federal Parliament) adopted a reformed abortion law in order to harmonize the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. Even though the law was similar to the one overturned in the First Abortion Judgment, the FCC held in the Second Abortion Judgment of 1993 that in principle it was constitutional. However, the Court affirmed that generally abortion must be regarded as illegal. 88 BVerfGE 203 (203). See also Gerald L. Neuman, Casey in the Mirror: Abortion, Abuse and the Right to Protection in the United States and Germany, 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 274 (1995). According to the reformed abortion law of 1995, which is in effect today, abortion during the first three months is illegal, but a woman who aborts during this time period after she received counsel will not face legal sanctions.Google Scholar

4 Even though Roe v. Wade was limited in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld that the right of privacy encompasses the right to abortion and indicated that criminalization is forbidden until viability. For recent Supreme Court cases on abortion, see Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) and Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).Google Scholar

5 On the pro-life movement, see National Right to Life Committee, http://www.nrlc.org (last visited 6 Nov. 2011).Google Scholar

6 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade and the Right to Choose, NARAL Pro Choice America Foundation (1 Jan. 2011), http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/fact-sheets/government-federal-courts-scotus-roe.pdf (last visited 6 Nov. 2011).Google Scholar

7 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 160 (1973).Google Scholar

8 Only the 1970 abortion law of New York did not penalize abortion during the first 24 weeks, and thus corresponded to the standard set out in Roe v. Wade. See, e.g., Eva R. Rubin, Abortion, Politics and the Courts: Roe v. Wade and its Aftermath 24 (1987).Google Scholar

9 39 BVerfGE 1 (49), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 648.Google Scholar

10 Id. at 68, translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 663.Google Scholar

11 E.g., Brugger, Winfried, Abtreibung—ein Grundrecht oder ein Verbrechen? Ein Vergleich der Urteile des United States Supreme Courts und des BVerfG, 39 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 896 (1986).Google Scholar

12 See e.g., Kommers, Donald P., Abortion and the Constitution: The Cases of the United States and West Germany, 25 Am. J. Comp. L. 255 (1977). “That the highest tribunals of two robust constitutional democracies and secular political cultures should decide differently the question of the unborn child's right to life under the constitutions of their respective countries must excite curiosity, no matter one's stand or stake in the abortion controversy.” Id. (referring to similarities between the German and American political systems and political cultures).Google Scholar

13 There exists some literature that explains the discrepancy in the rulings. Kommers suggests that inter alia divergent “social philosophies” between an American individual liberty approach and a German communitarian approach shaped the contrasting decisions. Id. at 280. Similarly, Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law. American Failures, European Challenges 38 (1987), points out that the FCC majority chose to stress community values, while Roe v. Wade focused on privacy and autonomy. Marc Chase McAllister asserts that the abortion cases reflect the difference between the German Constitution of dignity and the American Constitution of liberty. Marc Chase McAllister, Human Dignity and Individual Liberty in Germany and the United States as Examined through Each Country's Leading Abortion Cases, 11 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 491, 494 (2004). Douglas G. Morris argues that while the U.S. decision followed a model of individual liberalism, the German majority stood in a tradition of authoritarian liberalism. Douglas G. Morris, Abortion and Liberalism: A Comparison Between the Abortion Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and the Constitutional Court of West Germany, 11 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 159, 183 (1988); Hartmut Gerstein & David Lowry, Abortion, Abstract Norms and Social Control: The Decision of the West German Federal Constitutional Court, 25 Emory L.J. 849, 869 (1976) recognize a conservative and paternalistic philosophy in the German decision and put forward that the German Court resorted to an abstract analysis, while the Supreme Court undertook judicial balancing of conflicting rights and interests.Google Scholar

Even though the writings address many important issues (especially the influence of liberalism on Roe v. Wade), they underestimate the impact of the justices’ political provenience and the National Socialist past on the First Abortion Judgment. Google Scholar

14 See, for example, on the debate for the United States, Raymond Tatalovich, & Byron W. Daynes, The Politics of Abortion: A Study of Community Conflict in Public Policy Making 82 et seq. (1981); Lee Epstein & Joseph Kobylka, The Supreme Court and Legal Change: Abortion and the Death Penalty 137 et seq. (1992); for Germany, Dirk von Behren, Die Geschichte des § 218 StGB 409 et seq. (2004); Michael Gante, § 218 in der Diskussion. Meinungs- und Willensbildung 1945–1976 129 et seq. (1991).Google Scholar

