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The Allocation of Cultural Policy Powers in the Federal Republic of Germany

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Markus Ogorek  and
Tian Pu

Extract

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The Federal Republic of Germany is a state that shows a strong support for culture of any kind. While it is not explicitly stated anywhere in the Grundgesetz (Basic Law), it can be argued that very few nations regard the promotion of the arts, sciences and education as a public undertaking to the extent that Germany does. The federal structure of the German constitution is reflected in the allocation of governmental tasks between the federal government and the individual federal states, or Länder. Under this structure, the Länder bear the primary responsibility for cultural matters. However, contrary to widely-held belief, the Basic Law also grants the federal government a range of legislative, administrative and financial powers with respect to cultural matters. Although when taken together these do not add up to a comprehensive promotional authority of the federal government in the cultural sector, due to numerous individual empowerments, the federal government is without doubt in a position to take an active role in cultural affairs to a significant extent.

Type
Developments
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 6 , Issue 10: Special issue - Articles German Federalism: Theory and Recent Developments , 01 October 2005 , pp. 1335 - 1354
Copyright
Copyright © 2005 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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