The COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing mandated health protections saw courts turn to communications technology as a means to be able to continue to function. However, courts are unique institutions that exercise judicial power in accordance with the rule of law. Even in a pandemic, courts need to function in a manner consistent with their institutional role and their essential characteristics. This article uses the unique circumstances brought about by the pandemic to consider how courts can embrace technology but maintain the core or essential requirements of a court. This article identifies three essential features of courts—open justice, procedural fairness and impartiality—and examines how this recent adoption of technology has maintained or challenged those essential features. This examination allows for an assessment of how the courts operated during the pandemic and also provides guidance for making design decisions about a technology-enabled future court.

The establishment of the Immigration Assessment Authority (‘IAA’) and the Fast Track Processing Regime for certain asylum seekers has posed new and important questions for Australian administrative law, especially in respect of the place, scope and effect of merits review. This article considers the early and formative jurisprudence of the federal courts in relation to ‘Fast Track decisions’ made by the IAA. It concludes that the Fast Track process represents a novel development in Australian public law: a partial review process which is not sufficient to correct the errors of the decision-maker at first instance but which appeared for a time capable of immunising elements of the decision from appeal or direct judicial review. It is, in its intention and current operation, more than a ‘targeted tinkering’ with the mechanics of merits review and of migration law in Australia. It deserves attention as it commences its journey through superior courts and as the regime settles into the Australian administrative law landscape.

The defence of superior orders is not new. However, within Australia, its statutory codification is lamentably underexplored. The 2018 Amendments to Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) provides a neat catalyst to expand the defence and look at possible manners in which it can be constructed. Utilising a theoretical case study of Australian Defence Force members killing a possible terrorist, ‘this article addresses’ the key elements of the defence—what an order is, when can it be constructed as being manifestly unlawful and what does reasonable and necessary force mean for Australian Defence Force members.

The 2014 judgment in Richardson v Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Ltd (‘Richardson’) had a seismic effect on workplace sexual harassment claims in Australia. Overnight, the ‘general range’ of damages awarded for non-economic loss in such cases increased from between $12 000 and $20 000 to $100 000 and above. The judgment has made Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) litigation considerably more attractive for plaintiffs and resulted in greater judicial recognition of the pain and suffering experienced by sexual harassment survivors. Richardson’s impact has also been felt beyond that immediate context, with the judgment cited in support of higher damages in discrimination cases and employment disputes. However, six years and over 40 judicial citations later, Richardson’s broader significance remains unclear—particularly following the emergence of the #MeToo movement. Drawing on a doctrinal analysis of subsequent case law and qualitative interviews with prominent Australian legal practitioners, this article evaluates Richardson’s legacy and considers how sexual harassment litigation may further evolve to reflect changing societal norms.

This article begins the process of evaluating the adequacy of the procedural and substantive requirements that Australian communications regulators (and hence industry bodies) must satisfy before co-regulatory codes of practice can be registered. It considers if the procedural requirements relating to consumer and public consultation, included in the statutory frameworks that authorise and govern co-regulation in the media, online and telecommunications sectors, ensure co-regulatory rule-making is sufficiently responsive to the interests of consumers and citizens. Drawing on publicly available information about seven industry bodies that have drafted codes of practice and round table discussions with industry, consumers and regulators, the article highlights that the current engagement practices of industry bodies often fall short of the ‘democratic credentials’ of responsiveness. It suggests that the code registration criteria relating to consumer and public consultation must be overhauled if these weaknesses are to be rectified.

In Australia, a technocratic minimalist approach to constitutional interpretation leaves little space for what has recently been described as a ‘democratic’ or ‘social’ ‘constitutional imaginary’. The ‘big picture’ of what a constitution is, and why it matters, is systematically reduced to a ‘strict and complete legalism’ that shows little interest in the social and cultural functions of a constitution in the modern world. The ‘dual citizenship’ cases (2017–18), concerning s 44 of the Australian Constitution, provide an exceptional case study. The High Court of Australia’s narrow positivism shielded it from criticism, but at a high cost to Australia’s democratic and social fabric. This article argues that, at a time when the rule of law and the public sphere is under threat as never before, we can and should expect more of our peak legal institutions. A constitutional court without a broader commitment to constitutionalism imperils the legitimacy of the whole constitutional order and of the public sphere.