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Perpetual anarchy: From economic security to financial insecurity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 November 2023

S.M. Amadae
S.M. Amadae*
Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
*
Corresponding author: S.M. Amadae, MassachusettsInstitute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02139-4307, USA.Email: [email protected]
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This forum contribution addresses two major themes in de Goede's original essay on ‘Financial security’: (1) the relationship between stable markets and the proverbial ‘security dilemma’; and (2) the development of new decision-technologies to address risk in the post-World War II period. Its argument is that the confluence of these two themes through rational choice theory represents a fundamental re-evaluation of the security dilemma and its relationship to the rule of law governing market relations, ushering in an era of perpetual physical and financial insecurity.

Type
Forum: Conceptualising finance-security relations
Information
Finance and Society , Volume 3 , Issue 2: Finance and security , 2017 , pp. 188 - 196
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BYCreative Common License - NCCreative Common License - ND
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivatives licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits noncommercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is unaltered and is properly cited. The written permission of Cambridge University Press must be obtained for commercial re-use or in order to create a derivative work.
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2017

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