In Britain around 1900, established financial institutions for long-term savings such as life assurers, and pension funds which were just in their formative phase, did not make material allocations to publicly quoted equity markets or ordinary shares; long-established life assurers, for example, had less than 3 per cent allocated to the asset class (Baker and Collins 2003). Over the following 100 years, this picture radically changed, with equities emerging as the central asset class for many institutional investors and the term ‘the cult of (the) equity’ was coined (Scott 2002; Avrahampour 2015). As the century progressed, institutional investors superseded private individuals and became the dominant holders of British publicly quoted companies (Cheffins 2010). Despite the attractions of the asset class and their generally high returns, within a relatively short period by the end of the century, institutional equity exposure had peaked and was in decline both at life assurers and within pension funds. Here we highlight, and link together, the key actuarial (Turnbull 2017) and investing (Morecroft 2017) ideas that were influential in these developments. We also identify the main individuals who were instrumental in the application of equity investing to institutional portfolios. The article has an emphasis towards years from 1920 to 1960 when most of the changes to investment practice and actuarial theory occurred.

Innovations in the world of alternative finance such as online consumer lending, fund-raising platforms and cryptocurrencies are proceeding apace. In this article, we examine three historical case studies of newly emerged non-bank financial markets and discuss the possible implications for today's alternative finance markets. The first insight is that the private sector can generally be counted on to meet previously unmet needs. Moneylenders filled a gap unaddressed by the banking system of the day. Junior market IPOs provided access to funds for smaller companies that might otherwise have struggled to raise external finance. Private currencies replaced sovereign coins in transactions at various points in history. The second insight, however, is that new financial markets and instruments eventually attract the attention of regulators. Finally, these examples are a warning to industry not to take for granted that an initially laissez-faire regulatory regime precludes a stronger response at some point in the future. In all three cases, tougher regulation – in some cases even to the point of shutting down the products and markets concerned – arrived after long periods of observation and deliberation by the state.

This article explains the problem of adjustment to the challenges of globalization in terms of the logic underpinning four distinct policy constraints, or trilemmas, and their interrelationship, and in particular the disturbances that arise from capital flows. The analysis of a policy trilemma was developed first as a diagnosis of exchange rate problems (the incompatibility of free capital flows with monetary policy autonomy and a fixed exchange rate regime); but the approach can be extended. The second trilemma we describe is the incompatibility between financial stability, capital mobility and national policy choice over exchange rates. The third example extends the analysis to politics, and looks at the strains in reconciling democratic politics with monetary autonomy and capital movements. Finally, we examine the security aspect and look at the interactions of democracy with capital flows and international order. The trilemmas, in short, depict the way that domestic monetary, financial, economic and political systems are interconnected with the international order, or the impossible policy choices at the heart of globalization. Frequently, the trilemmas conjure up countervailing anti-globalization tendencies and trends.

This article studies the financial market integration in the 1670s by examining the effectiveness of triangular exchange arbitrage. The results suggest that international credit markets based on bills of exchange in northwestern Europe were well integrated and responded to exchange-rate differences quickly. The speed of adjustment, ranging between one and three weeks, accorded with the speed of communication, but the transaction cost associated with exchange arbitrage was much lower than that of shipping bullion. Although warfare had a disruptive effect on exchange arbitrage by increasing transaction cost, markets were resilient in remaining efficient.

Following the pioneering work of Irving Fisher, this article assesses the uncovered interest-parity (UIP) condition by comparing Indian interest and exchange rates during the 1869 to 1906 period. The Indian case provides a good example of the UIP condition, since Indian rupee and sterling bonds were simultaneously traded in the London financial market and subject to negligible default risks. Large deviations from the UIP condition arose when India suffered from pervasive levels of uncertainty about the future of its silver-based currency system. Otherwise, a relatively close correlation arises between sterling-to-rupee interest-rate differences and exchange-rate changes.

In this article, using new estimates of the size of the UK's capital market, we examine financial development and investor protection laws in Britain c.1900 to test the influential law and finance hypothesis. Our evidence suggests that there was not a close correlation between financial development and investor protection laws c.1900 and that the size of the UK's share market is a puzzle given the paucity of statutory investor protection. To illustrate that Britain was not unique in its approach to investor protection in this era, we examine investor protection laws across legal families c.1900.