15 For the United States, see, for example, Tatalovich, & Daynes, supra note 14, at 82 et seq. and Epstein & Kobylka, supra note 14, at 137 et seq. For Germany, see, for example, von Behren, supra note 14, at 409 et seq. and Gante, supra note 14, at 129 et seq.Google Scholar

16 For the pro-choice movement, see Suzanne Staggenborg, The Pro-Choice Movement: Organization and Activism in the Abortion Conflict 13 (1991); for the pro-life movement, see Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood 126 (1984).Google Scholar

17 Tatalovich & Daynes, supra note 14, at 24.Google Scholar

18 Mississippi, Colorado, California, North Carolina, Georgia, Maryland, Arkansas, Delaware, Kansas, New Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina, Virginia, Florida, for example, Tatalovich & Daynes, supra note 14, at 24.Google Scholar

19 New York, Washington State, Hawaii and Alaska. See, e.g., Tatalovich & Daynes, supra note 14, at 24; however, there existed no general trend to abortion reform; four states considered repeal laws in 1971, and the proposals were rejected. Epstein & Kobylka, supra note 14, at 151.Google Scholar

20 Four different drafts were introduced to the Bundestag. One from SPD and FDP delegates together, one from a number of SPD parliamentarians and two from CDU/CSU delegates. The majority supported the most liberal SPD/FDP draft, see, for example, the detailed account in Gante, supra note 14, at 160.Google Scholar

21 See, for example, Rubin, supra note 8, at 31 or Epstein & Kobylka, supra note 14, at 162, who describe the “litigation avalanche.”Google Scholar

22 In the public debate, Roe v. Wade has become the abortion case, because Doe v. Bolton refers in large parts to the reasoning in Roe v. Wade. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 189 (1973).Google Scholar

23 According to GG Art. 93(1) S.2 (Ger.), the FCC had jurisdiction in the “abstract norm control” procedure to declare whether a particular law is in line with the constitution. The case can be brought by the federal government, a Länder government, or one fourth of the members of the Bundestag. Before the revision of GG Art. 93(1) S.2 (Ger.) on 1 December 2009, the federal government, a Länder government or one third of the members of the Bundestag could bring the case.Google Scholar

24 See, for example, the powers of the strong U.S. President in the U.S. Const. art. II, and the much weaker German President. GG Art. 54–61 (Ger.).Google Scholar

25 See, for example, the right to keep and bear arms in the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. II.Google Scholar

26 Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity. Freedom of the person shall be inviolable. These rights maybe interfered with only pursuant to a law. GG Art. 2(2) (Ger.).Google Scholar

27 “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV; cf. U.S. Const. amend. V.Google Scholar

28 GG Art. 2(2) (Ger.).Google Scholar

29 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).Google Scholar

30 For the U.S. context, see, for example, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).Google Scholar

31 For the German jurisprudence, see, for example, 6 BVerfGE 32 (41) (Elfes-judgment).Google Scholar

32 E.g., Augstein, Rudolf, Unseres Herrgotts Kanzlei, Der Spiegel, 3 Feb. 1975.Google Scholar

33 Id. Google Scholar

34 39 BVerfGE 1 (49), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 648.Google Scholar

35 E.g., von Behren, supra note 14, at 498.Google Scholar

36 The Evangelic Church did not have a unified position. However the Protestants who embraced the liberal reform law were in the minority. See, e.g., Simone Mantei, Nein und Ja zur Abtreibung: Die evangelische Kirche in der Reformdebatte um § 218 Stgb 345 (2004).Google Scholar

37 39 BVerfGE 1 (37, 648), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 638.Google Scholar

38 See, e.g., Kommers, supra note 12, at 279.Google Scholar

39 American Cardinals referred to the judgment as an “unspeakable tragedy for this nation” with “disastrous implications for our stability as a civilized society.” Lawrence van Gelder, Cardinals Shocked—Reaction Mixed; 2 Cardinals Denounce Decision; Other Leaders’ Reactions Mixed ‘Neutrality of State,’ N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1973, at 80. However, some churches generally supported a liberalization of the abortion laws; see, for example, Staggenborg, supra note 16, at 23.Google Scholar

40 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).Google Scholar

41 Id. at 161.Google Scholar

42 Id. Google Scholar

43 Gelder, Lawrence van, Cardinals Shocked-Reaction Mixed; 2 Cardinals Denounce Decision; Other Leaders’ Reactions Mixed ‘Neutrality of State,’ N.Y. Times 23 Jan. 1973.Google Scholar