This article explores the global cycle hypothesis by testing whether the US stock market serves as an explanatory variable for the evolution of expansions and contractions in the UK stock market from 1922 until 2016. Alternatively, it tests an index that groups the stock markets of advanced economies to identify whether this driving force is international. Second, regarding co-movement with the US, the article explores whether its time-varying nature is contingent on the domestic and international economic policy regimes. I find evidence that there is a strong and contemporaneous co-movement between the US and UK stock markets. Additionally, through a VAR model, I identify that the movements in the UK stock market cause, in the Granger sense, changes in the index for advanced economies up to two years later. Furthermore, in the short-run co-movement between the US and UK stock markets is contingent on the macroeconomic trilemma while, in the long run, both domestic and international policy regimes affect the relationship. A final contribution is the design of a new methodology for describing the evolution of financial time series as risk-adjusted above or below average returns to different time horizons: the Local Bull Bear Indicators (LBBIs).

Before the Panic of 1907 the large New York City banks were able to maintain the call loan market's liquidity during panics, but the rise in outside lending by trust companies and interior banks in the decade leading up the panic weakened the influence of the large banks. Creating a reliable source of liquidity and reserves external to the financial market like a central bank became obvious after the panic. In the call loan market, like the REPO market in 2008, lack of information on the identity of lenders and volume of the market hindered attempts to stop panic-related depositor withdrawals. Our new estimates of who was participating in the call loan market reveal that it did not contract after 1907; while the trust companies became less important, the New York national banks and outside lenders more than made up the difference.

Recent literature has clearly charted the growth of pawn credit in nineteenth-century developing countries in Europe. Such expansion has frequently been associated with governments’ concerns to prevent malpractice and promote the establishment of public agencies that mirrored the Italian Monti di pietà. Precisely at the time modernizing European societies adopted the model of Italian public pawn banks, Monti were being dismissed as a relic of a bygone age in their home country. Assembling and comparing data from an 1896 national survey, we conclude that, contrary to traditional assumptions, Italian pawn banks were not obsolete or out of place in the European context of nineteenth-century pawn credit. However, ideology and hostile legislation did hamper the access to credit of those most in need, and the choice hardly assisted the modernizing spurt of Italian society.

Before banks rose to dominate credit markets, ordinary people raised credit themselves or through alternative intermediaries. However, obtaining a comprehensive overview of the size and functioning of the non-bank segments within the credit market has been a great challenge for historians. Notarial deeds are widely available, but typically shed light on the borrowing of relatively well-to-do members of society. Probate inventories and insolvency records do provide insight into the modest loans of ordinary people, but only haphazardly and not for the overall stock of loans. This article exploits an exogenous shock, the Discipline Act introduced in the Netherlands in 1856, which forced lenders to record all unredeemed loans they had provided to a particular group of borrowers: seafarers. The c.14,000 loans that were recorded, in combination with several additional sources, provide a unique insight into the overall size, composition and functioning of a particular segment of the non-bank credit market.

The Exchequer bills were a key component in Britain's financial revolution of the 1690s. Using a range of archival sources not examined in previous work, this article argues that closer study of how these bills were given credit and circulation between 1696 and 1698 can offer a more nuanced reading of the mechanisms which helped to create credible commitment in this period. Though proper institutional design did help to give the bills credit, it was only one part of a wider series of informal measures used by the Treasury to secure subscribers for the fund for circulating the bills and to manage the emission of bills to prevent high discounts. This reflects the fact that credit and confidence in this period were influenced by a wide range of factors, including commercial advantage, patriotism and the example offered by other investors, all of which could be manipulated by the Treasury to promote the credibility of the Exchequer bills. Proper institutional and financial incentives were therefore not the only factors which could create credible commitment in Britain's financial revolution.