44 For instance, after Roe v. Wade, one of the reform advocates was quoted in the New York Times: “I am delighted to see that our position—that the women have the right to control their own bodies—has been vindicated.” Id.; see also for the women's movement, Rubin, supra note 8, at 89.Google Scholar

45 E.g., von Behren, supra note 14, at 496.Google Scholar

46 E.g., Estelle Freedman, No Turning Back: The History of Feminism and the Future of Women 4 (2002).Google Scholar

47 For the United States, see, for example, William H. Chafe, The Unfinished Journey: America since World War II 79 (2003); for Germany, see, for example, Kristina Schulz, Der lange Atem der Provokation: Die Frauenbewegungen in der Bundesrepublik und Frankreich 1968–1976, at 34 (2002).Google Scholar

48 For the U.S., see Chafe, supra note 47, at 79; for Germany, see Schulz, supra note 47, at 34.Google Scholar

49 E.g., Barbara Ryan, Feminism and the Women's Movement: Dynamics of Change in Social Movement, Ideology and Activism 42 (1992).Google Scholar

50 E.g., Epstein & Kobylka, supra note 14, at 145.Google Scholar

51 E.g., Rubin, supra note 8, at 26.Google Scholar

52 E.g., Epstein & Kobylka, supra note 14, at 151.Google Scholar

53 E.g., Luker, supra note 16, at 99. Compare the quote of one of the radical women's movements’ supporters:Google Scholar

54 E.g., Gerhard, Ute, Frauenbewegung, in Die sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945: Ein Handbuch 199 (Roland Roth & Dieter Rucht eds., 2008).Google Scholar

55 See, for example, the protest in the United States against the Miss America Election of 1968, which received wide public attention. Alice Echols, Nothing Distant About It: Women's Liberation and Sixties Radicalism, in The Sixties: From Memory to History 149 et seq. (David Farber ed., 2000). At first the German women's movement did not have a similar outreach.Google Scholar

56 Alice Schwarzer initiated the “Aktion 218,” according to a French exemplar, and won the support of famous personalities like Romy Schneider, Senta Berger, Sabine Sinjen and Veruschka von Lehndorff. von Behren, supra note 14, at 425.Google Scholar

57 E.g., von Behren, supra note 14, at 427; Edgar Wolfrum, Die geglückte Demokratie: Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart 318 (2006).Google Scholar

58 39 BVerfGE 1 (33), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 635. Horst Ehmke had been Federal Minister of Justice (1969), Chief of Staff at the Bundeskanzleramt (Federal Chancellery) (1969–72) as well as Federal Minister for Research, Technology, Post and Telecommunication (1972–74).Google Scholar

59 Among the most influential groups were the National Association for Repeal of Abortion Laws (NARAL), the Association for the Study of Abortion (ASA) and Planned Parenthood. See Epstein & Kobylka, supra note 14, at 144.Google Scholar

60 E.g., id. at 144.Google Scholar

61 E.g., Rubin, supra note 8, at 31.Google Scholar

62 Argument, Weddington's, Roe v. Wade, in Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law 433 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1990).Google Scholar

63 Id. Google Scholar

64 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 154 (1973).Google Scholar

65 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 215 (1973).Google Scholar

66 Id. Google Scholar

67 Id. at 214. (Chief Justice Burger, Justice Douglas and Justice White formulated their concurring and dissenting opinions in Doe v. Bolton).Google Scholar

68 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.Google Scholar

69 Id. Google Scholar

70 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 208.Google Scholar

71 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 164.Google Scholar

72 Id. at 153.Google Scholar

73 Id. at 166.Google Scholar

74 On the First Abortion Judgment in this direction, see Gerhard Biehler, Sozialliberale Reformgesetzgebung und das Bundesverfassungsgericht 197 (1990).Google Scholar

75 The President of the Court Benda, Justice Brox, Justice Böhmer, Justice Ritterspach and Justice Faller all had been nominated following a proposal by the CDU/CSU. Only Justice Haager and the dissenting Justices Rupp-von Brünneck and Simon had been supported by the SPD, see, for example, Christian Stahl, Schwangerschaftsabbruch und Bundesverfassungsgericht: Der Einfluss der Weltanschauung von Bundesverfassungsrichtern auf die Rechtsprechung in weltanschaulichen Fragen 39 (2004). On the debate whether there might have been a third dissenting justice who did not make his dissent explicit, see, for example, id. at 46.Google Scholar

76 E.g., Gante, supra note 14, at 160.Google Scholar

77 For the minority opinion, see, for example, 39 BVerfGE 1 (68), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 663.Google Scholar

78 Id. at 44, translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 641.Google Scholar

79 Id. at 55, translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 653.Google Scholar

80 Id. at 56. translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 653.Google Scholar

81 Id. at 56. translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 653.Google Scholar

82 E.g., the critique of Robert Spaemann, Am Ende der Debatte um § 218 StGB, in Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 49 (1974).Google Scholar

83 E.g., Wolfrum, supra note 57, at 152.Google Scholar

84 One might question whether there was a unified party position on abortion in the United States. It was not until the 1980s that the national Republican Party took a position for restrictions on abortion; also, the Democratic Party did not formulate a binding position. N.E.H. Hull, William james Hoffer & Peter Charles Hoffer, The Abortion Rights Controversy in American History: A Legal Reader 336 (2001). Nonetheless, there arguably was a tendency of Republicans supporting restrictions while Democrats favored liberal abortion laws.Google Scholar

85 E.g., The Burger Court: Political and Judicial Profiles 8 (Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds., 1991).Google Scholar

86 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 208 (1973).Google Scholar

87 E.g., The Burger Court, supra note 85, at 18.Google Scholar

88 Justice White argued that the majority opinion meant that “[d]uring the period prior to the time the fetus becomes viable, the Constitution of the United States values the convenience, whim or caprice of the putative mother more than the life or potential life of the fetus.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 221. Because “nothing in the language or history of the Constitution” would support this interpretation, the laws, which criminalized abortion, were not unconstitutional. Id. Google Scholar

89 Rubin, supra note 8, at 24.Google Scholar

90 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973).Google Scholar

91 For example, Verfassungsgerichtshof [VfGH] [Constitutional Court] 1975, Schwangerschaftsabbruch/Verfassungsmäßigkeit der Fristenlösung, Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift 74 (1975) (Austria); the German dissent also refers to this decision. 39 BVerfGE 1 (95).Google Scholar

92 39 BVerfGE 1 (68), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 663.Google Scholar

93 Id. at 73, translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 667.Google Scholar

94 Id. at 73, translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 667.Google Scholar

95 For an extensive study of the different abortion laws, see Albin Eser & Michael Koch, Schwangerschaftsabbruch im internationalen Vergleich: Rechtliche Regelungen—soziale Rahmenbedingungen—empirische Grunddaten (1988).Google Scholar

96 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).Google Scholar

97 Id. Google Scholar

98 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).Google Scholar

99 Id. at 483.Google Scholar

100 Id. at 486 .Google Scholar

101 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973) (emphasis added).Google Scholar

102 Id. at 163 .Google Scholar

103 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).Google Scholar

104 Roe, 410 U.S. at 169, (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)).Google Scholar

105 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 113, 213 (1973).Google Scholar

106 E.g., Hans Vorländer, Politische Kultur, in Länderbericht USA 299 (Peter Lösche & Hans-Dietrich von Loeffelholz eds., 4th ed. 2004); Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Liberal Thought Since the Revolution (1955).Google Scholar

107 E.g., Hartz, supra note 106, at 5–6.Google Scholar

108 E.g., Vorländer, supra note 106, at 299.Google Scholar

109 E.g., James P. Young, Reconsidering American Liberalism: The Troubled Odyssey of the Liberal Idea 6 (1996); Hartz, supra note 106, at 3 et seq.Google Scholar

110 E.g., Kommers, supra note 12, at 282, who argues that Roe v. Wade “seems perfectly consistent with Madisonian liberalism: the constitutional order is to serve the individual and his interest.”Google Scholar

111 E.g., The Burger Court, supra note 85, at 18.Google Scholar

112 The Law: A Stunning Approval for Abortion, Time Magazine, Feb. 5, 1973.Google Scholar

113 The second oral pleading was held because the first argument had taken place only before 7 justices (two justices had retired in 1971 for health reasons). The majority of the justices decided that there should be a reargument in front of a full bench with two newly appointed justices, see, for example, David Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade, 552 et seq. (1994).Google Scholar

114 Argument, Weddington's, Roe v. Wade, in Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law 433 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1990).Google Scholar

115 39 BVerfGE 1 (43), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 643.Google Scholar

116 The divergent resonance of the argument about state limitation in the United States and Germany in the abortion debate has been analyzed in Jürgen Gerhards & Dieter Rucht, Öffentlichkeit, Akteure und Deutungsmuster: Die Debatte über Abtreibungen, in Die Vermessung kultureller Unterschiede. die USA und Deutschland im Vergleich 165, 179 (Jürgen Gerhards ed., 2000).Google Scholar