This article investigates the determinants of Dutch firms’ dividend policies in the twentieth century. We identify three distinct episodes and document shifts in dividend policies in the 1930s and 1980s, because firm managers cater to the changing preferences of shareholders. The first episode, prior to World War II, was characterised by dividends that were fixed contracts between shareholder and management and the payouts were mechanically determined by earnings. The second epoch of Dutch dividend policy, until the 1980s, was characterised by dividend smoothing. Dividends were still strongly related to earnings, but because of shareholder's preferences for stable dividend income, earnings changes are incorporated in dividends with a lag. Finally, dividend policy in the most recent episode is inspired by shareholder wealth maximisation, based on agency and signalling motives. In this period, dividends have become largely decoupled from earnings.

This article explores the world of informal financial transactions and informal networks in pre-industrial France. Often considered merely as simple daily transactions made to palliate a lack of cash in circulation and to smooth consumption, the examination of private transactions reveals not only that they served various purposes, including productive investments, but also that they proved to be dynamic. The debts they incurred helped to smooth consumption but also helped to make investments. Some lenders were more prominent than others, although no one really dominated the informal market. This article also compares informal transactions with formal ones through the study of probate inventories and notarial records respectively. It compares these two credit circuits, their similarities and different characteristics, and their various networks features. The debts incurred in the notarial credit market were more substantial but did not serve a different purpose than in the informal market. Here too, the biggest lenders did not monopolise the extension of capital. Perhaps the most striking result lies in the fact that the total volume of exchange between the informal credit market and the notarial credit market (after projection) was similar.

The article deals with Italian inter-war debts against the background of the contentious international issue of war reparations that many Allied nations wanted to link to war debt repayments. Italy, having first achieved an extremely large haircut by restructuring US and UK debts in 1925-6, defaulted in 1934, after the Lausanne conference of 1932 failed to deliver war debt forgiveness. We construct a new series of Italian foreign debt from 1925 to 1934 that is consistent with the unfolding of relevant historical events. Starting in 1926, our values are much lower than the currently available foreign debt series. The reason is that the current series do not take into account the large haircut that Finance Minister Volpi extracted from the London debt accord of 1926. Then, beginning in 1932, the values of our series exceed the currently available series because we date the formal Italian exit of the US war debt to 1934, whereas the current series dates it to 1932, at Lausanne.

This article explores the process of the formalisation of the Swedish financial market, through an analysis of commercial bank lending in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The analysis shows that the incorporation of Swedish business around the turn of the century led to a shift from lending primarily backed by name security to an increased use of mortgage and shares as collateral – after the severe stock market crash in 1920/1 mortgage lending surpassed lending against shares as collateral. We interpret this change as an important part of the formalisation process of the financial system, as it standardised the valuation process and allowed creditors to exit on a secondary market. Our statistical testing points to increased financial wealth and liquidity represented by the broad money supply, plus population growth and urbanisation, as important forces behind this formalisation.

Farley Grubb's recent article in the Financial History Review contains econometric results designed to support his theoretical propositions concerning the paper money of the American colonies. This comment demonstrates that some of his results are spurious and the rest are based on using incorrect testing procedures and incorrect critical values of test statistics.

This article scrutinizes the results of the mission carried out by Edwin Walter Kemmerer in Mexico during 1917. Based on unpublished materials from his private archive, as well as other Mexican archives, this article analyses the process of approval, installation and implementation of the reforms introduced by Kemmerer's mission in Mexico. It is argued that Kemmerer's work as a financial advisor for Venustiano Carranza was not a total failure, as the existing literature on the subject claims. Indeed, on the eve of Great Depression, Mexico exhibited the main institutional features of ‘Kemmererized’ countries: a central bank, the gold standard and a centralized tax system. It is also suggested that the economic knowledge brought into the country by the money doctor moulded the ideological foundation of the new financial and economic elite of revolutionary Mexico.

Ron Michener takes issue with my approach to and analysis of colonial Virginia's paper money. He objects to how I calculate the paper money's asset present value when the paper money is hypothesized to be zero-coupon and interest-bearing bonds. He questions my data on the amount of Virginia's paper money in circulation, and he objects to the econometric treatment I apply to my model of that money's performance. He, however, presents no alternative data constructions, or any alternative explanations for the patterns in the data, nor does he present any alternative hypotheses or do any hypothesis testing to account for the level and movement in the value of Virginia's paper money.