117 Kommers, supra note 12, at 280.Google Scholar

118 See Kommers, supra note 12, 278 for a different view: “The German decision mentioned two elements of contemporary experience, the widespread incidence of illegal abortion and the Nazi slaughter of defenseless and innocent persons; but in the end these considerations seemed not to loom very large in the reasoning of the Court, although the Court did note that the Founding Fathers had the Nazi experience in mind when they included a right to life in the Basic Law.”Google Scholar

119 39 BVerfGE 1 (36), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 637.Google Scholar

120 Id. Google Scholar

121 Id. at 36, translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 637 (quoting 18 BVerfGE 112 (117)).Google Scholar

122 Id. at 42, translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 642.Google Scholar

123 Id. at 43, translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 643.Google Scholar

124 E.g., Verfassungsgerichtshof [VfGH] [Constitutional Court] 1975, Schwangerschaftsabbruch/Verfassungsmäßigkeit der Fristenlösung, Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift 74 (1975) (Austria).Google Scholar

125 See Eser & Koch, supra note 95.Google Scholar

126 Even in Catholic Italy a liberal law similar to the German proposal was not over turned by the Italian Supreme Court in 1978. E.g., Johanna Bosch & Anna Menges, Italien, in Schwangerschaftsabbruch im internationalen Vergleich: Rechtliche Regelungen—soziale Rahmenbedingungen—empirische Grunddaten 872 (Albin Eser & Michael Koch eds., 1988).Google Scholar

127 39 BVerfGE 1 (67), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 661:Google Scholar

128 39 BVerfGE 1 (36), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 637.Google Scholar

129 Id. at 67, translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 662.Google Scholar

130 E.g., Hans-Walter Schmuhl, Rassenhygiene, Nationalsozialismus, Euthanasie. von der Verhütung zur Vernichtung “lebensunwerten Lebens,” 1890–1945 364 (1992); Henry Friedländer, The Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final solution 11 (1995); critical of this view, Dieter Pohl, Verfolgung und Massenmord in der NS-Zeit 1933-1945 34 (2d ed. 2008).Google Scholar

131 E.g., Henry P. David, Jochen Fleischhacker & Hohn, Charlotte, Abortion and Eugenics in Nazi Germany, 14 Population and Dev. Rev. 81, 88 (1988).Google Scholar

132 E.g., David, Fleischhacker & Hohn, , supra note 131, at 88; Schmuhl, supra note 130, at 360.Google Scholar

133 E.g., Schmuhl, supra note 130, at 362.Google Scholar

134 E.g., Schmuhl, supra note 130, at 211; see also on Cardinal von Galen, Michael Burleigh, Death and Deliverance: Euthanasia in Germany 1900–1945 176 (1994). However, Burleigh argues that T-4 was not stopped because of the protest but because “the team of practiced murderers were needed to carry out the infinitely vaster enormity in the East that the regime's leaders were actively considering.”Google Scholar

135 E.g., Schmuhl, supra note 130, at 364.Google Scholar

136 39 BVerfGE 1 (67), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 662.Google Scholar

137 Id. at 67, translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 661.Google Scholar

138 E.g., Schmuhl, supra note 130, at 161.Google Scholar

139 E.g., David, Fleischhacker & Hohn, , supra note 131, at 91.Google Scholar

140 For example, David, Fleischhacker & Hohn, , supra note 131, at 89, who also stress that during the Nazi era the criteria for obtaining legal abortions were interpreted more strictly and illegal abortionists were punished more severely; see also the dissenting opinion, 39 BVerfGE 1 (76).Google Scholar

141 For example, the dissenting opinion, which used the National Socialist past as support for the view that the state should be careful with criminalization of all kinds of behavior, 39 BVerfGE 1 (76).Google Scholar

142 39 BVerfGE 1 (49), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 648.Google Scholar

143 In practice, the law opened the potential for abortion considerably since the social indication was interpreted rather broadly. Albin Eser, Reform of German Abortion Law: First Experiences, 34 Am. J. Comp. L. 369, 381 (1986).Google Scholar

144 E.g., Staggenborg, supra note 16, at 58; Luker, supra note 16, at 137.Google Scholar

145 E.g., Erich Geldbach, Protestantischer Fundamentalismus in den USA und Deutschland 95 (2001). Geldbach mentions Jerry Falwell, a well-known Southern Baptist pastor, as an example for an evangelist who was mobilized by Roe v. Wade. Google Scholar

146 E.g., Chafe, supra note 47, at 446.Google Scholar

147 E.g., von Behren, supra note 14, at 496.Google Scholar

148 E.g., id. at 498.Google Scholar